U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #90, 98-07-23
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
895
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Thursday, July 23, 1998
Briefer: James P. Rubin
STATEMENTS
1 Execution of Baha'i in Iran
1 Secretary's Meeting with Bosnian Croat Member of Joint
Presidency
IRAN
2-3,5 Missile Test: Test Launch of Medium-Range Ballistic Missile
(Shahab-3) / Fully Operational Range Capabilities &
Targets / Development Phase / Secretary's Speech re US
Concerns About Weapons Programs & Policies
3 Recent Positive Steps by Iran
4 Effect of Test on Peace Process / Israeli Reaction
2,4-6 Technology Contributions by North Korea & Russia / Vice
Pres Gore's Agenda Item
10 DAS Welsh Mtg with Kurdish Group
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
6-10,14-15 US Involvement & Contacts/ Importance of Direct Contacts /
Request for Amb Ross Travel / Secretary's Mtg Today with
Palestinian Authority Officials / Secretary's Comments on
Future of Talks / US Judgment on Proceeding /
Netanyahu-Arafat Mtg
TERRORISM
10 Iraqi Support for PKK
CAMBODIA
10-11 July 26 Elections / Status of US Sanctions
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
11-12 US Position on Treaty / Correcting Flaws in Treaty
CHINA
12 Military Withdrawal from Commercial Activities
URUGUAY
12-13 Visit of President Sanguinetti / Women in Democracy
Conference
BELARUS
13 Visa Ban for Violation of Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations
TERRORISM / LIBYA
13-14 US Explores Possible Third Country Venue for Trial of PanAm
#103 Suspects /Communication from Libyan Govt
JAPAN
14 Rating of Financial Situation
CROATIA
14 Refugee Returns and Resettlement
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #90
THURSDAY, JULY 23, 1998, 1:00 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing; today
being Thursday. Let me start with a statement that we have with regard to
the summary execution of Baha'i in Iran.
On July 21, Iranian authorities executed by hanging an Iranian Ba'hai, Mr.
Rowhani, who had been charged with converting a Muslim to the Baha'i faith.
There is no evidence that Mr. Rowhani was accorded due process of
law.
The United States strongly condemns the execution of Mr. Rowhani for the
exercise of his freedom of conscience. We call on the government of Iran to
protect the lives of the 15 other imprisoned Baha'is, seven of whom are
sentenced to death on charges of apostasy and so-called Zionist Baha'i
activities. We understand that three of the condemned Baha'is are
threatened with imminent execution and urge the Iranian authorities not to
carry out the death sentence.
Since the Islamic republic came to power, more than 200 Baha'is have been
executed because of their religious beliefs. Mr. Rowhani is the first
Baha'i to be executed in Iran since 1992. We have repeatedly urged the
government of Iran to ease restrictions on the practice of religion, and to
recognize and uphold the fundamental human right to freedom of conscience
and belief. We have also called for the release of all those serving
sentences for the peaceful expression of their religious or political
beliefs; we do so again today.
The President and Secretary Albright have made it clear that the issue of
freedom of conscience and belief is a central component of our human rights
policy in Iran and around the world. Our concerns about restrictions on the
practice of religion will play an important role in any future dialogue
with the government of Iran.
One more statement, on the subject of Bosnia. Secretary Albright will meet
with President Zubak, the Bosnian Croat member of the joint presidency,
this afternoon at 2:15 p.m. They will discuss a range of issues, including
the upcoming elections and progress in implementing the Dayton accords in
Bosnia.
We are encouraged by the increasing political pluralism in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and welcome the pro-Dayton orientation of President Zubak's
new party. There will be some press arrangements that we can provide after
the briefing.
With those two statements, let me turn to George Getta of the Associated
Press.
QUESTION: A two-part question - what is your assessment of the significance
of the missile test by the Iranians, in light of the Secretary's speech
last month or so? The second part of that, we understand that the missile
was detonated somewhere between 70 to 100 seconds after launch, but there's
some uncertainty as to whether it was deliberate or accidental. a) have you
heard that; and b) do you have an assessment of it?
MR. RUBIN: Let me tell you what I can say on this subject. Obviously,
there are intelligence issues that make it difficult to be as specific as I
know some of you may like. But I can say that the United States did detect
yesterday the test launch of a No Dong type medium-range ballistic missile.
The North Korean No Dong medium-range ballistic missile has a range in
excess of 1,000 kilometers. The Iranian name for this missile is the Shahab-
3.
This test is significant because it shows that Iran's aggressive effort to
develop missiles more capable than its existing shorter-range Scud missiles
is making progress. Additional time and flight tests normally are required
to bring a missile into series production or so-called "operational
status." Therefore, it would be premature to say this test suggests that
Iran has an operational medium-range missile capability. However - and
fairly obviously, once the Shahab-3 is made operational, Iran will have the
ability to strike more distant targets, including Israel, portions
of Russia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
This missile, I'm advised, is a No Dong type medium-range missile,
indicating that it was largely derived from North Korean technology. This
is also consistent with the fact that just as North Korea itself developed
the No Dong, based on Scud technology, Iran for many years has been working
with North Korea to put in place an indigenous Scud production capability.
That is what I can say about the significance of this and the status of the
program as far as I can. With respect to whether it exploded and what the
significance of that is, I am not in a position to comment.
QUESTION: Is it the first such test?
MR. RUBIN: I don't know the answer to that. But clearly, this system is
in a development phase, and during the development phase the missile is
often tested. That is not a surprise; and therefore, one couldn't rule out
additional tests. But it is not in the operational phase.
QUESTION: Given the test yesterday and --
MR. RUBIN: Oh, I didn't answer George's first question, and then I'll
come over to you.
With respect to the Secretary's speech and the significance of this test,
let me remind you that the Secretary made very clear in her speech that one
of the key issues that we have profound concerns about is Iran's pursuit of
programs in this area, including ballistic missile capabilities and weapons
of mass destruction capabilities. That is one of our prime concerns with
respect to Iran. It is one of the reasons why we think we need to do
all we can to retard and deter other countries from providing assistance
to this program. It is one of the basis for many aspects of our policy.
But it doesn't mean that we don't want to have an opportunity to express
these concerns directly; and it doesn't mean that we don't see the election
of President Khatemi and the steps that he's taken as significant enough to
say what the Secretary said about what the future might hold.
The question is, will Iran pursue policies that don't threaten the
interests of its neighbors and the world. We think one of the ways in which
we can try to achieve that objective, in addition to retarding and
deterring the assistance to Iran from other countries is to talk to the
Iranians and express our concerns directly to them, at which time they
would be in a position to express their concerns as well.
So Secretary Albright went into the speech on Iran with her eyes wide open
about the problems in our relationship with Iran. It is precisely because
of those problems that she identified what is the phenomenon in Iran
politically, and what our road map might look like in the future if they
are prepared to deal with the concerns that we have - especially with
respect to ballistic missiles.
QUESTION: Does the test yesterday and the execution as well tell the
Administration anything about what's going on between President Khatemi and
the religious leaders who rule the country?
MR. RUBIN: It's not our practice to try to divine exactly what goes on
between different groupings of interest groups and views that are obviously
in existence in Iran. What we can do is identify phenomenon that we
consider real, and that was the democratic basis of the election of
President Khatemi. We can identify things that he said that have significance.
We can identify things that Iran has done in the area of drugs, refugees,
Afghanistan, statements about terrorism. And now we can identify, as we
have always been, things that they've done that are bad news; and clearly,
this kind of a test is bad news.
So what we are focused on is the policies and practices of the government
as well as the significant trend that was demonstrated by his election and
things he's said and done since then.
QUESTION: One just follow-up on that. Does the Administration have any
reason to think that there may be additional missile tests?
MR. RUBIN: I think in response to George's question I indicated - or in
response to your question - that given that this is a missile in the
development stage, that it would be imprudent to rule out the possibility
of additional tests.
QUESTION: Could you talk a little bit about whether or not you see this
test at this moment in the Middle East peace process when things seem to be
stalemated to say the least, whether this would --
MR. RUBIN: Although that depends on which newspaper you read, obviously.
QUESTION: You can comment on that, too.
QUESTION: Hopefully you'll talk about that as well. But since you're
talking about Iran, I mean, do you see this as contributing to the jitters
in the region? And in short term and long term, what affect does this have
on the balance of power in the region? Maybe it has no affect at the moment,
but in the long term, how significant is this?
MR. RUBIN: Well, as I indicated, once the missile, the Shahab-3, is made
operational, Iran will have the ability to strike more distant targets,
including Israel, portions of Russia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia; and at that
point, would therefore have an impact and a significance strategically. But
at this point, this is a missile test in a development stage. There are
many such tests that occur around the world. Our job and our effort and our
objective is to try to work with the various countries around the
world to try to retard and deter the acquisition of additional technology
or capability that can add to what is obviously an indigenous capability
that they now have.
QUESTION: Are you concerned that Israel might take a preemptive strike on
this system? And have you talked with the Israelis about --
MR. RUBIN: Well, we're in regular touch with the Israelis. I do believe
we've talked to them about the significance of this test, and we've had
such discussions. But I'd rather keep those discussions private.
QUESTION: Follow-up, Jamie - you mentioned that this missile was based on
North Korean technology. Do you all believe also that any of the transfers
of technology from Russia could have aided in the test of this particular
missile; or do you think that's more in helping in different areas?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say in general, we have been extremely concerned for
some time about Iran's aggressive efforts to obtain missile technology from
Russian firms. Some of those acquisition efforts have been successful; and
therefore, one can't rule out that some technology contributed to this. But
it is our understanding that this was largely derived from North Korean
technology, and that is a key point.
We have been pursuing an intensive, high-level effort to impede Iranian
efforts to obtain missile technology from Russian firms. We have produced
real progress in this effort. Over the past year, the government in Russia
has enacted sweeping new export controls, which is the basis by which you
can change policies and practices and have a substantive impact on a
subject like non-proliferation. They have shut down some activities, made
arrests and announced last week that they are investigating nine Russian
entities for cooperating with Iran.
So we have concerns in this area; we've been working very hard on those
concerns. I can't rule out what you suggested, but the basic view is we
regard this missile as based on and largely derived from North Korean
technology.
QUESTION: I'd like to follow up Carol's question. Some months ago the
Iranian resistance here in Washington developed some information based on
their sources in Iran that the Iranian Government had one Shahab already
operational. Could it not be very possibly that Iran now has the capability
of reaching Israel with a medium-range rocket that's too fast for missile
defenses that are not yet developed for this kind of medium-range
rocket? Is it not possible that Israel is under that threat?
MR. RUBIN: I think I've made very clear what our view is, and that our
view is there is not now an operational capability; that this program is in
a development stage. You are quoting a particular source; you're welcome to
continue to quote that source. If you're asking for our view - the
government's view - I told you the government's view is that this is a
missile in research and development, and it has not reached its operational
phase. If it did, I've also told you our view that it would be possible
for it to reach Israel.
QUESTION: But could it not have just a small number or even one missile
ready to use against Israel; isn't that possible?
MR. RUBIN: I think I'm doing the best I can with your question. Your
question is, what do we think of this missile. I've given you our judgment
that I've been provided as to our judgment on a highly technical, very
difficult judgment that we make with thousands and thousands of people
working on this problem.
QUESTION: Not operational, that's the judgment?
MR. RUBIN: That's the word that I used, yes.
QUESTION: I know you're not the Vice President's spokesman, but would you
expect this issue to come up during his meetings in Russia in the coming
days?
MR. RUBIN: I would be surprised if, in one form or another, the Vice
President - as the President has and the Secretary has - didn't have
discussions about the issue of preventing and deterring and retarding
assistance by certain Russian entities to Iran.
QUESTION: Natan Sharansky was here on Monday, did he raise any of these
same concerns - possible presage the preparations for the test?
MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't be able to get into details of Mr. Sharansky's
discussions with us in any detail. I can say that we weren't surprised by
this test, given the program that we know is in existence. Mr. Sharansky
and US officials obviously did talk about our joint effort to try to deter
and retard assistance to Iran's program, precisely because we share a view
about the dangers inherent of such a program.
QUESTION: Can we move to the Middle East peace process?
QUESTION: Speaking of North Korea's missile technology, what is your
understanding of the cooperation? Do you think Iranians used North Korean
technology - (inaudible) - missile program; or Iranians used North Korea's
missile body like No Dong missile body?
MR. RUBIN: Iran for many years has been working with North Korea to put
in place an indigenous Scud production capability. That is something I
indicated earlier, and that is the kind of cooperation between Iran and
North Korea that we're so concerned about and we are working to deter and
retard.
QUESTION: As you noted, there are different reports coming --
MR. RUBIN: There sure are.
QUESTION: -- from the region. What is your reading? Are they close to a
breakthrough or a breakdown or something in between?
MR. RUBIN: In terms of the state of play, let me say this. The Administration
continues to work with both parties and be in intensive consultation with
both parties. We have made clear that we are urging them to continue
working together. We're obviously trying to help them, in our discussions,
to find creative and constructive approaches that can resolve these
problems.
Let me say this clearly - we have not closed the gaps; and that is the
state of play. But we believe that they need to continue to engage with
each other.
QUESTION: Well, the Defense Minister of Israel specifically asked that
the US Government send Dennis Ross back. Two questions - one, are you going
to respond to that; and two, is he in extensive contacts with them,
telephonically?
MR. RUBIN: The Administration as a whole, including Ambassador Ross and
the Secretary and others, have been in contact with different officials
either by phone or in person. Secretary Albright will have a meeting, this
afternoon, as you know, with Abu Ala-a, the head of the Palestinian
Parliamentary Committee. So there is contact.
What I'm telling you is that there is a focus on having the two parties
talk to each other. We believe that this phase of the discussions at this
juncture the negotiating process is such that the best way for each party
to hear out each other's concerns is to talk to each other. But, yes, we
are in touch with them.
With respect to travel plans, we have no current plan for the Secretary to
ask Ambassador Ross to go to the region at this time - precisely because we
want to see them engage with each other. I wouldn't rule it out, as I have
not ruled out such visits in the past.
QUESTION: Do you know what time the Palestinians are due in here?
MR. RUBIN: In the Department?
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. RUBIN: Mid-afternoon.
QUESTION: Can you comment on the suggestion in one report today that - I
don't know how to put it - that Secretary Albright is --
MR. RUBIN: I'll probably respond, no matter how you put it.
QUESTION: Well, fill in the blank - dropped her pressure on Israel,
stepped back, whatever that story was attempting to say.
MR. RUBIN: It is always an interesting phenomenon to read in the
newspapers what appear to be fictional accounts to those who are participants.
This was a classic hype job. The basic lead of the story was incorrect.
I've spoken to Secretary Albright, and she does not believe that - she
doesn't believe nor has she said to anybody that she has "no hope" that the
Israelis will agree to the ideas we've put down. Secondly, she has
not said to anyone in recent months or weeks that on a date certain
that we intended to make public our proposals.
Having said that, the third point that is stated in the story, where
clearly there was a quote from one Palestinian official, does not represent
the views of the Palestinians. I've spoken to Secretary Albright about this,
and she has made clear that it is our understanding and has been our
understanding for many, many days now that the Palestinians regard our
efforts as constructive, and they do not believe we have backed away from
the ideas we put forward. It is my understanding that the Palestinian
Authority has put out a statement to that effect - namely, that they
believe the United States has adhered to its initiative, and they
want us to continue our efforts.
So taking one quote and creating a journalistic hype job has created an
unfortunate impression that is simply not true.
QUESTION: What story are you referring to?
MR. RUBIN: The story in The Washington Post.
QUESTION: Jamie, has the Secretary - you talked about contacts by the US
side - has the Secretary spoken with Prime Minister Netanyahu or Chairman
Arafat in the last week?
MR. RUBIN: In the last what?
QUESTION: Week - since that famous -- conversation --
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of - I think that since that flurry of calls, it
has been our hope that they would engage with each other, and that she has
not spoken to Prime Minister Netanyahu.
QUESTION: What exactly is the purpose of her meeting with the Palestinian
today?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I think it's appropriate for the Secretary to meet with
a delegation of Palestinian officials. She's been heavily involved in this
peace process for a long time and they're here, as I understand it, at the
invitation of Speaker Gingrich. They are reflecting the importance of
greater contact between the parliament of the Palestinian Authority and the
US Congress. It's in the nature of a courtesy call, not a negotiating
session.
QUESTION: I know you don't want to give out any details, but could you
say whether she's feeling optimistic about the way the talks are going? Is
it a generally positive direction, same direction?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say this - the issues that they are now engaged in and
the reason why we urged them to engage with each other are issues
particularly suited for direct negotiation between the parties, direct
contact between the parties precisely because the issues are of a nature
that require the concerns of each side to be better understood by the
others.
We have heard the concerns repeatedly, and we understand them quite well.
We thought if there is going to be a chance to narrow the gaps further --
and we have narrowed the gaps considerably in recent weeks, we have made
substantial progress since May. At that time we took certain steps that
were designed to change the dynamic; and we believe that it did change the
dynamic. In the subsequent weeks, there was considerable progress
towards the objective, which is that the Palestinians have accepted
our ideas in principle, and we have been working with the Israelis
in an effort to get them to say yes as well. We are moving -- or had been
moving very steadily in that direction, and that is what's been going on.
But considering there are concerns in certain areas, we have urged them to
share those concerns with the other party.
It's hard to assess whether we will succeed. We have made clear, if we
cannot achieve a breakthrough we will have to explain why we couldn't; and
we are not at that point yet. We are continuing to make progress. Those who
are seeking the thrill of pressure or the thrill of confrontation will not
be satisfied, because that is not our policy. Our policy isn't to pursue
confrontation and pressure for their own sake; our policy is to try to get
an agreement, because it is only an agreement that can enhance the
security and the livelihood of the people of Israel and the Palestinian
Authority.
Some would like to see a confrontation, and perhaps skew their views for
that reason. That is not our view. If we are unable to make continued
progress and these bilateral discussions are not successful in closing the
gaps, then we have to decide how to proceed. But at this phase -- there are
always different phases when we have to make a judgment as to whether it's
better for us to continue to talk to the parties separately; it's
better for us to try to work the problem, to be as creative as we
can; or is this a moment when the two of them ought to talk to each
other, and then maybe they can make progress.
Let's bear in mind that not only won't we reach an agreement if they can't
talk to each other and share their concerns with each other, we will not be
able to implement it even if we did reach it. So the kind of dialogue that
we've been urging and the engagement we've been urging is a necessary
prerequisite for the peace process to succeed.
QUESTION: I guess I'm just a little confused, because the focus had been
on the meeting last weekend between the two sides - US officials had been
focusing on that meeting as an effort - the point at which the two sides
might be prepared to take decisions. Yet that's come and gone, and now
we're sort of into a continued limbo phase. At what point do you say they
seem to be unable to do it and --
MR. RUBIN: Carole, what I'm trying to explain is that it is our job to
try to reach closure; it is our job to overturn every stone and seek every
creative avenue and go every last mile to try to get an agreement, to get a
breakthrough, because that is what is good for the people on the ground.
That is what the peace process needs to get back on track - not a
confrontation, not a breakdown.
We make our judgments as to whether to continue to work based on whether we
continue to make progress. Unless we've concluded that we are not going to
be able to close the gaps and get a second yes, then we're going to
continue to work at it despite the desire and focus and hype that is
associated with different milestones in the process. Every time there's a
big meeting or a big session, the hype process increases and everyone
thinks this is it: yes or no. But we don't take that position; we take the
position that when there are critical moments in the process, they are
designed to serve a purpose. In May, the purpose was to change the
dynamic; and it succeeded in changing the dynamic and yielding substantial
progress on key elements of the American ideas. And we got much closer to
agreement.
Last week, we decided that the dynamic that needed to be changed was for
the two parties to meet with each other and engage with each other in the
hopes of again making progress. That is what we're doing right now. If we
conclude that these discussions don't yield progress and can't yield
closure, then we will have to act accordingly. But we haven't made that
decision. The pursuit of peace requires the patience of Job, and we are
trying to do that.
QUESTION: Either separate the apples and oranges, or maybe you mean to
lump them together; I'm not sure. Your reference is to those who seek
confrontation and your reference is to hype, including specifically
journalistic hype. Are you talking about the article today or generally
journalists who hype this; or are you talking about the parties themselves
or various aspects of the parties who say one thing or another?
MR. RUBIN: All of that.
QUESTION: One more - I guess my question - and I'm trying to put it in a
way that makes sense. At what point does all this become like kabuki
theater, and at what point do you - I mean, it's in nobody's interest to
declare failure. I mean, it's not in the US interest; it's not in the
Israeli interest; it's not in the Palestinian interest. But at some point,
when it goes on and on and on and this milestone is passed and that
milestone is passed and nothing comes of it, I mean, you sort of -
it's like the emperor has no clothes - you sort of say, there's no
agreement; there's not going to be an agreement.
MR. RUBIN: Right, and what I'm saying to you is that I know that there
are those who are impatient for a conclusion for any of the reasons that
Charlie suggested - journalistic reasons, some of the people in the
countries in Israel or in the Palestinian Authority or some of the people
outside of that -- in the Middle East -- there are those who would prefer
to see a clear end point at which they can say something, write something
or hope that something happens. We may get to that.
As Secretary Albright has made clear, she is determined to ensure that
there is no kabuki theater. Secretary Albright does not intend to in any
way pursue a policy in which the emperor or the empress has no clothes. But
we have to be the judge, because we are the mediators and the facilitators,
as to whether we think we've reached a dead end. Then we decide, do we tack
in a different direction, change the dynamic by doing so and get more
progress, or have we really reached the end of the road?
We certainly understand the impatience; but the pursuit of peace requires
enormous patience and determination, and that's the business that we have
chosen.
QUESTION: Deputy Assistant Secretary David Welch's meeting with the two
Iraq Kurdish groups. Do you have any read-out on this meeting?
MR. RUBIN: We have something in the press office from yesterday that I'd
be happy to provide you.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - one of the US officials which is in the party
with Welch, he said that Iraqi support of the PKK terrorist organizations
is increasing. Do you have any information on this subject?
MR. RUBIN: Again, we'll try to get you that for the record.
QUESTION: With regard to the elections coming up in Cambodia this weekend,
we've heard conflicting reports about how free and fair those are likely to
be. Does the Administration have any particular views on that topic?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. Despite flaws in the election climate, we continue to
believe that Cambodia's elections can be held on July 26, and that a delay
would not improve the climate. It wouldn't necessarily make it a better
election if it was delayed.
The 1993 Cambodian election campaign was beset with violence and intimidation,
yet the outcome was certified internationally as free and fair. So it is
impossible to predict how this election will be judged. We do believe the
election campaign is in full swing with opposition leaders campaigning
vigorously. Those opposition leaders no longer are calling for a boycott,
and they indicated that they would participate fully in the election.
So there are many parties participating, thousands of Cambodian election
observers have pledged not only to stay close to the tallying of votes, but
literally to sleep with the ballot boxes overnight during the counting
process if that was necessary.
We believe that election observers can play a constructive role, and the US
is funding over 200 international observers, as well as over 20,000
Cambodian observers; and we're providing $2.3 million for observation,
training of poll workers and other activities. In short, we're not giving
the elections a clean bill of health in advance; what we're saying is that
we think the climate is about as good as it's likely to be for some time,
and that the Cambodian people deserve the opportunity on balance to
exercise their ballot rights and their democratic rights.
QUESTION: What is the status of the US sanctions against Cambodia; are
there any?
MR. RUBIN: I'm sure there is some set of policy restrictions that are
relevant that I will get you after the briefing.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) - after elections, lifting several sanctions?
MR. RUBIN: Again, we don't know that the election will be free and fair;
so let's wait and see how the election proceeds and then we will know what
responses are appropriate - whether it is to view the new government as
freely elected or not, and if not, what steps are appropriate.
QUESTION: New subject - do you have any news with respect to what you
said the last time as to what form US opposition to the international
criminal court will take, or about any possible reprisals against signatory
countries?
MR. RUBIN: I don't have that much to add, but I know that Secretary
Albright has talked to some of her colleagues about this matter and made
clear our strong views on the subject; and that there was a rush to
judgment in Rome -- a phony deadline created a rush to judgment and created
a treaty with flaws, or a proposal for a treaty with flaws. Therefore, we
believe that the right course is to correct the flaws. We are going to
try to correct the flaws before we conclude that they will not be
corrected, and we need to move into a different mode such as serious
opposition.
In other words, we are continuing to be in diplomatic contact with various
countries in the hopes that they will see the wisdom of correcting the
flaws and avoiding a situation where we would have to seriously oppose the
agreement.
QUESTION: Does the treaty as it was approved allow for correcting flaws
in the first seven years?
MR. RUBIN: I think that any international body can reconstitute itself to
repair flaws. I mean, that's not hard if there's a general view that - I'm
sure that amendments made pursuant to the actual treaty text may have to go
through a certain process. But if the organizers and the principal
participants decided that it was worth trying to correct the flaws, I don't
think there would be a procedural hurtle to doing so. Whether they will is
obviously an open question.
QUESTION: Another subject - Jiang apparently has told the army to stop
its involvement in commercial activities. I was wondering what you thought
of that and its significance.
MR. RUBIN: The order by President Jiang to have the military withdrawal
from commercial activities is consistent with previous steps taken to
professionalize China's military. It is also consistent with China's
overall economic reforms, which include efforts to better separate
commercial and government functions and to stamp out corruption. It is too
early to tell how this latest announcement will be implemented or to assess
its long-term impact. But as I indicated, that is consistent with efforts
in the economic sphere.
QUESTION: Is this something, though, that you think could help China get
a better handle on its transfers of technology and material that trouble
you - missile and things?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we think that process has to go on regardless of this -
that there is no substitute for the political leadership exercising the
strongest possible control over those entities that might be involved in
those kind of transfers. Whether this kind of a split of the military from
its commercial functions will make it better able to exercise such control,
it is impossible to tell at this level of generality.
QUESTION: Was this a surprise to the US or was this signaled to either
the Secretary on her separate trip or the President and his party?
MR. RUBIN: I don't know an account of every meeting and everything that
was said. It's certainly consistent with previous steps to professionalize
the military. But whether at some level or another, this type of step was
previewed, I just don't know.
QUESTION: Today President Clinton and President Sanguinetti Uruguay meet.
Can you comment on any bilateral relations or economic agreements towards
which the US and Uruguay are working?
MR. RUBIN: This obviously is a subject more appropriately directed at the
White House; but to the extent I can describe the purposes, I will do
so.
The visit provides an opportunity for the two presidents to address a broad
bilateral and multinational agenda. As a member of the common market of the
south - MERCASUR - Uruguay is an important partner in the process of
integration and is committed to working with us to implement the Santiago
summit declaration.
The presidents will also discuss our shared commitment to free trade,
environmental protection and international peace-keeping. In particular, I
want to express America's condolences at the loss of a Uruguayan military
observer who was killed on Monday while participating in a peace-keeping
mission in Tajikistan. The presidents, as I understand it, will also
discuss the upcoming Vital Voices of the Americas, the women in democracy
conference to be held in Montevideo October 1 through 3, where the
United States and the American Development Bank are cosponsoring the
conference, which supports the goals of the Summit of the Americas.
QUESTION: The Russian Federation Council last week described the visa ban
against Belarusian officials as "inappropriate and destructive action." Can
you comment on that?
MR. RUBIN: I haven't seen that quote, but I certainly would disagree with
your characterization of it and disagree with that view. We think that a
fundamental tenet of international diplomacy and international law was
violated in the most crude fashion when the inviolability of the ambassador's
residence was rejected. So we could not agree with anyone who doesn't
understand the seriousness, the significance or the importance of that
fundamental tenet and therefore, disagrees with the view that is shared by
many European countries and the United States that firm action was
required.
QUESTION: Jamie, the newspaper, Al-Hayad, had a story today which says
that the two Libyan suspects are prepared to come to The Netherlands for
trial.
MR. RUBIN: I've seen differing accounts here. I've seen that account;
I've also seen an account from the lawyers in Scotland indicating that they
would only do so if there was an international panel of judges.
Let me be very clear on this - we continue to explore the idea with the
British Government and others of moving a Scottish court to The Netherlands
so that the victims can get justice. That is a tricky legal exercise that
we are continuing to work on. But we are not going to negotiate with the
Libyan authorities or their lawyers or anyone else on what's involved here.
The Security Council resolution is clear; and that is that it should be
before a Scottish court. If the Scottish authorities are satisfied that the
Scottish court system and procedures can be replicated in a geographically
different location, then the quality of justice will remain and the
Security Council resolution requirements could, in theory, be implemented.
But anything short of that, such as an idea of international judges, is not
what the Security Council resolution said. This is not a negotiation; this
is a different way of achieving the same precise objective.
QUESTION: News stories aside, have you heard directly in some fashion
from the Libyan Government about this?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of any answer; but again, we haven't even put
the proposal formally forward. We have acknowledged publicly that we are
exploring this possibility in conjunction with the British Government and
others so that we're in a position to decide whether this can meet the test
of a Scottish court de facto in another country.
QUESTION: I have a question to ask about Japan. The credit rating agency
Moody's has just released that it's going to start formal review on Japan,
and that there's a possible downgrading of Japan's rating. How would you
comment on that?
MR. RUBIN: I'd have to see the report; I haven't seen that. We'll try to
get you something after the briefing.
QUESTION: This morning the Croatian Foreign Minister, at the National
Press Club, said that all refugees returning to Croatia have the same
rights, regardless of ethnicity. I wanted to know what your assessment of
that is, and how Croatia is proceeding as far as resettling refugees; is he
correct?
MR. RUBIN: We certainly have had concerns for some time in that area, and
we're obviously pleased about what he said their policy is. But with
respect to the details, I will have to get you one of our refugee experts
to detail the different problems that we're observed or are aware of.
Certainly, in general, I can't say that everything has gone perfectly.
QUESTION: Could we go back to the Middle East for just a second, because
you're working the problem, but the two parties are not technically meeting
together, are they?
MR. RUBIN: It's our understanding that they will continue to engage, and
we continue to urge them to engage.
QUESTION: But at what level?
MR. RUBIN: It's really up to them to make specific statements about how
they're meeting with each other. It's our understanding they continue to
engage, and we are urging them to do so.
QUESTION: Have you, in the past 16 months, suggested that Arafat and
Netanyahu should meet together to bring this thing up to a decision-making
level rather than --
MR. RUBIN: Well, they have met during that period. I believe in not --
QUESTION: But not negotiating.
MR. RUBIN: Well, they've met. We are of the view now that the parties
need to engage, and if we decide that proposing such a meeting is going to
be helpful, we will make such a proposal.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:45 P.M.)
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