U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #113, 97-08-08
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
857
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Friday, August 8, 1997
Briefer: James P. Rubin
PEACE PROCESS
1-2,5 Security Concerns and Dennis Ross' Trip to the Area/
Secretary's Travel
3 Reaction to Secretary's Speech by Israelis and by
Palestinians
3-5 Katyusha Rocket Attack in Southern Lebanon/Violation of
1996 Understanding/Mtg. Of Monitoring Group
NORTH KOREA
6-8 Four Party Preparatory Talks in NY/Points Agreed/Future
Meeting and Agenda Items/US Troop Deployment on Korean
Peninsula
INDIA
8 State Department Travel Warning
TERRORISM
8-9 List of "Terrorist Organizations"/Submission of Report to
Congress
CAMBODIA
9-10 Secretary's Decision to Extend Suspension of US
Assistance/ Embassy Personnel to Return/Desaix Anderson
Meeting with Ung Huot
IMMIGRATION REFORM
10-11 Report on Restructuring of INS
BOSNIA
11-12 Amb. Gelbard/Amb. Holbrooke Mtgs/Agreements on
Multi-ethnic Diplomatic Corps, Telecommunications/No
Agreement on Currency Coupon-Delay of IMF
LOANS
12-14 SFOR Announcement on Actions to Control and Restructure
Specialist Police Forces
14 US Effort to Persuade Pres. Milosevic to Turn Over War
Criminals
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #113
FRIDAY, AUGUST 8, 1997 12:33 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Good afternoon. I see I've got a new mug with my name on it,
so I won't make any mistakes.
Barry, I just thought you also ought to know that I received my master's
and my bachelor's degrees from Cambodia University in New York.
(Laughter)
MR. RUBIN: We have some statements that will be posted after the session -
- on Angola, on UN Cyprus talks, and on a development in India. We also
have a new travel warning on Cambodia.
Let me go straight to your questions. Barry.
QUESTION: Well, it's the Middle East again, I guess. Despite U.S. appeals,
there doesn't seem to be cooperation between the Palestinians and the
Israelis on security. You asked more than you ever asked before. You know,
you asked Arafat to not only arrest people and keep them there, but
dismantle the infrastructure. And the Palestinians, by all reports from
there, are responding to Israel's actions, in other areas, by refusing to
cooperate. So I wondered if that's something Dennis might be able to
unlock. How do you feel about this?
MR. RUBIN: Well, Ambassador Ross is scheduled to leave today and will be
there over the weekend. He will be working very assiduously on this subject,
exclusively focusing on security cooperation. Again, the Secretary laid out
what we think the areas are. That's a very high standard, but it's a
standard that would demonstrate, over time, if it were implemented, 100
percent effort. So that's what we're looking for; we're looking for 100
percent effort. Ambassador Ross is hoping to get that process started.
Based on his report, or if there is some progress in that area, Secretary
Albright has said she is prepared to go by the end of the month.
QUESTION: The other side of the coin, quickly - the not- so-public but
obviously there, U.S. appeals to the Israelis to let up on these economic
strictures; any sign of that about to happen?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we have said that we regard the closure that harms the
Palestinian people themselves as unwise. They have said that they will look
at ways to ease that closure as the Palestinians improve their security
cooperation. So I have no new information that any new steps are going to
be taken to ease the closure.
QUESTION: I meant more reimbursement, that problem.
MR. RUBIN: Well, right, I talked about the closure in --
QUESTION: You're including that?
MR. RUBIN: I talked about the closure in a general sense, as opposed to
just the physical closure.
Yes.
QUESTION: You say Dennis Ross is going to focus exclusively on security
cooperation. But when you bring it up with the Palestinians, they say, well,
we're not going to cooperate as long as we are coming under what they
describe as collective punishment. Is he not going to address their
complaints then?
MR. RUBIN: Well, Ambassador Ross is quite familiar with the Palestinian
concerns, and I'm not saying that it won't come up. What I'm saying is that
his mission is focused --in terms of any new ideas we have or any new
positions that we're going to take with regard to the process -- on
security cooperation. That doesn't mean that he might not review past
American positions. What it does mean is that he sees his goal as laying
the groundwork and making it possible, if some progress is made, for the
Secretary to go at the end of the month.
QUESTION: The chief Palestinian security official said that he and his
force have no intentions of arresting any kind of militants right now or
people suspected of terrorist acts in Palestinian territories, he said,
because they feel as though these arrests might inflame ordinary Palestinian
citizens. And you've talked a lot about raising the cooperation and you
were just talking about this. Is this something that is a good thing
or a bad thing? I mean, the officials are coming out publicly saying that
they're not going to go along with any of the demands Israel has asked
about arresting people and clamping down.
MR. RUBIN: If the Palestinian Authority commits itself to the peace
agreement that they signed, in so doing they will be committing themselves
to fight terrorism. Terrorists are their enemies as much as they're the
enemies of the Israeli people and the Palestinian people. If they don't go
about cooperating in the area of security, if they don't provide 100
percent effort, they will not be doing their share of the bargain that is
implicit is Oslo.
That's the point the Secretary made. That's the point that the President
made. And that's the point we'd like to make today --which is that if they
want to see the peace come to fruition that they worked so hard to get,
that was signed on the lawn of the White House and in many other parts of
the world, it requires hard work. The time of avoiding choices like that is
over.
The enemies of peace are the enemies of the Palestinian Authority, and the
sooner that they realize that the better off they will be and the Israeli
safety will be. That's our view.
QUESTION: Jamie?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Since the Secretary made her speech and laid out the U.S.
position so definitively, how would you evaluate the response from the
Israelis and the Palestinians? Has it been - are you encouraged that they
heard her words and are responding as she hoped?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I can't say we're pleased that in the days since the
speech we have not seen the kind of security cooperation from the
Palestinians that we would have hoped. And as you know, we weren't thrilled
with some of the rhetoric that was used by the Israeli side, either. So in
that sense we're not regarding the reaction as necessarily a good
thing.
But the speech isn't about what the reaction is in a day or two days. The
speech is about laying out America's role in the Middle East; laying out
the principles by which peace can be achieved; and laying out our ideas as
to what is needed in terms of partnership, in terms of not taking
unilateral steps and most important, in terms of fighting terrorism to get
the peace process back on track.
The test of whether the reaction to the speech will be good will come over
time, not in a matter of a day or two.
Yes?
QUESTION: For the second day in a row, Katyushas have fallen in northern
Israel. A synagogue was hit. I believe it was the first Israeli rocket
casualty since Christopher worked out that deal 14 months ago. Do you have
a reaction to that?
MR. RUBIN: We do understand that a Katyusha rocket struck a synagogue in
northern Israel, slightly injuring one person. Let me say that we condemn
such attacks and we're concerned that this could lead to an escalation of
violence in the region. We've seen that over the past few days and we want
that to stop and let's remember why -- first and foremost, because
civilians are the ones who suffer.
We've been in contact with all the parties directly to urge maximum
restraint. What we are hoping is that when this meeting of the monitoring
group resumes this weekend -- and there's a session scheduled -- that the
situation will calm. But we've sent messages to the relevant parties. We've
said that this is no time for escalation; this is no time to see civilians
suffer and that's our view.
QUESTION: You're in contact with Hezbollah?
MR. RUBIN: Yeah, in the back.
QUESTION: Does that include a message to the Syrians? And, if so, at what
level can you tell us -- ambassadorial, embassy, Secretary phone call,
what?
MR. RUBIN: I don't have any specific modality to report to you today, but
I'm reliably told that they are aware of our view and have understood the
need for restraint. I believe it was an oral message, but I'm not certain
of that. Yes?
QUESTION: Are you in contact with Hezbollah?
MR. RUBIN: Obviously we're not in touch with Hezbollah, I meant the
Syrians, the Lebanese and the Israelis.
QUESTION: Does not escalating mean the Israelis should not retaliate?
MR. RUBIN: We are urging maximum restraint, yes.
QUESTION: This was an unusual agreement, as you'll remember. Some of us
who were there remember it quite well. I mean it really was - you had stand-
ins for Hezbollah, but it was an agreement between Hezbollah and Israel.
The Syrians were the ones who were sort of allowed to remain somewhat
detached. But they did guarantee the agreement. So it really would be
relevant to know who the US has now specifically said - and does the attack
violate the agreement?
MR. RUBIN: In the Secretary's view, in the State Department's view, Item
one in the understanding -- let me read it to you, armed groups in Lebanon
will not carry out attacks by Katucha* rockets or by any other kind of
weapon into Israel. So the action that we saw today is a violation of the
agreement.
As far as the question of how we are trying to see the agreement implemented,
there what I would say is that the Lebanese are in contact with the
Hezbollah and we are in contact with the Lebanese.
QUESTION: Can I have a follow-up, please?
Yes?
QUESTION: You said yesterday that the subject is to the monitoring group
to decide, but now you said hitting inside Israel is a violation of the
agreement. Do you consider killing the Lebanese civilians on two occasions
in the last week as a violation of the agreement, also?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I will read you the agreement and there are four parts
to it. Part one, armed groups in Lebanon will not carry out attacks by
Katyusha rockets or by any kind of weapon into Israel. Clearly that
happened. Israel and those cooperating with it will not fire any kind of
weapon at civilians or civilian targets in Lebanon.
QUESTION: So it was a violation of this agreement, then?
MR. RUBIN: That requires you to determine where they were fired at. That
is what they will discuss over the weekend.
Yes?
QUESTION: The Israelis are now expecting more cooperation from the
Palestinian police and more security or more arrests. How do the Israelis
explain to you, now that it's the 8th of August and these Palestinian
policemen have not been paid yet; so are so many people working for the
Palestinian Administration. How can they explain to you through your
contacts with them requesting more security and more arrests and more
effort from these Palestinian police while withholding their salaries?
MR. RUBIN: We have said I think for several days in a row from this
podium that we think the decision to withhold funds was unwise and
counterproductive. I think that to add to that only I would say that if
failure to provide funds makes it harder for people to cooperate, that's a
bad thing. But at the same time, people should want to cooperate because
the terrorists are their enemies, not just Israel's enemies. It's not a
favor to Israel to stop terrorism; it should be a favor to the Palestinian
people, as well.
New subject?
QUESTION: One more on this?
MR. RUBIN: One more question on this subject, yes.
QUESTION: The Secretary said and the President said yesterday and the day
before that she will go only if there's some progress on security
issues.
MR. RUBIN: Correct.
QUESTION: Doesn't this mean that you're giving those who are doing the
bombings veto power on her trip?
MR. RUBIN: Again, the President has said 100 percent effort will not
necessarily lead to 100 percent success. If we have 100 percent effort, she
will go.
Yes?
QUESTION: Another subject.
MR. RUBIN: By the way, she would also go if there were some progress. So
I'm trying to explain the difference between effort and success.
Yes, Carol.
QUESTION: On Korea, how serious are these disagreements that surfaced in
New York this week? And why didn't the parties just stay there until they
could reach some sort of agreement? Or is the problem so great that they
have to have some breathing room?
MR. RUBIN: The people who work on North Korea have developed a strong
stomach and a thick skin. I would liken them to marathon runners. They are
in the game for the long haul, and they know how slow the progress is. The
marathon runners who I've spoken to on the phone in the last day tell me
that they were pleased, that given the pattern of negotiation in that past
that they think they got a lot of work done.
They produced agreement on most of the items we were seeking. There's a
date for a plenary meeting six weeks after the agreement on the details at
the prep meeting, which will occur in September. The venue will be Geneva.
We're grateful to the Swiss Government for the support they offer. We
agreed on delegations being represented by senior officials under the
direction of ministers, foreign ministers; and so those ministers will
participate when they deem it appropriate. We agreed that the U.S. would
chair the first meeting, and that the chairmanship would then rotate by
random drawing to the other three and that would be the pattern. They
also agreed on the languages.
So the people who follow this issue tell me that they consider that
substantial agreement. Now, there was not agreement on the agenda, and
there was a significant difference over whether the agenda should be
general or whether the agenda should be specific. Rather than get bogged
down on that subject, I think there was a feeling that if people went back
to capitals and talked about that a little more, that one might have an
opportunity to make some progress in September when we resume.
In our view, the difference is an important one, because we do not want the
negotiations to be bogged down with issues that are non-starters, like U.S.
withdrawal of troops from the Korean Peninsula or a U.S.-DPRK separate
agreement. At that point, I understand, the negotiators stuck with their
posture that might be referred to a former First Lady - they just said no
over and over again. So it was deemed necessary to take a break - made a
lot of progress - and come back at it in September.
QUESTION: Is the United States unwilling to talk about its troop
deployments on the Korean Peninsula at all? Or are you just - well, let me
leave it at that.
MR. RUBIN: What we want to see is a general agenda item on confidence-
building measures, on replacing the armistice, in the context of which,
subjects can be discussed. But if we get agenda items on issues that we
know are non-starters, then the talks will become bogged down when they
start. Rather than dealing with that then, we dealt with it now.
Steve?
QUESTION: To follow up on that, some of those marathoners this week said
that the North Koreans appeared to come unprepared to make a final decision,
and in fact, they could agree on the easy subjects of the venue and the
time but not on the difficult ones. Thus, it seemed to be a deliberate
delaying tactic, which as you mentioned, you've seen before. At what point
does the patience of the United States wear out?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we were not surprised by the developments in New York.
This is an unprecedented meeting, if it happens. Given the pattern of
negotiations with the North Koreans, the marathoners were not surprised. So
they did not expect to close in one preparatory meeting on all the details
of a negotiation as complex and an issue of this importance and on a
subject so unprecedented. So they're hopeful that in the return it will
be possible to successfully conclude the talks. We think important
goals were achieved, but more work needs to be done.
QUESTION: I have to come back to --
QUESTION: A follow-up, Mr. Rubin - a follow-up, please.
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Thank you. Yes, sir. You say we have a plenary meeting in
Geneva planned. Now, this is not the opening of four-party talks in Geneva;
is that correct?
MR. RUBIN: Let me explain it for you.
QUESTION: Yes, go ahead.
MR. RUBIN: There will be another meeting in September. It's a preparatory
meeting.
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. RUBIN: The decision is, once you've completed all the preparatory
meetings, six weeks later you'll meet in Geneva for your first meeting of
the four-party talks at a plenary session and then break down as appropriate.
Yes, Carol.
QUESTION: I have to go back to the first question, because it's unclear
to me. Are you unwilling to talk about U.S. troop deployment in the context
of these negotiations? Or are you just saying you don't want to specify it
now and you just want to sort of keep it under the general umbrella of
confidence-building, as you go into the talks?
MR. RUBIN: What I'm saying is that if the agenda item gets too specific
on proposals that we deem as a non-starter, you're setting yourself up for
getting bogged down later. If the question is, will we be prepared to
discuss the reasons why we deploy our troops in South Korea, no, we have no
trouble with talking about that in the context of the four-party talks, so
long as it is part of a general agenda item along the lines that I
suggested.
QUESTION: But could you foresee any change in that deployment?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not going to speculate on what would lead us to change our
deployment. We've deployed our troops there for very good reason. It's a
very dangerous place. We see no reason now to speculate on what would
change in an area this dangerous.
QUESTION: Did the Chinese ask the U.S., agree with the North Koreans that
the U.S. should pull out?
MR. RUBIN: You'll have to talk to the Chinese about that.
QUESTION: There was a report.
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: On India - the State Department issued a warning about
Americans in India. Is this due to the 50th anniversary Indian and Pakistan
are celebrating next week?
MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of a specific warning.
QUESTION: The State Department has issued some warning that in New Delhi,
that there may be danger to the Americans in India.
MR. RUBIN: I'll have to check that for you.
QUESTION: Have you seen the reports that the State Department is being
criticized for not submitting to Congress in a timely fashion a list of
terrorist organizations? Do you have a response to this?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, I do. This act requires an enormous amount of work by
lawyers from all the different agencies to get together and provide a
rationale for declaring an organization a terrorist organization. That
rationale has to be able to be subject to judicial review, which means it
has to be declassified. It means it has to have no mistakes, because in
judicial review you can really have the whole thing thrown out for small
mistakes.
So teams and teams of lawyers have been working on this. It's a very labor-
intensive effort. I saw a book for one of the groups - one group, it was
this thick, probably 200 pages. And that all has to be able to be submitted
to the court. So we're working on this. I spoke to the Secretary about it
this morning. She obviously places a very high priority on fighting
terrorism and she's been very frustrated with the process that has forced
the slow pace.
There are some suggestions that we've been rejecting lists from other
agencies. That's flatly untrue. Frankly, some of the other agencies have
had concerns about the way in which the reports will be put out. Let me say
this - this isn't about political correctness, it's about legal correctness.
Some suggestions were made that we didn't want to put them out for some
reason like that.
What I can tell you is that she's sufficiently frustrated that she's going
to look at whether there is a way to get them out before you wait for the
whole package to be completed.
QUESTION: There are also some constitutional questions. Are there any
second thoughts at her level, or even a higher level, about infringing on
first amendment rights?
MR. RUBIN: I have not heard that as the reason that it's taking so
long.
Yes.
QUESTION: New subject?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Cambodia.
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: You said yesterday something curious that I just wanted to
follow up on.
MR. RUBIN: That's going to last a long time. Can we drop it by Monday?
All right. Yes.
QUESTION: You said that the United States would deal with Hun Sen, as
necessary.
MR. RUBIN: Right.
QUESTION: Obviously, you know that King Sihanouk has come out --
MR. RUBIN: I believe I was referring there to Ung Huot, as necessary.
QUESTION: Oh, okay.
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: Well, it seems as though - dealing with Ung Huot as necessary,
pardon me - but that would seem to suggest that if you're dealing with him,
you would be, in turn, dealing with Hun Sen and what he wants in the new
regime in Cambodia. Are we to surmise, then, that the United States would
recognize this new government or new regime in Cambodia on a need basis? So
you would recognize Hun Sen as the leader?
MR. RUBIN: Let me make a few comments on Cambodia. First of all, we don't
recognize governments, we recognize states. Second of all, the Secretary
has decided today to extend indefinitely the suspension on assistance to
Cambodia until progress towards free and fair elections has been made.
During this suspension period, our estimate is roughly two-thirds of the
assistance that had been programmed or planned will be suspended because
that assistance would go, one way or another, to the government of
Cambodia, or be seen as supporting that government.
Although these numbers are a little confusing, for me as well as you, the
way the accounting works can tell you that some number like $20 million in
humanitarian assistance will go forward. But it is not correct that the
total number is $60 million and $40 million is suspended, because it
involves several fiscal years. I'm trying to give you some numbers that can
make you understand it, but please bear with me. If you misuse them, they
will never give them to me again.
(Laughter.)
Two-thirds of our aid is going to be suspended because it goes to the
government. Roughly $20 million is going to be available for humanitarian
assistance, but the total pie is not $60 million.
Thirdly, we have put a new travel warning out for Cambodia because we think
the situation has changed. We are now sending back our embassy employees
and their dependents, because we've decided that Phnom Penh is now safe
enough to permit their return. And Ambassador Quinn has reported that the
city is now as safe as it was before the fighting.
As far as your specific question is concerned, we are going to work with
the government of Cambodia because we care about the people of Cambodia. We
will meet with Hun Sen. We will meet with representatives of the FUNCINPEC
party. In fact, we probably -- our special envoy, Desaix Anderson, will
probably meet with Ung Huot today because Hun Sen is out of action for, I
gather, family or personal reasons. So we're going to meet with the people
we need to meet with to try to get the job done. That doesn't mean
that we recognize the way in which the leader of FUNCINPEC was chosen.
Yes.
QUESTION: Jamie, a bipartisan panel of the U.S. Commission on Immigration
Reform --
MR. RUBIN: Eric Schmidt, welcome to the State Department.
QUESTION: Thank you very much. Welcome to the podium. Has recommended
splitting up the Immigration and Naturalization Service and assigning many
of the duties for benefits to the State Department. I was wondering what
the State Department thinks about that idea?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I hope you're not sorry you came, but we're still
studying that report.
(Laughter.)
Does anyone want to ask me about my conversation with the tag-team
diplomats in Belgrade?
QUESTION: Yes.
QUESTION: We were getting to it.
MR. RUBIN: Oh, you want to know. All right. I did speak to Ambassador
Gelbard and Ambassador Holbrooke about an hour ago, an hour and a half ago.
They are now meeting with President Milosevic. They were quite pleased with
the progress they were able to make in Sarajevo yesterday. They achieved
what they considered significant agreements in three areas.
First and most important was the ambassadors. The agreement was that the
Sintra deadline had said that ambassadors had to be assigned according to a
criteria that would demonstrate the multi-ethnicity of Bosnia. They have
agreed on a formula for the creation of a multi-ethnic Bosnia diplomatic
corps. It's a major accomplishment. The formula calls for 13 Bosniak, 11
Serb and eight Croat ambassadors and an additional ambassador appointed
jointly by the Bosniak and Croat members.
Secondly, they had a telecommunications agreement that was signed today by
Izetbegovic. I guess that would have been yesterday. That allows a multi-
million dollar loan to go to the government of Bosnia and ensures that
there is one country code and three area codes. So that makes clear that
Bosnia is one country.
They did not reach agreement, however, on the question of a currency
coupon. This was blocked by the Serbs. The result of that, unfortunately --
and I hope the Bosnian Serb people understand this -- is that two loans
totaling $50 million were scheduled to be made available if that currency
coupon had been agreed to. Because the Bosnian Serbs refused to do so,
those loans are now not available. They would have been loans to build
roads and loans to build schools in the Serb parts of Bosnia.
So the people of the Republika Srpska are suffering because their leaders
are too stupid to realize that supporting Dayton leads to progress and
economic prosperity and opposing it leads to further isolation.
Our dynamic duo met with Mrs. Plavsic this morning. They reported that the
meeting went extremely well. She seems determined, confident that she will
succeed in her struggle. She believes she has support of the people there.
As a result of our policy, they announced a loan of $9 million for five
municipalities in the Republika Srpska. Those are municipalities that are
supporting Dayton. So they think they accomplished a lot. This mission is,
I guess you could say, a follow-on, in a sense, to the Secretary's trip;
and that, of course, was a follow-on to the President's decision to
intensify our efforts on the Bosnia front.
Now, that doesn't mean we don't have a long, long way to go. In one of the
areas - security - there was also important progress from the mission. SFOR
has announced today that the special police forces of the parties will now
come under the control of the Dayton Annex, which means that the Republika
Srpska police that had been serving the purposes of obstruction and the
purposes of the people in Pale will now be subject to control by SFOR,
pursuant to the agreement. We're hoping that it will make it easier for
compliance with Dayton to go forward.
QUESTION: Jamie?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: What does this mean, specifically?
MR. RUBIN: Well, it means that there was a police force that was not
controlled by the Annex. That police force was probably one of the most
pernicious influences in Bosnia. The people who supported Dayton, people
who are supporting democracy, people who are opposing Karadzic and his
cronies were harassed, intimidated and scared by the presence of those
police forces. Now, under this agreement - and I'd urge you to contact SFOR
and the Pentagon for the specifics - it will be much harder for that police
force to be used for those pernicious purposes.
QUESTION: Will they have to turn over weapons? Will they --
MR. RUBIN: They will be subject to - I believe they will be subject to
all the provisions of the specific annex. Their activities will be
curtailed. But I don't want to make a mistake on the specific requirements,
so I'd urge you to check with the Pentagon. I'll try to get you more
details more myself on the Dayton specific application.
Yes.
QUESTION: Are they going to be replaced by other people? Or will they be -
-
MR. RUBIN: No, what this is about is putting their activities under the
control of SFOR. SFOR now has a better legal authority to control what they
do and don't do. This agreement came about as a result of a meeting between
Chairman Shalikashvili, the new SACEUR - General Wes Clark, and Ambassador
Holbrooke and Ambassador Gelbard.
What is shows is that the military - the American military and, in Wes
Clark's case, the NATO military - are working closely with our diplomats to
try to get civilian-military cooperation to intensify our efforts to
implement Dayton. It's quite an important development.
QUESTION: But do you anticipate that these troops now will be more apt to
arrest Karadzic if they see him?
MR. RUBIN: This is not related to Karadzic; this is related to the police
forces that were used by him to intimidate citizens in Bosnia. So if you
look across the board now, whether it's the issue of conditionality with
Croatia, whether it's the issue of refugee returns, whether it's the issue
of controlling police forces, whether it's the issue of getting the
Bosnians to agree on the elements of a country, we have made progress, and
this is an important element in that.
QUESTION: Why wouldn't it follow that, if these forces who were
protecting Karadzic and doing his bidding in terms of intimidating his
opponents, why wouldn't it follow that, if they are now under SFOR, they
wouldn't receive directions or be injected with some backbone to go after
war criminals?
MR. RUBIN: You know our policy as far as what SFOR will and won't do in
the area of war criminals. This doesn't change that. We think that Radovan
Karadzic belongs in The Hague, and nothing that's happened in recent days
changes that fact. What this development is about is whether police forces
he has influence over will be used for the other additional purposes of
intimidating civilians.
Steve.
QUESTION: I want to follow up on that and maybe ask it a different way.
What mechanism does SFOR have to require these police officers to do what
they say? They might still take orders --
MR. RUBIN: As I understand the agreement - and I want to check this for
you - but the way it was explained to me is that if they fall under the
rubric of the Dayton Annex, SFOR can take any step it deems necessary to
ensure implementation of Dayton. That's the basic authority for SFOR and
American and European forces in the Dayton Accord. So it will enable SFOR
to be more robust in the area of making sure that the special forces of
the Republika Srpska are not used to undermine Dayton.
QUESTION: So is this an agreement that gives SFOR the right to disarm
these police, for example?
MR. RUBIN: Again, I'll try to get you more details on that. I just got it
about an hour before the briefing. I thought it was more important to get
you the fact of, rather than know all the answers, but we can get you
that.
QUESTION: Did the Bosnian Serbs agree to this new arrangement?
MR. RUBIN: This is not about the Bosnian Serbs; this is about how SFOR
will treat the different entities in Bosnia. This is an announcement, and I
refer you to an announcement by SFOR in Sarajevo, that they are now going
to treat this particular unit that was causing such suffering and
intimidation in a way that gives them greater power to influence the unit.
So it's an SFOR decision.
Any more? One more question. Yes.
QUESTION: Jamie, in the meeting with Milosevic today, how specific are
your envoys being on the question of his responsibility to pressure the
Bosnian Serbs to turn over war criminals?
MR. RUBIN: You and I have both spent time with Ambassador Holbrooke, and
we know Ambassador Gelbard pretty well. I think, between the two of them, I
would be stunned if President Milosevic didn't know at the end of the
meeting that it was the firm view of the United States that until he helps
ensure that the war criminals are in The Hague, until he helps ensure that
Karadzic is not stopping the implementation of Dayton, that he will be
isolated and he will be left out of the Europe that is now coming together.
There will be no doubt in his mind. Ambassador Holbrooke and Ambassador
Gelbard have a nice package of carrots and sticks in their quiver, to mix a
metaphor, and they will use those carrots and sticks as they see fit. But
we think they have the tools they need to make an imprint on Milosevic.
QUESTION: Can you take one more? Procedural - I have a procedural
question.
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: If I might, after the briefing yesterday, the custom is to come
up for some background briefing. Are you not going to be giving us
background?
MR. RUBIN: I have an answer for you and this will be the last question.
The answer is that Mr. Foley and Mr. McClenny have agreed on, after my
briefings to be available to talk to you. Thank you.
QUESTION: In the beginning you mentioned something - you have something
on India. What is it?
MR. RUBIN: Well, you'll see that it's an announcement and it will be
posted.
QUESTION: Okay. Thank you.
MR. RUBIN: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:11 P.M.)
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