U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 95/07/27 DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

From: [email protected] (Dimitrios Hristu)

Subject: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 95/07/27 DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

War in Bosnia

--Situation in Enclaves:

--Bihac: NATO Contingency Plans ..........................1,3-4,12-13

--Sarajevo: Blocking of Humanitarian Convoys ..............5-6

--Gorazde: NATO Defense ...................................1,3

--Tuzla ...................................................2,6

--Zepa ....................................................2

Reports of Use of Chemical Weapons by Bosnian Serbs .......2,5

--Dual Key Arrangement ....................................3-8

--Senate Vote on Unilateral Lifting of Sanctions ..........8-10

--Resignation of UN Human Rights Investigator Mazowiecki ..10

--War Crimes Tribunal Indictments .........................11

--Issue of Recognition ....................................13

[...]

MR. BURNS: Good afternoon. Welcome to the State Department briefing. First question to Don.

Q Would you like to give us an update on Bihac?

MR. BURNS: Be glad to. We are monitoring the situation, as you can imagine, very closely. Let me give you a description of what we think is happening there.

The Serb assault on Bihac is extremely serious and threatens to draw Croatia into the war to protect the Bihac enclave.

We hope the conflict can be contained to Bosnia. Croatian military assistance comes at the request of the Bosnian Government to relieve pressure from continued incursions by Croatian Serbs across the border.

The United Nations reports that the joint Serb offensive has overrun 38 square miles in the western enclave of Bihac in the past week, causing 8,000 people from Bihac to have to flee their homes.

The Mayor of Bihac has reported that 58 Bosnians have been killed and l80 wounded in the past few days.

As for the other safe areas, as you know there is continued shelling and fighting in Sarajevo where the Bosnian Health Ministry has reported that two more people were killed yesterday and l3 more wounded.

Gorazde has been fairly quiet. I would note that in response to the now very clear and decisive threat of NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Serb leadership has said that they have no plans to attack the enclave in the near future.

We will see. We are watching that situation in a very close way.

In Tuzla, there are still tens of thousands of displaced people from the fighting in Srebrenica and Zepa and elsewhere. In Srebrenica itself -- despite the pledge of the Bosnian Serbs that they would give access to the Red Cross and others to the people who were detained there -- I don't believe that that has yet happened, and we would call upon the Bosnian Serbs once again to give access to the international community, to pertinent international organizations operating in the area to make sure that they can care for the people who lost their homes in Srebrenica.

Zepa, although there are still pockets of resistance, people still fighting in Zepa, the UNHCR reports that most of the enclave has fallen into Bosnian Serb hands.

There have been convoys carrying people, both civilians and Bosnian Government fighters, out of Zepa, and towards Bosnian Government- controlled territory. I believe several thousand people have left Zepa by that means.

We understand that the Bosnian Serbs have prevented the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UNHCR to monitor the evacuation. The international community is very displeased by this because of what happened in Srebrenica, and we have to be aware that there were gross atrocities and brutalities carried out in Srebrenica.

The intent of the United Nations now is to try to monitor the exodus of these people so that we might be able to play a role in assuring that they are fairly treated as they try to make their way to Bosnian Government-held territory.

So the situation throughout Bosnia is quite critical, as we have gone through the description of what is happening in these enclaves.

Just another note on Zepa: we have seen the press reports of the possible use of chemical gas or chemical weapons by the Bosnian Serbs in the final days of their military assault on Zepa.

We are not in a position to confirm these reports right now, but we are certainly going to urge the United Nations and others to look into them, because we certainly don't want to discredit these reports. We want to look into them. They seem to be reports by a number of people who are doing the fighting inside Zepa.

Q Your fairly grim report on what's going on at all the different areas, does any of this then trigger the new resolve to retaliate, to use NATO power in this?

MR. BURNS: Well, Don, your question just gives me an opportunity to make a larger point before I go and answer your question directly.

We think that since the London meeting last Friday, the West, led by the United States, has taken a number of steps to achieve the objective that we think is fundamental to this conflict, and that is to strengthen UNPROFOR.

The London Conference agreed that the United Nations should be reinforced and that NATO air power should be deployed if necessary to defend Gorazde. What was important about the NATO conference that followed it was that it not only confirmed the decision to deploy NATO air power and confirmed the decision to issue an ultimatum, it instructed NATO to prepare contingency plans for possible operations in the other safe areas, most notably Bihac.

We were also encouraged to see in the statement issued by the United Nations yesterday, by the spokesman for Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, that the United Nations believes that NATO and the United Nations ought to prepare contingency efforts for Bihac, because of the critical nature of the fighting there. And we were very happy to see that Boutros-Ghali decided yesterday to delegate authority for the dual- key arrangements to his military commanders on the ground.

This now allows, having taken these decisions at London and at Brussels, and having seen the results of Boutros-Ghali's deliberations yesterday, this now allows the United States and its allies not only to actively implement the ultimatum delivered to Mr. Mladic on Sunday on Gorazde, but to consider the possibility of further action elsewhere.

Right now I am not aware that we have a specific request for that type of either close air support or air strikes in Bihac, but we are certainly drawing up the plans to undertake those activities should it be necessary.

The process for that would be for the North Atlantic Council to reconvene, and it can do so on a moment's notice, in Brussels and to consider any request that does come in the future.

Q Well, it sounds like you don't have a lot of time in Bihac. That situation is deteriorating fairly rapidly, isn't it?

MR. BURNS: The situation there is quite different than the threat that was posed by what we thought was an imminent Bosnian Serb military offensive in Gorazde.

The situation in Bihac is different, not only because of the difference in terrain but also because of the presence of federation forces, both Bosnian and Croatian, and because of the presence of not only Bosnian Serb elements and Croatian Serb elements, but a renegade rebel Moslem army. The fighting is very confused, and the situation is quite chaotic.

So in military terms, to calculate whether either close air support or air strikes makes sense is somewhat more problematic in Bihac than it has been in Gorazde, or even in Sarajevo.

Q Isn't there some concern within the Administration that if the allies don't act quickly on Bihac, that the Croatian government will get even more involved and thus widen the war?

MR. BURNS: The concern is that the Bosnian Serbs and their Croatian Serb compatriots have on their own decided to widen the war. They have widened it by a very aggressive military campaign against Bihac. They have made that decision. They took the first step.

There is a federation in place between Croatia and Bosnia. The Bosnian Government requested Croatian military support. We certainly would like to see this war contained. No one wants to see the war spill over into Croatia or any other region. But I would just note the fact that the Bosnian Serbs began this fight, and that there is a federation in place. There was a request made, and the Croatians are responding to that.

So, yes, there is a concern about limiting the war. I think that the onus and the responsibility for the fighting has to be placed where it should be properly, and that is on the shoulders of the Serbs and the various Serb factions.

Q I just have a follow-up on that. When the Secretary General delegated his dual-key, does that apply only to Gorazde, or can that also apply to other enclaves like Bihac, or does this all have to go back to the drawing board if there is a different scenario?

MR. BURNS: In reading the statement that was issued from New York yesterday, it is very clear that it pertains to Gorazde, to support the decision taken by the United States and its allies on Gorazde, with both close air support and military air strikes, both being very different military operations.

The statement doesn't say anything about the dual-key pertaining to other possible operations throughout Bosnia.

Q Nick, going back to the possible use of chemical weapons, have you been able to bounce it off your own experts? Do the reports have a ray of truth, according to your people who know something about these weapons?

MR. BURNS: We are doing that now, Jim. And we also want to talk to the United Nations, particularly people who may have access to both Zepa and also the people who just left Zepa, the Bosnian fighters, to question them.

I would just say this: Absent the ability to confirm right now, we have to look at recent history. We have to look at the behavior of the Bosnian Serbs, their brutal behavior, their willingness to deploy any means to cleanse, as they say, ethnically cleanse the area of Muslims. And I certainly wouldn't put it beyond the Bosnian Serbs to deploy such tactics.

While we have not been able to confirm them, we certainly are in no way discrediting these reports and are taking them very, very seriously.

Q There is a new report that the Bosnian Serbs have now once again blocked the humanitarian aid coming into Sarajevo. Is that the sort of thing that would trigger action from the artillery batteries manned by the British and French?

MR. BURNS: Well, we have seen reports of continued Bosnian Serb intransigence in honoring international commitments they have made to allow humanitarian convoys into Sarajevo. They are not honoring them.

The most effective way to respond to that, we think, is the way that the British and the French are currently responding, by trying to widen and open up the Mt. Igman road and possibly to open up other corridors, transportation corridors, into Sarajevo to help relieve the siege.

We have said on a number of occasions that the UNHCR statistics for April, May and June show that Sarajevo and most of the other enclaves are receiving a tenth of their normal expected food and medical deliveries. We simply can't afford to only bring a tenth of these supplies in as we approach a fourth winter of the Bosnian war.

So I think the way to oppose the Bosnian Serbs is to support the British and the French in deploying the rapid reaction force to open up these corridors. And that is what the British and the French have said that they hope to accomplish.

The tactic of containing the Bosnian Serbs in Gorazde is quite different. That is the use of military air power. The tactic of containing them elsewhere, in Bihac, perhaps in Sarajevo, if there are other provocations -- it really must be considered in a case-by-case basis and will be by the North Atlantic Council should those requests come in.

Q But I'm a little confused at your answer to a previous question about the Secretary General's statement.

Is there some confusion over whether he was referring to the dual- key arrangement applying only to Gorazde and not to the other safe areas?

MR. BURNS: I don't think there is confusion. The fundamental decision that had to be made at London and confirmed at Brussels was how should the leading Western countries deploy military power to protect Gorazde and to deter a Bosnian Serb advance. And there were a number of proposals made. The once that was agreed to was the American proposal for air power.

In making that proposal and in making the decision, NATO formally requested that the United Nations' Secretary General, Mr. Boutros-Ghali, relinquish his civilian control over the dual-key and delegate that to U.N. commanders on the ground, for the specific example of Gorazde, both for close air support to protect the U.N. peacekeepers in Gorazde, the British, and also for military air strikes to contain the Bosnian Serbs or to threaten them should they either advance against the city or mass tanks or fighters in an attempt to make an advance upon the city. And both categories would apply. And so the dual-key -- the relinquishment of civilian control certainly pertains to Gorazde, and the statement was very clear about that.

I do not see, myself, anything in the statement that was specific about wider air actions beyond those that would be close to the fighting pertaining to other parts of Bosnia. I think it's a question that needs to be answered perhaps from the United Nations.

But the most pertinent military question in delivering the ultimatum was Gorazde, and that's the one we needed answered now to make the ultimatum effective.

Q Has the United States or NATO sought this clarification as to just what is Boutros-Ghali talking about? Is he talking about only Gorazde, or is he talking about other actions in Bosnia?

MR. BURNS: We're certainly going to continue our conversations with the U.N. We work with them every day, and so that process will continue.

Betsy.

Q So, Nick, it doesn't sound like it's as easy -- if the commanders on the ground call for support in Bihac, it's not as easy as going to NAC and getting an overnight okay or plan of action if you've got to go back to Boutros-Ghali and get that change in the dual-key extended.

MR. BURNS: Our assumption is that if there is a necessity for NATO to become involved in other enclaves along the lines of the plan for Gorazde -- that is, close air support or military airstrikes -- our assumption is that the change in the dual-key would be in place.

I was just trying to be very factual about answering a specific question about what was in the statement yesterday and what was not. But certainly our assumption would be that that would be extended to the other areas.

In responding to any request to deter a threat against Bihac or any place else, we believe that the process would be quite simple and flexible. It would be a NATO process, a decision for NATO countries to take in the North Atlantic Council. We don't believe that we'd have to go back for a U.N. Security Council resolution or for a U.N. Security Council meeting.

So I do think that the statement issued by the Secretary General yesterday was quite clear. It was very promising and very supportive in our effort to have the U.N. and NATO work well together.

Charlie.

Q What about extending the U.N.'s dual-key to the French General and not the British General, as you had talked about and had preferred, we believe. Do you have any comment on the Secretary General --

MR. BURNS: The primary effort here was to convince the United Nations that it really made more tactical military sense to have the decision in the place of military commanders, and that was our primary objective.

A number of American officials said -- and I think we even said publicly -- that perhaps our first desire would be to have the two Smiths be the people with the keys in their hand, but we're very pleased that the decision is made -- that civilians will not be turning the key or preventing the turning of the key, and that it will be military people on the ground.

We have a very good relationship with General Janvier, as do a number of the NATO military people that will be involved in this process.

Tom.

Q Are we ready for another part of the world yet?

MR. BURNS: I think we'll stay on Bosnia and then go -- Judd.

Q I have a question on yesterday's Senate vote. How concerned is the Administration that the message -- if the embargo were to be unilaterally lifted, if the process would be completed -- what the message might be regarding other U.S.-backed sanctions, such as in Iraq?

MR. BURNS: That's an excellent question. (Laughter)

Q What you've talked about before, but I'd like you to talk about again.

MR. BURNS: It's an excellent question because -- I think there are two points to be make here, Judd. One is that I know a number of people that have tried to analyze yesterday's Senate vote by saying, "It really doesn't make a difference; it was only a symbolic gesture, and it's not going to affect the situation on the ground."

That's not the way that this Administration sees that vote. Our allies have told us privately -- not just for public purposes, but privately in the last several days that a unilateral United States elimination of the embargo or a lifting of the embargo would have a profound effect on their ability to keep their forces in the field. We take that very seriously.

We make the calculation that we cannot afford to have the United Nations continue to fail in the field, and that it is our responsibility to work with our allies, because they have made the decision to augment their forces, to strengthen them. And I'd make the argument that having gone to London and made a decision to issue an ultimatum, having then transferred the discussion to Brussels and having had NATO confirm that decision and get ready to implement it, having NATO make contingency plans now for Bihac and other areas is a dramatic strengthening of UNPROFOR in a very difficult situation where UNPROFOR needs help.

We don't think it's right that the United States simply walk out on its NATO allies at a time when they need help, and that is the fundamental way that we view yesterday's Senate resolution.

But to go to the other point, Judd, I think you're absolutely right that the United States as a leading member of the United Nations, a founding member, the host country and a member of the Security Council, cannot treat U.N. resolutions as it wishes. There are U.N. resolutions that we care very deeply about pertaining to Iraq.

We certainly wouldn't want to see one of our partners unilaterally advocate or ignore those resolutions. Our partners want us to take the U.N. arms embargo on Bosnia and on Croatia and on the other countries seriously, and we intend to do that.

So we take the vote yesterday as a very serious vote. We oppose what happened, and we'll do everything we can to make sure that this does not become the law of the land.

Q Can I follow on that, on the first part of your answer. When the allies have told you privately that they -- it would be difficult for them to keep their troops in the field, is that conditioned on the hedges in the bill -- the fact that the bill does not require unilateral lift until a certain number of things happen down the road? Do they understand that distinction, or are they not making --

MR. BURNS: I think the allies understand. They all have very good Embassies in Washington. I think they fully understand what the conditions are here. I think what bothers them and what bothers us is that the United States would be saying in a very loud voice, if this law passes and becomes the law of the land, we're walking out.

The United Nations has failed. The situation is too tough for us. We're going to leave, and we're going to let the parties fight it out. That's not a message that will help our allies keep their troops in the field. It's not going to do any good in supporting what most Americans support, which is justice for the Muslims who are being brutalized by the Bosnian Serbs, because it will widen the war.

Who will be left in Bosnia to defend Gorazde and to defend the other safe areas should they need air power to be defended? Who will be left to care for the now over 60,000 refugees that have been produced by the fighting, just over the last couple of weeks. There are 200,000 people in Bihac. Who's going to care for those people if they're driven out by the Bosnian Serbs?

These are the questions that we have raised with those who voted for this amendment in the United Senate, and it will continue to raise. We understand the moral outrage. We understand the frustration that people feel about what has happened in Bosnia over the last four years. We all share it. We share it as a government, and the President has spoken to this as well as the Secretary. We share it personally.

But the answer is not to walk away, throw up your arms and say, "We can't do anything." The answer is, "Support our allies. Support the United Nations. Do what we can now that we've strengthened the United Nations. Deploy NATO air power, if necessary, to deter, contain and punish the Bosnian Serbs." That's the answer.

Q How do you respond then to the Prime Minister of Bosnia who has a very different view of this than the Administration does?

MR. BURNS: I know the Prime Minister of Bosnia does have a different view. We have a disagreement with him on this. I would note that there are other people in the Bosnian Government who are not making such dramatic public statements, and there are other people who want us to stay and who want -- and I think have applauded the actions of the United States in leading the Western consensus towards a firmer line against the Bosnian Serbs, just in the last week.

We do have a disagreement with him. We have great respect for him. We certainly understand the most difficult position that he is in.

Q Do you have any comment on the resignation of the U.N. human rights investigator, the former Polish Prime Minister?

MR. BURNS: We've seen the statement that Mr. Mazowiecki made this morning. He is someone we certainly have high respect for, given his role in leading Poland towards democracy but also the role that he's played with the United Nations over the last several months. We regret his resignation, because he was playing an important role.

Laura.

Q This is a technical question concerning the War Crimes Tribunal. Now that General Mladic and Mr. Karadzic have been charged, what authority is actually needed to apprehend these two men?

MR. BURNS: They were investigated over a period of several months. They've now been indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal, and the War Crimes Tribunal would like to proceed to trial. To bring them to trial, they must be apprehended. I think the practical effect of the indictment is that both gentlemen ought not to be making reservations for summer vacations outside of their area; that all member governments of the United Nations would have an obligation to seek their detention, should they travel outside of the area in which they now reside. I think that's the practical effect.

What is more complicating, of course, to be realistic about this is how one would apprehend them, should they not leave Pale and its surroundings. That's a much more difficult question. I think that there have been a number of statements from the Tribunal to the effect that these indictments now having been made, we're not quite sure when the trials will begin, because we're not quite sure when these gentlemen will be able to be detained. But that certainly is the objective of the Tribunal, and, as we have noted, the United States fully supports both the creation of the Tribunal and its actions, and we'll continue to support it.

Q Nick, what if you want to hold (inaudible). Can Karadzic go?

MR. BURNS: If we face the prospect in the next couple of months of an international peace conference outside of Bosnia, I think we'd be very pleased indeed, considering the situation as we've just described it this morning on the ground.

They are very, very far from an international peace conference. They've shown no willingness to sit down with anybody to talk about peace. They simply want to talk about war. War favors them. Peace does not favor them.

Betsy.

Q Different question?

MR. BURNS: Still on Bosnia?

Q Same subject.

MR. BURNS: David.

Q Forgive me if you've been asked this, because I was a bit late, but at what point do you expect to be able to extend the same kinds of warnings as you have over Gorazde to Bihac?

MR. BURNS: That's the question of the day. It's a very important question, given the fact that the most intense fighting right now is in Bihac, not in Gorazde, not in Tuzla. The situation is extremely confused, partly because of the terrain, partly because of the fact on both sides you have a number of armies fighting.

On the attacking side, the people responsible for this are Croatian Serbs and Bosnian Serbs and the rebel Muslim army. On the defending side, you have the Bosnian Government, the citizens of Bihac -- 200,000 of them -- and the Croatian army, which has a Federation with Bosnia and which has been requested to intervene by the Bosnian Government.

It's confused, and so it's not an easy situation around which one can plan effective use of air power to deter the attackers, as it clearly is in Gorazde, which is surrounded by the attackers. The battle lines are drawn somewhat haphazardly in this case.

Q Does that mean air power would be of no use in Bihac -- the threat of air power would be of no use?

MR. BURNS: It doesn't necessarily mean that at all, David. It just means that right now there is no consensus, I think, on the part of the defenders or of the NATO countries that have troops on the ground, that that is a decision that we should make right now to deploy air power.

I think, frankly, most people believe that Bihac can be defended and will be defended because of the strength of the Federation between Bosnia and Croatia. Had it not been for that Federation, had the Bosnian Government been left to its own devices to face these marauding armies, I think it would be a very, very different picture, perhaps akin to the one that they faced in Srebrenica several weeks ago. But I think that most analysts would say that the inclusion now of -- the addition of the Croatian military forces will make a difference -- a decisive difference for the Bosnian Government.

Q Do you therefore welcome the inclusion of the Croatian forces?

MR. BURNS: We have said that we do not favor a widening of this war. The Bosnian Serbs, the Croatian Serbs and the Muslim -- the renegade Muslim army have widened the war. The responsibility rests on their shoulders for having done so.

We've also noted that there is a Federation in place; that one member of the Federation, Bosnia, requested the assistance of the other, and the other has come to its rescue. I think that's an adequate description -- an accurate description of the American position.

Q Has any U.S. official make any contact with the President of (inaudible) for the last couple of days concerning the lifting of the embargo of Bosnia?

MR. BURNS: There was a Contact Group meeting yesterday in London. Bob Frasure -- Ambassador Bob Frasure represented the United States. I understand that the European Union negotiator Carl Bildt reported to the Contact Group about the question that you asked -- the status of the negotiations on recognition that do involve the government in Belgrade.

As you know, there's been a lot of back and forth about this. This was originally a negotiation in which the United States Government -- namely, Ambassador Bob Frasure -- played the leading role. In the last couple of weeks, that role has been played by Mr. Bildt.

It's our position that the time is not yet ripe for the conclusion of this agreement. We continue to believe that recognition of Bosnia would be an important development. We also believe, however, that in order for this recognition to have real meaning, additional steps must be taken to stabilize the situation on the ground and seal the border between Bosnia and Serbia.

As we discussed this issue in London last Friday night with our NATO allies and Contact Group member -- allies -- it was very clear that not all of the issues had been resolved. There was an issue of frozen assets that had not been resolved, and we've always talked about mutual recognition between Bosnia and the Government in Belgrade.

It was not at all clear last weekend in London that the Bosnian Government was satisfied and was willing to take the steps to recognize. So it's the position of the United States that we should continue this dialogue; that this would be a very important accomplishment, but it is not yet ripe for accomplishment.

[...]

(The briefing concluded at l:36 p.m.) END