U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING (June 7, 1995)

From: [email protected] (Dimitrios Hristu)

Subject: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING (June 7, 1995)

[...]

SERBIA/BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Amb. Frasure Meetings/Talks with Milosevic ...........8-10

Contact Group Proposal re Sanctions Suspension .......8-9

Milosevic Involvement in Release of UNPROFOR

   Hostages ..........................................8-10

Downed U.S. F-16 Pilot ...............................10

[...]

[...]

Q Is Ambassador Frasure still in Belgrade, and has he met with President Milosevic?

MS. SHELLY: Ambassador Frasure is on his way back. Secretary Christopher instructed Ambassador Frasure to return to Washington today from Belgrade. He did have a meeting with President Milosevic this morning prior to his departure. He is coming back to Washington for consultations on the next steps.

I don't have a lot I can say on his meeting with President Milosevic except simply to say that in those last discussions that he had, he conveyed the U.S. expectation that President Milosevic should distance himself from the actions of the Pale Serbs. He should recognize Bosnia. He should keep his border sealed with the Bosnian Serb territory, and he should continue with his efforts and pressure on Pale to try to get them to accept the Contact Group map and plan.

Q By him being recalled -- by Ambassador Frasure coming back, should we read into this that the talks have stalled or that there seems to be no more room for movement on Mr. Milosevic's side?

MS. SHELLY: I mentioned yesterday that progress had not been made along the kinds that we had hoped for. He had been there and had had several discussions on the Contact Group proposal, but while he was there, he also had taken advantage of the opportunity to try to impress upon Milosevic the need to try to make some progress with Pale Serbs on issues, such as, for example, the U.N. peacekeepers.

But as to the original point of his visit, which was, of course, the Contact Group proposal, there was not progress that certainly we would have liked to have seen on that visit.

I wouldn't overdramatize the ending of his visit there now. I wouldn't characterize it as a rupture. It certainly is our expectation that the discussions will continue at some point, but we certainly hope that he will come to the view that he should accept the Contact Group map and plan. So it certainly is very much there on the table, but it was simply not something that we were able to reach agreement on during the course of this visit.

Q I didn't know that the map was the focus of Mr. Frasure' talks.

MS. SHELLY: It was the Contact Group -- well, the Contact Group -- I'm sorry --

Q I thought the idea was to offer him a deal --

MS. SHELLY: I'm sorry. The Contact Group proposal -- I'm sorry -- that did relate to the sanctions, specifically to the sanctions being suspended --

Q For recognition.

MS. SHELLY: -- in return for Serbian recognition of Bosnia and not being lifted permanently but being selectively suspended. But we would still like him to pressure the Pale Serbs to accept the Contact Group map and plan.

Q Did he help get hostages out, do you think?

MS. SHELLY: He was not negotiating issues related to the U.N. hostages.

Q No, I mean Milosevic -- did Milosevic help get the hostages out?

MS. SHELLY: President Milosevic said that he was deeply engaged in this issue with the Pale Serbs, and that he was trying to bring about the immediate release of the hostages. Certainly, there was some measure of progress in that insofar as a group was released and there do seem to be some indications of movement on a second batch.

But I think the proof is in the pudding on this one. We want to see all of the U.N. peacekeepers who are detained or otherwise being held to be released immediately and unconditionally.

Q Is it your feeling that Frasure's efforts to get Milosevic involved in the hostage issue weakened his case on the recognition of Bosnia, because Milosevic thought he'd done the West a favor by getting some hostages released and therefore could hold out for more on the recognition front?

MS. SHELLY: We never saw any linkage between either of the two issues. Now, what factors might weigh on President Milosevic's thinking, we're not in his head. It's hard to say.

There certainly was speculation out there to that effect, that he somehow felt that these issues had strengthened his hand. We saw no relationship between them and certainly did not accept the view that actions related to trying to seek the immediate and unconditional release of hostages -- that that would somehow change the nature of the offer being made to him by the Contact Group.

Charlie.

Q Just to follow on that, you've made your position clear over a number of days, but did Mr. Milosevic tell Ambassador Frasure that he saw linkage?

MS. SHELLY: I don't know whether he specifically said that to him.

Q Anything on the pilot?

MS. SHELLY: I have nothing on that.

Q Do you want to tell us about the Secretary's expectations, or should we let him do that on the plane or somebody in his behalf? Do you have any --

MS. SHELLY: I think it's more the latter. There are lots of --

Q Because I'm sure he's aiming to make progress in the Arab- Israeli dispute, isn't he?

MS. SHELLY: The Secretary's always aiming to make progress on the Middle East peace process. But I think he will indicate with the traveling party what he hopes to achieve in the context of that visit. We are not providing our usual backgrounder here, since one of the people who is usually involved in that also happens to be in the region. And I'm sure the Secretary will be --

Q I think I know who you mean.

MS. SHELLY: You think you know who I mean?

Q Yes. He's a font of information. Thank you very much.

MS. SHELLY: Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:35 p.m.)

END