Subject: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
Topic: std
From: hristu@arcadia.harvard.edu (Dimitrios Hristu)
 
Subject: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
                        DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

                              I N D E X

                      Monday, April 24, 1995


                                       Briefer:  Nicholas Burns

[...]

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
International Criminal Tribunal--Prosecutor's Request .6
--U.S. Assistance/Commitment to Tribunal ..............7
Possibility of Contact Group Mtg. @ Ministerial Level .8
Secretary Christopher Mtg. w/Ambassador Frasure .......8
Number of Deaths in War ...............................9,12
Status of Sarajevo Airport ............................10
Status of Extension of Ceasefire ......................11-12
--Report of French FM Juppe Threat to W/Draw Troops ...14

[...]



                     U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
                       DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

                                                DPC #57

                 MONDAY, APRIL 24, 1995, 1:13 P.M.
                (ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTE)


     Q     The Tribunal in The Hague today issued various statements  
relating to the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs.  Do you have any  
comment on them, and also what are the implications for the negotiating  
process?

     MR. BURNS:  I do have a comment, a rather long comment, if you'll  
bear with me, but I think it's worth going through.

     We understand the Mr. Richard Goldstone who is the prosecutor of  
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has today  
formally asked the Tribunal to request that the Bosnian Government defer  
to the Tribunal on the investigation of various war crimes, allegations,  
and possible prosecution of those responsible.

     These allegations, as you know, concern the possible involvement of  
the Bosnian Serb leadership in a wide range of alleged war crimes and  
genocide, and alleged crimes by Bosnian Croats against Muslims in  
central Bosnia between September 1992 and June 1993.

     Assuming that the Bosnian authorities comply, this means that they  
would yield to the international investigation and would provide the  
Tribunal with the results of its investigations to date.  The  
prosecutor's request specifically names three Bosnian Serb leaders as  
the focus for the ongoing Tribunal investigations:  Mr. Karadzic, who is  
the head of the Bosnian Serb administration; Mr. Mladic, who is the  
commander of Bosnian Serb armed forces; and Mr. Stanisic, the Bosnian  
Serb official in charge of the Bosnian Serb police force.

     The prosecutor's request focuses on the possible responsibility of  
these persons for a variety of crimes by reason of their positions of  
authority over the forces alleged to have committed these acts.  The  
acts mentioned include alleged genocide, war crimes against the civilian  
population and destruction of cultural and historical monuments, murder,  
rape, mistreatment of civilians, torture and other offenses arising from  
the operation of detention camps, and from attacks on unarmed civilians,  
unlawful shelling and sniping of civilians and unlawful attacks on U.N.  
peacekeeping forces and humanitarian operations.

     The prosecutor's request does not amount to a finding of guilt on  
the part of the persons mentioned, but an indication that the prosecutor  
considers these people to be suspects and wants to assume sole  
responsibility for further investigation and possible future  
prosecutions.

     I don't have a specific comment on the cases or the individuals  
under investigation by the Tribunal -- we talked about this, I think,  
last week -- because this is an ongoing investigation and because the  
locus of this investigation is with the Tribunal.

     However, the United States strongly supports vigorous action by the  
prosecutor and the Tribunal to investigate and prosecute those  
responsible for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity that  
occurred in the former Yugoslavia.  We believe the Tribunal should  
follow wherever the evidence of such crimes leads, regardless of the  
position or ethnic identity of the perpetrators.

     The United States has played a leading role in supporting the  
Tribunal in its work.  We have, among other things, furnished at our  
expense over 20 prosecutors, investigators, and other experts to the  
Tribunal.  We've made a voluntary contribution of $3 million to support  
its operations, in addition to our assessed share of the Tribunal's  
regular budget; and we have provided extensive information to the  
prosecutor.

     Establishing the truth about what happened in Bosnia and Croatia is  
essential, not only to justice but it's essential to peace, and  
responsibility for the atrocities committed does not rest with the Serbs  
or any other people as a group.  It rests with the individuals who  
ordered and committed the crimes.

     Q     Is it possible for Mr. Karadzic, since he's been named, to be  
part of a peace negotiation and will American officials be calling on  
him in Pale or inviting him to meet them elsewhere in the context of the  
Contact Group?

     MR. BURNS:  I think that's an obvious question to ask.  It's also  
getting a little bit ahead of where the Tribunal is.  These people,  
including Mr. Karadzic, are suspects.  They have not yet been found  
guilty by the Tribunal, and it's therefore a preliminary phase.

     Q     Just to follow on this point, the fact that they are suspects  
does not change any U.S. policy with regards to talking to them and  
trying to resolve the political side of the difficulty?

     MR. BURNS:  Not at this point, because they are suspects and they  
have not been found to be guilty of the crimes that they allegedly  
committed.  I would just note, though, that we believe that the  
prosecution of these war crimes is in the long-term interest of  
achieving peace in the region, and we also believe that people  
responsible for such crimes must assume full responsibility for their  
actions regardless of their position or their rank.

     And we have emphasized to the Contact Group, to our friends in the  
Contact Group, that nothing should be done to affect our commitment to  
the Tribunal, and that all parties involved -- international parties --  
should cooperate in its efforts.  In particular, we would call upon the  
Serbs not to interfere with the operations of the Tribunal, and they  
should not expect to fully rejoin the international community until they  
fully comply with the Tribunal's requests.

     Q     Nick, why should the United States continue meeting and  
negotiating with individuals suspected of genocide?

     MR. BURNS:  As I said, these individuals have been declared to be  
suspects, but they have not yet been found guilty by the sole  
international body that is responsible to find them guilty; and that's  
why we supported this Tribunal, because we want to get to the bottom of  
these questions.  So in essence, your question is a somewhat  
hypothetical question.  At this point they are suspects.  We will  
continue whatever diplomatic dealings with have with these people for  
the time being.

     Steve.

     Q     Do you foresee a Contact Group Foreign Ministers' meeting  
before the Moscow Summit?

     MR. BURNS:  There is no decision at this point on whether or not  
the Contact Group will meet at Ministerial level.  It met last week at  
representative level.  The United States believes that for such a  
meeting to take place, it's got to be very well prepared, and there have  
to be some reasons to think that this meeting could produce something  
concrete beyond what the Contact Group representatives have already  
accomplished.

     Right now Ambassador Frasure -- our Contact Group representative --  
is back in Washington.  He's just returned from the region.  After a  
very interesting visit to the Sarajevo airport, he consulted with  
Secretary Christopher this morning.  So at this point we don't really  
have an answer to that question.

     George.

     Q     George Kenny has a piece in the Sunday Times yesterday in  
which he said that the death toll over the past three years in Bosnia  
has been grossly exaggerated, and he believes it's only about a tenth as  
much as is widely believed.  Did you see that article, and do you have  
any evaluation?

     MR. BURNS:  I don't have a specific comment on George Kenny's  
article, no, and I don't have any specific figures to give to you today.   
I think the second part is something that we could look into, George.

     Q     Well, you must have some number.

     MR. BURNS:  I don't have any numbers in my head right now, but we  
can certainly look into it for you.

     Q     I have two questions about the Korean issue.

     MR. BURNS:  Let's stay with Bosnia for a minute, and then I'll be  
glad to go to the Korean issue.

     Q     You said that Serbia should not fully rejoin the  
international community until they cooperate with the Tribunal.  Does  
this have an implication on the sanctions?  Are you saying that  
sanctions will not be lifted until they fully cooperate?

     MR. BURNS:  No.  My statement just referred to the activities of  
the Tribunal.

     Q     But Serbia is under sanctions now -- international sanctions.

     MR. BURNS:  That's right.

     Q     Will the sanctions be lifted if Serbia does not cooperate?  I  
mean, there's been a threat of this outstanding for some time that they  
will not be fully re-integrated until they cooperate fully.

     MR. BURNS:  I think the Serbs understand fully that it's not only  
their activities on this question but the question of recognition of  
other states in the region, including Bosnia.  These are factors that  
will affect whether or not the West is amenable to sanctions relief.

     Patrick.

     Q     It's been suggested that this move by the Tribunal might deal  
a death blow to the already faltering efforts of the Contact Group, and  
that what little cooperation there was from the Serbs will now evaporate  
altogether.  Do you have any comment on that?

     MR. BURNS:  We're going to continue the activities of the Contact  
Group.  We think it's an important forum and is an important objective  
for the international community and for all the parties to this  
conflict, and that is an extension of the current cease-fire.

     However imperfect that cease-fire has been, especially over the  
last couple of weeks -- and it's been highly imperfect over the last  
couple of weeks -- that remains a primary objective of the United States  
in this process.  There is a tremendous amount of fighting going on in  
Bosnia these days.  We would like to avoid the expansion of this  
fighting into a larger war in the region.

     Q     How do they even carry on their negotiations if they can't go  
to Sarajevo?  And I see that Karadzic is now saying that he's going to  
probably close the airport for future visits by the Contact Group.

     MR. BURNS:  That's a very good question, and we're not prepared to  
give in to Bosnian Serb demands to change the procedures at Sarajevo  
airport.  These demands represent an attempt by the Serbs unilaterally  
to redefine the airport's status.  Also their attempts to dictate the  
ground rules for the conduct of legitimate diplomatic business is a  
serious breach of U.N. agreements.

     Specifically on Friday and Saturday, when Ambassador Frasure was in  
Sarajevo airport with Mr. Steiner, his German colleague in the Contact  
Group, the Serbs attempted to put a time limitation on Ambassador  
Frasure's and Mr. Steiner's activities in Sarajevo.  They also insisted  
that in addition to a meeting with the Bosnian Government, Ambassador  
Frasure and Mr. Steiner meet with the Serb forces in the area.

     The United States is not prepared to permit the Serbs to dictate  
the activities of our diplomats.  We understand the United Nations  
intends to stick firmly to all relevant agreements governing the airport  
and especially agreements governing the activities of diplomats in the  
area.  Secretary Christopher has asked Ambassador Albright to raise all  
of these issues with the United Nations in New York.  In the meantime,  
we expect the airport to remain open for the unimpeded delivery of  
humanitarian aid to Sarajevo under the existing U.N. agreements.

     Q     Nick, if I could follow, did Mr. Frasure and Mr. Steiner --  
did they have to leave?  Are they -- where are they now?

     MR. BURNS:  They chose to leave.

     Q     They chose to leave?

     MR. BURNS:  As you remember, they arrived in Sarajevo on Friday,  
fully expecting that they would be permitted to travel into Sarajevo for  
meetings with the Bosnian Government.

     Q     They were Contact Group representatives going to the Bosnians  
to talk about extending the cease-fire?

     MR. BURNS:  Yes.  As you remember, the week before when the Contact  
Group had tried to get into Sarajevo, they could not get into Sarajevo;  
we said at the time that we would like for the first available  
opportunity to have some of our people brief the Bosnian Government on  
the meeting with Mr. Milosevic that had taken place the week prior to  
that.

     That was the reason for Ambassador Frasure's travel.  When he  
arrived at the airport, he was informed that there were going to be  
constraints placed on his activities, the specific ones that I've just  
mentioned.  He was not detained at the airport.  I guess in theory he  
could have gone into Sarajevo but operating under Serb restrictions, and  
he chose and Mr. Steiner chose to leave on Saturday with Mr. Akashi,  
because we were not willing to subject our diplomats -- in this case a  
U.S. and German diplomat -- to unwarranted restrictions on their  
activities.

     Q     What were those unwarranted restrictions?

     MR. BURNS:  I just mentioned them.  I'll do it one more time.  The  
Serbs were insisting that there be a specific time limitation on  
Ambassador Frasure's and Mr. Steiner's activities.  They were also  
insisting that they wanted to have their own meeting with Frasure and  
Steiner in addition to the meeting that had been scheduled with the  
Bosnian Government.  These two conditions were unacceptable to the  
United States, and that's why Ambassador Frasure left Sarajevo on  
Saturday.

     Q     Finally, on this subject then, no officials of the Contact  
Group then have been able to get to talk to the Bosnian Government.  As  
of now the matter of an extended cease-fire has not yet been raised --  
the Milosevic meeting has not been conveyed.  Is that correct?

     MR. BURNS:  We do have American diplomats in Sarajevo, so there has  
been ongoing contact with the Bosnian Government.  But you're correct to  
say the Contact Group representatives have not been able to get in twice  
now.

     Q     This activity at the airport was a breach of agreements with  
the United Nations?  What -- simply that the airport be kept open?

     MR. BURNS:  Yes.  There are existing U.N. resolutions that give  
very specific regulations for what one can and cannot do, both the local  
forces on the ground, but also what rights do international diplomats,  
in this case American and German diplomats and U.N. representatives,  
have in terms of where they can go and who they can see.

     For the first time on Friday and Saturday, the Bosnian Serbs  
attempted to put their own constraints unilaterally on the activities of  
these two diplomats, and we found that was unacceptable.

     Q     Does this call for a military retaliation by NATO as an arm  
of the U.N.?

     MR. BURNS:  It calls certainly for the United Nations to stick  
firmly to the agreements that have already been established.  That is  
why Secretary Christopher has asked Ambassador Albright to have serious  
discussions with the United Nations, to encourage the United Nations to  
adhere to these resolutions and to ask others to adhere to these  
resolutions.

     Q     Nick, do the resolutions call for military action by NATO in  
this case?

     MR. BURNS:  I don't know the answer to that specific question, Sid,  
but I think certainly I can tell you where we're going with this.  What  
we're going to try to do is see if working through the United Nations,  
we can recreate the conditions on the ground in Sarajevo that would  
allow not only United States American diplomats but diplomats from all  
the Contact Group countries to do their job.

     Q     Has the Bosnian Government given us an answer about extending  
the cease-fire or is this --

     MR. BURNS:  The Bosnian Government?

     Q     -- whole rigamarole delaying those negotiations?

     MR. BURNS:  I think you saw late last week some public statements  
from Bosnian Government officials on this.  We obviously would like to  
continue talking to them to encourage the cease-fire which expires, I  
believe, next Sunday.

     Q      If these Ambassadors couldn't go about their business, then  
in what way is the United Nations holding up its regime, its agreements?   
I mean, the diplomats by leaving, haven't they all most confirmed the  
breach of the agreement?

     MR. BURNS:  We left because we were unwilling to operate under Serb  
restrictions.

     Q     But they could have gone into Sarajevo.

     MR. BURNS:  They could have gone into Sarajevo operating under Serb  
restrictions.  Our diplomats would have been giving in to the Serb  
restrictions.

     Q      I don't understand.  If they go into Sarajevo, how is that  
operating under Serb restrictions?  If they go, they stay as long as  
they want to and then they attempt to leave and (inaudible).

     MR. BURNS:  As you know very well, Sarajevo is an exceedingly  
dangerous place and has been so for a long time but especially during  
the last three weeks.  There have been several deaths, including two  
U.N. French peacekeepers.  We obviously want to be able to provide  
adequate safety conditions for our diplomats as they go into Sarajevo.

     We could not assure ourselves that there was adequate safety.  We  
could not assure ourselves -- let me put it in the conditional -- if we  
chose to defy openly the unilateral restrictions that had been put upon  
Ambassador Frasure and Mr. Steiner.  So we weren't willing to go in  
under those two conditions.

     Q     The United States interpreted what the Bosnian Serbs were  
saying as constituting a threat to the lives of American diplomats?

     MR. BURNS:  I don't know if I'd want to be that explicit about it.   
We took the obvious precautions on the issue of safety.  We made the  
right decision in not giving into demands that would violate our freedom  
of action; the freedom of action of our diplomats.

     Q     How do you restore their freedom of action?  I don't  
understand that.

     MR. BURNS:  I think that the action now must be directed to  
discussions in the United Nations, to convince the United Nations to  
stick very firmly to all the relevant agreements.  Also, to ask the  
United Nations to work with the Bosnian Serbs so that the status quo  
that had existed might resume.

     Q     French Minister Alain Juppe has threatened to withdraw all  
the French peacekeepers if the cease-fire is not renewed at some stage  
after the first of May.  Are you concerned about that?  Have you  
conveyed all your concerns to the French Government?

     MR. BURNS:  We've had on-going discussions, daily discussions with  
the French Government on this issue.  France is the largest troop  
contributor to UNPROFOR.  France has a very highly effective troop  
contingent, and we value very much French participation.  We hope very  
much that through the activities of the Contact Group and discussions at  
the U.N. we'll have with the parties on the ground, that it will not be  
necessary for that to take place.

     We believe the continuation of UNPROFOR in Bosnia is in the  
interest of France, the United States, and all parties concerned.

[...]
     (Press briefing concluded at 1:48 p.m.)

(###)







.
