NAA: Collective Security Revisited

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From: Chris Scheurweghs <[email protected]>

AM 296 PC/TO (95) 5 Original: English

COLLECTIVE SECURITY REVISITED

WORKING GROUP ON TRANSATLANTIC AND EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS

Draft Interim Report

Mr. Bruce GEORGE (United Kingdom) Rapporteur*

International Secretariat October 1995

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION 1

I. BUDAPEST 1 A. CSCE Becomes OSCE 1 B. Strengthening 2 C. Nagorno-Karabakh 2 D. Code of Conduct 3 E. Security in the 21st Century 3 F. OSCE First 4 G. Regional Arms Control and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation 5 H. The Mediterranean 5

II. CHECHNYA 6

III. PONDERING INTANGIBLES 8

NOTES AND REFERENCES 12

INTRODUCTION

"We offer our support and solidarity to participating States undergoing transformation to democracy and market economy. We welcome their efforts to become fully integrated into the wider community of States. Making this transition irreversible will ensure the security and prosperity of us all....Encouragement of this sense of wider community remains one of our fundamental goals. We welcome in this connection the rapid adaptation of European and transatlantic institutions and organizations which are increasingly working together to face up to the challenges before us and to provide a solid foundation for peace and prosperity."

CSCE Helsinki Summit Declaration 10 July 1992

1. The preceding quotation might well be understood as the mandate of the new Working Group on European and Transatlantic Organizations, established at the 40th Annual Session in Washington in November 1994. How can the non-exclusionary Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), described at the December 1994 Budapest CSCE Summit as a "security structure" for its participating States, work with "most of the great structures of the postwar period [which] offer a usable foundation for building stability"?1 As with NATO enlargement, the time is ripe to ask the "how" and "why" of OSCE, particularly as the Heads of State or Government agreed in Budapest to launch "a broad and comprehensive discussion on all aspects of security, as appropriate, aimed at devising a concept of security for the twenty-first century".

I. BUDAPEST

2. As earlier reported,2 the results of the Budapest Summit, held on 5 and 6 December 1994, are both future-oriented and directed towards immediate requirements in several ways.

A. CSCE Becomes OSCE

3. First, CSCE became OSCE. Although this "alters neither the character of our CSCE commitments nor the status of the CSCE and its institutions", the new appellation can be variously understood as an effort to strengthen the credibility of the OSCE by way of a regional organization for peaceful settlement of disputes within the meaning of the UN Charter, help galvanize political will to make use of the OSCE experience for preventive diplomacy and conflict management backed up by appropriate resources, and give Russia the sense of having an equal voice in a bona fide European security organization - and perhaps to smooth the way for NATO enlargement along with other possible "sweeteners" such as adapting the CFE Treaty, creating a NATO-Russia standing body for consultation and co-operation or a permanent "Contact Group" for all issues, no foreign forces on the territory of new NATO member States, and so forth. To some this could also signal the eventual creation of a treaty-based international organization, as France and Russia appear to favour, and work will continue on further institutional development. The Committee of Senior Officials (Prague) became the Senior Council, and the Permanent Committee (Vienna) became the Permanent Council. Most OSCE decisions will henceforth be made in the Permanent Council, as has been the trend.

B. Strengthening

4. Second, the role of the Chairman-in-Office (CIO) was strengthened - at UK initiative - so that he or she can now bring "serious cases" of alleged non-compliance in the human dimension field to the attention of the Permanent Council, and it was agreed that human dimension issues will be regularly dealt with by the Permanent Council. The position of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) was enhanced to increase its involvement in the work of the Permanent Council and mission activity, with the ODIHR Director able to propose further action in close consultation with the CIO. Participating States are also encouraged to see to it that the recommendations of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) and OSCE missions are followed up and that these activities are supported with adequate resources.

C. Nagorno-Karabakh

5. Third, the Summit also opened the way for the first OSCE peacekeeping mission -in Nagorno-Karabakh - linked to the first OSCE peace conference, the Minsk Group, which could fuse two vital objectives: to give OSCE a more operational role in conflict prevention and crisis management, and integrate Russia further into the OSCE community of values.

6. Decisions, now pending for over two years, must still be taken on general principles of OSCE peacekeeping and on the role and function of so-called third-party forces, meaning Russia. The Rome Council Meeting stated on 1 December 1993, under the identical rubric left unaddressed in Budapest ("Further Development of the Capabilities of the CSCE in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management", or Chapter III of the adopted text) that "the CSCE could consider...CSCE co-operative arrangements in order, inter alia, to ensure that the role and functions of a third-party military force in a conflict are consistent with CSCE principles and objectives", which would include "respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, consent of the parties, impartiality, multinational character, clear mandate, transparency, integral link to a political process for conflict resolution, plan for orderly withdrawal". Other issues concern what percentage of that mission any one State could contribute (the United States proposed that less than half should be Russian, whereas Azerbaijan proposed no one State provide more than 30 per cent), and the link between peacekeeping and the political process (the Minsk Group or Russian mediation) and between the OSCE activities and the UN, with Russia having insisted upon an "appropriate" Security Council resolution (both Sweden and Turkey entered interpretative statements noting that the decision did not constitute a precedent, with Sweden stating that there was no subordination to the UN).

7. In follow-up activity, the CIO (Hungary) established "a high-level planning group in Vienna to make recommendations on, inter alia, the size and characteristics of the force, command and control, logistics, allocation of units and resources, rules of engagement and arrangements with contributing states". It remains to be seen, nevertheless, how all of this can be reconciled with President Yeltsin's comment over two months after the Summit that "at the moment Russia remains the only force capable of separating warring parties in the former USSR and bringing them to the negotiating table".3

D. Code of Conduct

8. Fourth, a Code of Conduct was also adopted outlining principles in security matters compliance with which can be checked, including democratic control of the armed forces and on the use of armed forces for internal security purposes - an issue which heated up in just a few days after the Summit regarding events in Chechnya. Also of significance is paragraph five - arising from a Polish proposal - which could open the door to a broader discussion of OSCE evolving as a collective security, or even collective defence, not only co-operative security, regime:

"[The Participating States] are determined to act in solidarity if CSCE norms and commitments are violated and to facilitate concerted responses to security challenges that they may face as a result. They will consult promptly, in conformity with their CSCE responsibilities, with a participating State seeking assistance in realizing its individual or collective self- defence. They will consider jointly the nature of the threat and actions that may be required in defence of their common values."

E. Security in the 21st Century

9. Fifth, another dimension to this broader possible future role for OSCE is contained in Chapter VII of the Decisions, based on a Russian proposal. Although the section confirms that every participating State is free to choose, or change (a Polish adaption of the Helsinki Final Act), its security arrangement, including treaties of alliance, the participating States agree "to launch ... a broad and comprehensive discussion on all aspects of security, as appropriate, aimed at devising a concept of security for the twenty-first century".

10. This issue was taken up at the first meeting of the Senior Council in Prague on 30-31 March. Canada cautioned against any "hierarchy of institutions" and suggested that the model should comprise a "web" of interlocking arrangements and multilateral and bilateral agreements beyond traditional security questions. At the same time, the Canadian paper recalled that existing institutions had their limits, and that these institutions "are often simply the manifestation of security achievements, rather than their source". The Russian contribution also spoke of a "synthesis of several processes" including "integration within the European Union and CIS", "NATO transformation", and binding consultations, a new "bloc-free" CFE treaty, regional peacemaking mechanisms and "cross guarantees", whereas the Polish presentation referred to "the proper evolution of existing security institutions" rather than any aiming toward a "single system". Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev suggested on 24 April that the end result could be "a Euro-Atlantic or a Eurasia Treaty or a Charter of Co-operation", but the United States views the exercise as a discussion and not a negotiation, and only later conceded the possibility of a decision document. Canada suggests that a document be signed at the 1996 Lisbon Summit, but at this early stage it is at best unclear what "value added" feature the Model exercise holds beyond what OCSE participating States are already discussing and implementing. In any event, as the WEU Council of Ministers put it on 15 May:

"The discussion on a Security Model can be expected to reaffirm OSCE's central position in the European security architecture, but without any mandate to control other institutions. The OSCE is, inter alia, an important venue for dialogue with those countries that do not wish or are not likely to become full members of the Western security organizations. The OSCE, as a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, should be further developed into a primary instrument of early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management."

F. OSCE First

11. Sixth, a somewhat closer link was also agreed between the UN and the OSCE, with the OSCE now able to submit as an organization a dispute to the United Nations Security Council "in exceptional circumstances" (of course, any participating State can do so under Article 35 of the UN Charter). However, this remains a declaration without reference to a decision whereby Armenia, concerned that peacekeeping could be decided by consensus-minus-one, rejected adoption of Chapter III of the Decisions: "Co-operation between the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the United Nations." In this text, the participating States would have committed themselves to develop the OSCE "as a primary instrument for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security in its area". In "exceptional circumstances" (earlier text did not contain this qualifier), they may jointly decide that a dispute will be referred to the UN Security Council on behalf of the CSCE whenever in their judgement action by the Security Council under Chapter VII may be required; bracketed language would have further made it possible for this decision to be taken "if necessary, notwithstanding the position of the States party to the dispute". The OSCE would then co-operate with the UN in carrying out the measures adopted by the UN Security Council. This text was referred to the Permanent Council, which can adopt any amendments to the Budapest texts, but the prospects are unclear:

"...if the CSCE were to become the instrument of first resort it would have to develop new approaches for solving problems in its own area. One option would be peacekeeping. But if the CSCE (instead of the UN) takes on a peacekeeping role, what role would Russia and the CIS play? The answer is, a much more active one [although Russia did not interpret "CSCE first" as "CSCE only" to the detriment of the CIS]. There were several States, particularly Turkey, who had serious reservations about what this might lead to. But in the end it was the Armenians who withheld the necessary consensus. Ironically their concerns were based in large part on what role Turkey could play in third party peacekeeping operations in its 'near abroad.'"4

G. Regional Arms Control and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation

12. Seventh, also referred to the Permanent Council were a "Declaration on the Situation in the Bihac Area" and a decision on "Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the situation in the region", owing to a Russo-Bosnian dispute. Of potential significance is that the latter contained a request to the Forum for Security Co-operation to establish a working group to prepare for arms control negotiations in the region including limitations, reductions, and confidence- and security-building measures, something which Hungary has been proposing since 1992. This raises the issue of the continued suspension of Serbia-Montenegro, but arms control could still form an essential part of post-conflict reconstruction and reassurance to neighbours.

H. The Mediterranean

13. Eighth, building on the longstanding relationship with the "non-participating Mediterranean States", it was decided as a result of Spanish initiative supported by, inter alia, Austria, Canada, the EU, Hungary, and the United States to establish an "informal, open-ended contact group" within the framework of the Permanent Council to meet periodically to conduct dialogue (the concerned States are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, and Tunisia - cf. Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia regarding the NATO "Mediterranean Initiative"). A seminar in September 1995 is also planned in Egypt to examine the subject of OSCE experience in confidence- building measures - which, as the Counsellor to the Spanish OSCE Delegation, Mr. Emilio P rez de Agr da, has noted, will be "the first time ever that an OSCE event has taken place 'out-of-area'".

14. The Heads of State and Government agreed that the OSCE "will regularly review its goals, operations and structural arrangements". The Permanent Council is charged with further considering texts not adopted in Budapest, and additional developments now await the Budapest 1995 Ministerial Council meeting, with the next Summit scheduled for 1996 in Lisbon (where the frequency of future Summit meetings will be decided). According to Hungary, this future agenda should include establishing "a new unified effective and easy-to-use system of CSCE decision-making mechanisms", to encompass "a critical review of the CSCE decision-making mechanism based on the consensus rule" - which both the NAA and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly have endorsed changing.

II. CHECHNYA

15. The events in Chechnya beginning on 11 December 1994 posed another turning point for the OSCE. Would Russia reject international engagement on the grounds of the crisis being an internal affair, as at least one OSCE participating State has done, or would it accept some international engagement and recognize that the matter was of concern to other States? Would OSCE limit its engagement to yet another mission, would it expel Russia from the organization, or would it endeavour to become involved in negotiation among the parties concerned?

16. The CIO condemned on 5 January 1995 "the serious violations of human rights in Chechnya", where, by the end of the next month, estimates of as many as 25,000 civilian casualties were reported. On the same day, the ambassadors in Moscow of the OSCE "Troika" discussed the possibility of OSCE assistance at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On 12 January 1995, the Permanent Council discussed the events in a special session, where attention was drawn to violation of paragraphs 19, 36, and 38 of the recently-adopted Code of Conduct (co-operation in support of humanitarian assistance, recourse to force for internal security purposes must be commensurate with the needs for enforcement, and an obligation to respond to requests for clarification) and of paragraph 38.3 of the Vienna Document 1994 governing confidence- and security- building measures (notification of a concentration of forces exceeding 9,000 troops).

17. Russia denied these alleged violations, as well as other claims with regard to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol. At the same time, by the end of February two OSCE missions had been permitted to travel to Chechnya, and discussions were underway concerning co-operation with Russian authorities to enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the possibility of OSCE assistance in establishing a national human rights body to investigate the situation, in setting up local administration and government, and in preparing local and republic-wide elections drawing on OSCE institutions such as the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). One OSCE national diplomat commented that OSCE had managed to engage in "successful dialogues with a very important country", German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel cited the events in Chechnya as demonstrating that "it is impossible to set up a new architecture of European security without Russia's participation",5 whereas Zbigniew Brzezinski called for a strong condemnation and the branding of the Russian Defence Minister as a war criminal,6 and a group of Baltic parliamentarians urged that unless the international community helped the Chechen nation "to realize its right to self- determination and by refusing to demand from Russia to take responsibility for its crimes against small nations" then OSCE could turn into "a meaningless institution and open a green light for similar actions to be repeated in the future".7

18. On 29 March it was agreed by the Permanent Council that an "OSCE Assistance Group" should begin work in mid-April charged with seven tasks: (1) facilitate humanitarian aid; (2) promote reconstruction of constitutional order and building of democratic institutions; (3) promote human rights; (4) carry out free and fair elections "when possible"; (5) promote a cessation of hostilities (Ambassador Gyarmati favours no preconditions); (6) facilitate negotiations for a lasting political solution; and (7) promote a comprehensive ceasefire.

19. At the headquarters of the OSCE Assistance Group in Grozny on 30 July, Russian officials and Chechen representatives signed an agreement to end hostilities in Chechnya. The military agreement consists of four basic elements:

(1) The immediate cessation of military hostilities. The parties agreed to establish a Special Observer Commission, comprising representatives of all sides. Representatives of the OSCE are invited to join the Special Observer Commission in the capacity of observers. The Commission started to operate on 31 July.

(2) Liberation of forcefully detained persons on the bases of the principle of "all for all". Exchange of lists of force dispositions, minefields, and POWs/MIAs took place 30 July.

(3) A gradual withdrawal of troops under the supervision of Special Observer Commission, including an unconditional disarmament of illegal armed formations. Disarmament will be conducted in three stages: 1. units under the command of field commanders; 2. civilians belonging to militia groups; 3. individual persons.

In order to secure the process of disarmament the signatories decided to withdraw their forces from the line of contact to two to four kilometres. Additionally, in order to provide support to law enforcement authorities of the region, the signatories agreed to the deployment of one brigade of the internal security forces of the Russian Federation, as well as to one motor rifle brigade of the armed forces of the Russian Federation.

(4) The cessation of terrorist acts. The Chechen side agreed to give assistance to the Federal Authorities in finding and detaining Shamil Bassaev and his group, accused of the hostage taking in Budionnovsk.

Further negotiations on political and economic issues will continue at the OSCE Assistance Group offices in Grozny.

III. PONDERING INTANGIBLES

20. The Clinton Administration has assigned "top foreign policy priority" to the creation of a "new European Security Architecture" involving a "multi- track" effort:

. The mutually supportive enlargement of NATO and the EU

. Partnership for Peace (PfP)

. A "stronger relationship" between NATO and Russia outside the PfP framework

. OSCE developing as "a broader, more inclusive forum for consultation and action on issues not within the responsibilities of NATO and the EU".8

21. And, yet, this scheme, whether or not the best of all possible worlds, falls short objectively of a "common and comprehensive" concept of European security in the 21st century, as foreseen in the Budapest Document, or the "system of collective security" called for by the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly in July 1993 in Helsinki. As Hungarian President Arp d G ncz acknowledged at the Summit, albeit reflecting contemporary circumstances, "the CSCE cannot offer military security guarantees for any country" although it should, he ambitiously suggested, aim to eliminate "all the tensions which undermines societies".9 German Defence Minister Volker R he has declared that NATO remains "the only organization that can actually guarantee the security of its members".10 Moreover, States keen on entering NATO are concerned that the roles of NATO and OSCE could become blurred, and are anxious that this comprehensive security exercise does not lead to collective security as a goal (interpreting paragraph 5 of the Code as referring to co-operative security), to OSCE serving as primus inter pares of institutions, or to any link between joining the Alliance and the CFE Treaty. Several questions thus arise if we take the notion of a new European security architecture seriously and not just a cosmetic slogan:

. Can a "common and comprehensive" concept of European security be fashioned where only some members enjoy security guarantees, or are security guarantees an outdated or at least incomplete view of comprehensive security?

. Inasmuch as this year NATO is examining the "why" of expansion, might NATO evolve into the OSCE with the latter as a collective security or collective defence system but on NATO terms, as through the PfP?

. Can NATO serve the mission which SACEUR General George Joulwan has termed "strategic balance": while developing a close relationship with the State it must at the same time "balance", or should "balance" be understood as an internal function, of embedding Russia in a common structure much the way Germany was after the Second World War?

. Why is the idea of an OSCE Security Council, recently proposed by Russia, still considered unacceptable when such a system has functioned at the international level since 1945, and considering that the West German SPD raised the concept in 1986 as having the potential to "mark the inception of a pan-European security organization which, should tensions arise, would facilitate inter-alliance crisis management" and which is an idea supported by the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly (July 1993 Helsinki Declaration, Chapter I, para. 17)?

22. Addressing the Joint Meeting of the Defence and Security Committee and Political Committee on 21 February 1995, Russian Ambassador to Belgium and former Deputy Foreign Minister Vitali Churkin asked how the expansion of NATO, which while transforming is still a "hard security organization", would contribute to national minority and economic problems in Central and Eastern Europe? How would development there be affected by their purchase of sophisticated offensive weapons? Why were these nations reducing their military budgets and armed forces if they perceived a threat from Russia? Why were parliamentarians in "demonstrably indefensible" Estonia confident enough to call for recognition of the Dudayev regime in Chechnya or for changes in the Russo-Estonian frontier?

23. Ambassador Churkin also called for analysis to prevail over sentiments, which could lead to voting in new NATO members tomorrow but excluding others. "There may be a number of ways where we could alleviate peoples' fears of insecurities, speaking about Central and East European countries. OSCE is one of the ways. We have been offering the possibility of mutual security guarantees with NATO, with anybody else. International law and the practice of international life is rather rich and we could show some imagination if there is real security concern. But in very many respects, in addition to election pressures, [NATO membership] is a status symbol, it is a number of other things which do not really have much to do with real security problems". The statement of President Yeltsin in Budapest on 5 December 1994 on alternatives to an expanded NATO, however, was not entirely consistent: on the one hand, he cast doubt on the need for alliances; on the other hand, he called for common effort among NATO and CIS and other organizations, spoke of the possibility of extending security guarantees between individual or groups of States, and held out the prospect of Russia becoming a "political" member of NATO. (US President Clinton, however, affirmed NATO as the "bedrock of security in Europe" and that its expansion, not closed to any country, would be decided by no third party.)

24. In Ambassador Churkin's view, NATO was pursuing an unbalanced duality: a fast-track whereby by September 1995 NATO would present the results of its enlargement study with the net result of nations discussing the modalities of joining NATO, but another track of taking into account Russian concerns and developing an overall European security architecture had no such dates. Likewise, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev cautioned on 27 February 1995 against a "precipitate" expansion of NATO, and that instead a joint quest should be undertaken "to transform the old NATO Alliance, not to expand it, and to develop genuine partnership between Russia and NATO".11 Likewise, the Vice-Chairman of the Russian Federation Council, Mr. Valerian Victorov, informed NAA President Karsten Voigt on 2 February 1995 that "haste" in enlarging NATO would undermine "the very idea of universality of a system of collective security", whereas President Yeltsin has likewise termed a "speedy advance" of NATO to Russia's western frontiers as being to the detriment of "joint efforts at shaping a new model of a truly pan-European security system".12 Yet, would not this detriment arise regardless of the timing of Alliance enlargement? Moreover, is Europe truly ready to meet the commonly ascribed preconditions for collective security?

. No State is so powerful that it can resist collective sanctions

. The Major Powers have compatible views of a stable and acceptable international order; and

. The Major Powers share political solidarity and are willing to protect international order.13

25. We can only raise these issues by way of food for thought. Surely, nonetheless, the experience of Bosnia shows that the institutional vestiges of the Cold War are hardly providing common or comprehensive security; has perhaps the time arrived to consider how new arrangements can be put forward, while bearing in mind Article 8 of the North Atlantic Treaty (none of the international engagements of an Ally can be in conflict with the provisions of the Treaty, such that collective defence and collective security commitments in Europe could be at odds)? Governments themselves have agreed to study this issue, and we should be prepared to provide a substantial parliamentary input.

26. In the near to medium term, however, it cannot be ignored that nothing specific whatsoever is said in the Budapest Document about co-operation among security-related transatlantic and European organizations to give effect to the thus far discredited notion of interlocking institutions. In the past this reflected unique French concerns about the appropriate relationship between NATO and the CSCE. More recently, objections by other delegations to including the "CIS" in these sections mean that references to NATO, WEU, or "CIS" do not appear as they did in Helsinki in 1992. This raises real questions about how this condition will affect the discussion about the future of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) in the wake of the Partnership for Peace (should some or all of NACC activity be transferred to the OSCE), or how NATO is to take up its agreed task of contributing to peacekeeping missions under OSCE authority or contribute to a future European arms control regime.

27. However, at the same time we must recognize, as Bulgarian Prime Minister Zhan Videnov has described it, while his country seeks integration into NATO, "Today NATO still is a collective defence organization rather than a collective security organization. However, it is precisely collective security that the entire Euro-Atlantic space - from Vancouver to Vladivostock - needs."14 Can some adequate fusion eventually take place, drawing on the lessons of Bosnia? 28. It is, of course, too early for predictions. All that can be noted is that the OSCE participating States have agreed that the time has come to examine a comprehensive concept of security for the next century. What that means is unclear: can we improve significantly the thus far not very successful notion of interlocking institutions, or should we strive for a unitary all-embracing system? The search seems to have begun in finding the right balance, again attesting to the unique relevance of OSCE to the Europe of today, and of tomorrow, and a broad approach to OSCE can assist in finding solutions for those states who recognize that OSCE is a vital, but insufficient, organization for their security.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Richard C. Holbrooke, "America, A European Power", Foreign Affairs (March/April 1995)

2. NAA Staff Report, CSCE: Budapest Summit Meeting 1994, AL 282 PC (94) 9 Rev. 1

3. Op. cit., note 1

4. Walter Kemp, "The OSCE and the UN: A Closer Relationship", Helsinki Monitor (1:1995)

5. ITAR-TASS, 28 February 1995

6. International Herald Tribune, 28 February 1995

7. Deputy Nijole Ambrazaityte et. al., Memorandum On the Chechen People's Right to Self-Determination, 8 February 1995

8. Richard C. Holbrooke, "Creation of New European Security Architecture Under Way", USIS Defense, 22 February 1995

9. Hungarian TV1, 6 December 1994, in BBC SWB, Eastern Europe, 8 December 1994

10. "Europe und Amerika - eine neue Partnerschaft f r die Zukunft", speech by the Federal Minister of Defence, Volker R he, to the 32nd Munich Conference on Security Policy, 4 February 1995

11. Op. cit., note 5

12. BBC SWB, Former Soviet Union, 17 February 1995

13. Charles and Clifford Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe", International Security (Summer 1991). See for example: Richard K. Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War?", International Security (Summer 1992) (implementing collective commitments could turn minor into major wars, normative rules of collective security discredited by empirically validated rules of balance of power, a Concert of Europe could work only if disagreements among the Major Powers was minor; in the early 1800s security was condominial rather than collective and the balance of power remained important, held together by monarchical conservatism and opposition to liberalism and nationalism; "a Concert today would have more trouble juggling two contradictory sets of values: national self- determination and the sanctity of state borders....Why is strategic laissez faire, with ad hoc adaptation as we go along, unthinkable?...[accompanying arms control] balances established by apolitical criteria [no presumption of a likely aggressor] could be disastrous; having been decided without reference to the wartime lineups, it would be only fortuitous if the distribution of capabilities happened to favour the side with defensive objectives"; the author advocates three overlapping rings of security organization: the CSCE, NATO, and a Concert of the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Russia; Charles L. Glaser, "Why NATO Is Still Best", International Security (Summer 1993) (NATO is best matched to a spectrum of challenges that includes hedging against the possibility of a resurgent challenge from Russia, responding to conflict in Central Europe, and maintaining West European stability with the United States acting as a "defensive balancer", but beyond NATO the West needs "concert-like arrangements with Russia to ensure that Western policies do not generate Russian insecurity", although this, and the function of insurance against a resurgent Russia, would not require a collective security system); Josef Joffe, "Collective Security and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends", Survival (Spring 1992) (the Concert of Europe is a misleading analogy for today in that it failed as early as 1853 in the Balkans, and the notion of collective security is untenable in the nuclear age); Charles and Clifford Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe", International Security (Summer 1991) (the conditions for an informal Concert-based collective security - guided by a small group of Major Powers - in Europe are now present, and a two-tier system should be established: a concert of the five Major Powers with jurisdiction over arms control, boundaries, and peacekeeping and not operating by unanimity, with the full body concerned with promoting democratic values and continuing to operate by unanimity, but NATO should be preserved as a hedge); John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions", International Security (Winter 1994/95) (institutions have minimal influence on state behaviour, great powers use institutions for their own self-interest); and Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics", International Security (Autumn 1993) (Japan, China, and Germany are the rising states, Russia the declining power).

14. Sofia Duma, 22 April 1995