Subject: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING (April 13, 1995)
Topic: std
From: hristu@arcadia.harvard.edu
 
Subject: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING (April 13, 1995)


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                        U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
                          DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

                              I N D E X

                       Thursday, April 13, 1995

                                       Briefer:  Nicholas Burns
                                                 John Holum

[...]

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Report of War Crimes Evidence Against Milosevic .......14-15
Milosevic Response to Contact Group Proposal ..........16
Plan for Contact Group Mtg. w/Bosnian Gov't. ..........16

[...]

TURKEY
Readout on D/S Talbott Trip to Region .................18-19
Report of Turkish Proposal on Nagorno-Karabakh ........22
Upcoming PM Ciller Visit to U.S. ......................23





                       U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
                         DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

                                                    DPC #51

                 THURSDAY, APRIL 13, 1995, 12:52 P.M.
                (ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)


[...]

     Q     Nick, do you have any assessment of the report in The New  
York Times today by the former Serbian intelligence officer of evidence  
that Milosevic was directly involved in war crimes?

     MR. BURNS:  I have a few things to say on that.  This issue of war  
crimes is an issue for consideration by the International Criminal  
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and the Clinton Administration  
believes that people should be held responsible for atrocities, and they  
should be held individually accountable for atrocities regardless of  
their rank.

     You asked about Mr. Milosevic.  I can't speculate on whether or not  
the Tribunal might implicate President Milosevic.  The Tribunal has  
responsibility to investigate war crimes, and it's up to them to make  
that determination.  It's not up to the United States to make that  
determination.

     Q     How do you feel about dealing with someone who directly, I  
mean, in trying to reach peace in that area that is accused of these  
kinds of crimes?

     MR. BURNS:  By "dealing with them," as you put it, by talking to  
them, by in some cases negotiating with them.  We are in no way  
endorsing him or Serbian policies -- Serbian policies now or in the  
past.  We are simply trying to obtain in our current discussions Serbian  
compliance with Security Council resolutions, and we certainly hope to  
achieve Serbia's agreement on the major issues that confront the  
problems in Bosnia -- the cease-fire, the fact that there is no mutual  
recognition of the state in the former Yugoslavia.  But by dealing with  
him, we are by no means endorsing him.

     Q     Nick, has the State Department had a chance to examine these  
documents which are quoted and reprinted in The New York Times?  Do you  
think they are authentic?

     MR. BURNS:  I don't know the specific answer to your question.  I  
don't know what kind of access we have to the documents that have been  
given to the Tribunal.  But that's certainly something that I think I  
can probably get back to you on.

     Q     I don't think the Tribunal and I would imagine the United  
States has been aware of these documents because they were just  
discovered publicly, but they weren't just discovered by the  
international community.  Was the Clinton Administration aware of these  
allegations?  Were they made aware of the allegations in the last few  
months, you know, prior to their big diplomatic push with Mr. Milosevic?

     MR. BURNS:  I don't know if we were aware of the specific documents  
that this newspaper report refers to.  I do know, however, that we have  
turned over to the Tribunal, I think, around 700 accounts -- firsthand  
accounts of atrocities that were committed -- I believe to have been  
committed in Bosnia a number of years ago.

     We also have a Foreign Service Officer who works full time in this  
building responding to requests for information from the Tribunal.  So  
we are in touch with the Tribunal.  We're working with it, and we  
support it.  Whether or not we had knowledge of these documents or saw  
these documents until this week, I don't know.

     Judd.

     Q     Do you think any of the documents that you've turned over to  
the Tribunal implicate Milosevic in any way?

     MR. BURNS:  Not that I'm aware of.

     Q     Can you check on that when you're checking it?

     MR. BURNS:  I think we can probably check on that, but not that I'm  
aware of.

     Q     Nick, does this Administration agree with former Secretary  
Eagleburger that a number of political leaders, including Milosevic and  
Karadzic, should be put on trial?

     MR. BURNS:  As I said at the beginning, Norm, that is a decision  
that the International Tribunal has to make.  We supported the creation  
of the Tribunal.  We were one of the leading forces -- leading countries  
to create the Tribunal.  We support its activities.  We want it to  
succeed.  We have people working with it.  We're turning over  
information to it.  But it's really the judgment of the Tribunal that  
has to, I think, take primary place here.

     Q     During -- to come back to China -- during --

     Q     Can I ask one more, please?

     MR. BURNS:  Let's stay on this subject, and then we'll go to China.

     Q     Without reference to these specific documents, is the State  
Department aware of any trail of evidence -- paper or otherwise -- which  
would link these concentration camps to the leadership of the former  
Yugoslavia in Belgrade?

     MR. BURNS:  Again, I think that our position on that would be we  
supported the creation of this Tribunal to answer such questions -- that  
question and a lot of other questions -- pertaining to the atrocities  
that were committed -- that have been committed throughout the war but  
certainly those that were committed at the beginning of the war three  
and four years ago.  So I think I'd rather leave that answer right  
there.

     I think we want to go to China.

     Q     One more on this.

     MR. BURNS:  One more on this?

     Q     Just a quick one.  Yesterday you talked -- you mentioned the  
fact there was no reason for optimism with the Contact Group and  
Milosevic's rejection of the plan again.  Correct me if I'm wrong, but  
my recollection was that this proposal called for tightening sanctions  
if he didn't accept it.  Is that correct?  Is that what you -- is that  
next step?

     MR. BURNS:  I think yesterday I remember saying that there was no  
reason -- that our representative did not leave with a great deal of  
optimism regarding discussions in Belgrade with Mr. Milosevic.

     As I understand it, having read the account of that meeting, we  
don't have a final answer from Mr. Milosevic on the Contact Group offer.   
It is our assumption that he's not interested in it.  It's our  
assumption that it's not going to go anywhere.  This, of course, is the  
offer of limited sanctions relief in return for the recognition of  
Bosnia.

     But I believe we are waiting for a definitive response from  
Milosevic.

     Q     And, if he does give you a definitive rejection, isn't the  
planned next step to tighten -- to go to tightening sanctions?  Sticks  
rather than carrots.

     MR. BURNS:  I'd just prefer to say I think if that does happen,  
obviously the Contact Group will have to meet and assess the situation.   
I'm sure that will take place, but I don't care to go beyond that at  
this point.

     We had a question on China.

[...]

     Q     On Tuesday you said you didn't have much to report on Talbott  
and Holbrooke's visit to Turkey.  Do you have anything more today?  What  
was accomplished?

     MR. BURNS:  You know that Deputy Secretary Talbott gave a press  
conference in Ankara yesterday, in which he reviewed the accomplishments  
of his visit.  He met with the Prime Minister.  He met with the Foreign  
Minister.  He met with a wide range of leaders, including people in the  
human rights community; other people from the Foreign Ministry.

     The discussion was quite broad.  They talked about the situation in  
Russia.  They talked about the problems in Nagorno-Karabakh, other  
issues pertaining to U.S. and Turkish interests in the Caucasus and  
Central Asia.  They talked about the situation in Bosnia and the Balkans  
in general.

     There was, I know, a good exchange on the problems in Cyprus and  
also a good exchange about bilateral issues.  Obviously, there was also  
a very heavy concentration on the issue of the Turkish incursion into  
northern Iraq, and I think Deputy Secretary Talbott has characterized  
how those discussions went with both the Prime Minister and the Foreign  
Minister.

     Q     Do you have anything to add to --

     MR. BURNS:  Nothing new really.  He received again the assurances  
of the Prime Minister, Mrs. Ciller, and the Foreign Minister that this  
operation would be limited in time and limited in scope.  And that's a  
very important concern of ours, as you know.

     There was also a discussion of the problem of PKK terrorism which  
Turkey has a great concern about, and we share Turkey's concern about  
that problem.

     Q     Do you have anything on "Open Skies" negotiations with  
Europe?

     MR. BURNS:  I'm sorry, I don't, no.  Nothing today.  What are you  
interested in particularly?

     Q     My colleague asked a question yesterday and he was supposed  
to get an answer today.

     MR. BURNS:  I was not asked about "Open Skies" yesterday, I'm  
sorry.  But I'll be glad -- if you have a particular interest, maybe we  
can talk after the briefing.

[...]

     Q     The Turkish Prime Minister, Mrs. Ciller, she was at  
Azerbaijan.  When she met with the Azerbaijan leader, Mr. Aliyev, Mr.  
Aliyev asked to carry some message to the U.S. Government which, one of  
them, is giving some kind of self-determination in the Nagorno-Karabakh  
area to solve the Armenian and Azerbaijani conflict.  How do you look  
for this kind of proposal?

     MR. BURNS:  I'm not aware of a specific proposal that was made.  Of  
course, you're well aware of our position on Nagorno-Karabakh, but I'm  
not aware of any specific Turkish proposal on this.

[...]

     Q     (Inaudible) the Contact Group trying to get into Sarajevo;  
got the plane shot up.  Did they ever get to Sarajevo?  And did the  
Bosnians say, "Yes, we'll extend the cease-fire," or do you know yet?

     MR. BURNS:  As I mentioned yesterday, the Contact Group  
representatives were not able to land in Sarajevo because of a lack of  
assurance from the Serb authorities that their aircraft could land  
safely.

     They went onto Zagreb, had a meeting with President Tudjman, and  
they have all returned to their capitals.  What we hope to do is arrange  
a meeting with the Bosnian Government either in Sarajevo or outside of  
Sarajevo shortly, so that we might directly communicate to them our  
impressions of the discussions with Mr. Milosevic.

     Q     The Croatian (inaudible) agreement that it's going to be  
signed during Mrs. Ciller's visit to Washington next week?

     MR. BURNS:  I'm sorry I don't.  But as we get closer to that, I'll  
be glad to talk more specifically about U.S.-Turkish relations and her  
visit.

[...]


     (Briefing concluded at 1:43)

(###)




