Cyprus PIO: Turkish Press and Other Media, 01-08-10

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From: The Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office Server at <http://www.pio.gov.cy/>

[A] NEWS ITEMS

[01] HURRIYET publishes the controversial document of National Security.

[02] Ankara's puppet regime in occupied Cyprus claims rights over continental shelf.

[03] The so-called Assembly Speaker: British Bases are an obstacle to a solution in Cyprus.

[04] The co-operative banks in the pseudostate are faced with a serious crisis.

[B] COMMENTS AND EDITORIALS

[05] Columnist in �STAR� newspaper says Denktas in reluctant to resume negotiations on Cyprus.

[06] Letter by the Turkish Cypriot leader to Semih Idiz to �STAR� newspaper. TURKISH PRESS AND OTHER MEDIA No.152/01 10.8.00

[A] NEWS ITEMS

[01] HURRIYET publishes the controversial document on National Security

�The concept of National Security, which MP [Motherland Party] Leader and Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz labelled as an "obstacle preventing the government from making progress" and called for a public debate on this issue in a speech he made at his party's convention, provoking a harsh reaction from the General Staff, is based on a document defined as the "Government's Secret Constitution." The document, entitled National Security Policy Document (NSPD), is formulated by the National Security Council [NSC] and serves as a guideline for drafting laws and decrees. It is taken into consideration by the government in shaping its decisions and foreign policy strategies. The NSPD was updated substantially in a meeting held by the NSC on 31 October 1997, when Yilmaz was heading a coalition government formed by the MP and the DLP [Democratic Left Party]. In another NSC meeting held in January 1999, which was attended by Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, five new items were incorporated into a section of the document entitled "Priority Threat and Risk Factors." In addition to Muslim fundamentalism and terror, which are among priority threat factors, sentences were added calling for "prevention of economic crimes and launching a struggle against organized crime and improving Turkey's international image."

The NSPD was developed and updated in mid-60s, when "communism and the now-defunct USSR" were seen as the biggest threat to Turkey. The document underwent the most radical revision after the military coup staged on 12 September 1980. It had to be modified again as a result of events, which ensued disintegration of the USSR, giving the priority to Iran and Greece as the major threats and risks. When the coalition government formed by the now-defunct WP [Welfare Party] and the TPP [True Path Party] came to power attention shifted to Muslim fundamentalism, the Mafia, which is run by nationalists who describe themselves as Idealists, and organized crime. With this revision the NSPD experienced the biggest change since its inception. In January 1999 organized crime in the economy was added to threat and risk factors. Concurrently, the item related to Cyprus was revised with addition of a recommendation for "lending support for the proposal to establish a confederation." No major modification has been made to the document in the past four years.

The NSPD, which was thoroughly revised in the NSC meeting held on 31 January 1997, attended by then Prime Minister Yilmaz and then President Suleyman Demirel, was consisting of 2 booklets and 10 annexes. The document, which was issued as a "Secret Decree", included the following items after the revision in 1997:

1. Separatist and fundamentalist activities are equally important and have top priority.

2. Political Islam continues to pose a threat to Turkey.

3. Some groups intend to transform Turkish nationalism into a racist movement and the Idealist Mafia wants to capitalize on this trend. This issue also constitutes a threat.

4. Extreme left continues to remain as a threat. However, it seems that it has softened its policies.

5. Consideration should be given to perception of threat in relations with Greece. Although Turkey would not prefer a military conflict with Greece, this possibility should not be ruled out.

6. In the event of a military conflict with Greece, Syria may also be engaged in an armed conflict with Turkey.

7. Previous assessments related to Turkey's neighbours should be preserved without any change.

8. Arrangements should be made to develop local and cultural characteristics on condition that they do not extend to public domain.

9. Shortcomings and problems encountered in the judicial and government system must be eliminated without delay.

10. No change should be made in Turkey's relations with the West.

11. Turkey's goal for full membership in the EU should be preserved. However, the negative stance adopted by some European countries in this regard should not be overlooked.

12. (We cannot publish this item as it is about a very sensitive secret decision made by the government.)

13. Economic efforts including privatization, which are aimed at integrating Turkey with the rest of the world, should be stepped up.

14. Relations with Turkic Republics should be strengthened and governments of these countries should be supported in their efforts to maintain their strength�.

[02] Ankara's puppet regime in occupied Cyprus claims rights over continental shelf

The restricted economic region and continental shelf of the island have not been delineated. They should be delineated in line with international law through agreements to be concluded with all the concerned countries in the region, including Turkey. It is clear that this delineation cannot be possible without reaching an agreement with the TRNC. The administration in the south, whatever it calls itself, does not have the right to unilaterally sign a delineation agreement. The Greek Cypriot administration is obliged to act in cooperation with the TRNC on the issue. Otherwise, it is evident that the TRNC will defend its rights as required. We hope that the Greek Cypriot administration will not adopt a negative stand that might become a new source of crisis in the region and that the concerned countries will not permit such a move�.

[03] The so-called Assembly Speaker: British Bases are an obstacle to a solution in Cyprus

Hasipoglu explained to his quest delegation the importance of Cyprus from the Ottoman period until today. He said that Cyprus has a major strategic significance to Turkey from the security point of view. Hasipoglu repeated his known allegations that in Cyprus there are two people who are of different race and religion and speak different languages.

The so-called Assembly Speaker went on: "There is no Cyprus nation and there will never be." Alleging that the British Bases are an obstacle to reaching a final agreement, Hasipoglu concluded: "If the British go it will be easier to find a solution."

[04] The co-operative banks in the pseudostate are faced with a serious crisis

Invoking information given by the so-called �Department of Co-operative Affairs�, KIBRIS notes that only 87 of the 218 co-operative banks which are registered in the pseudostate are operating at the moment. One hundred and eighty of these banks were registered, the registration of 86 of them was cancelled and the activities of six of them were suspended.

The number of co-operative banks according to the region they are now functioning is as follows: Nicosia 20, Famagusta 24, Kyrenia 13, Morphou 10 and Trikomo 20, stated the same information sources.

[B] COMMENTS AND EDITORIALS

[05] Columnist in �Star� newspaper says Denktas is reluctant to resume negotiations on Cyprus

�UN Spokesman Fred Eckhard disclosed yesterday that UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan will hold a meeting with President Rauf Denktas in Salzburg on 28 August. Denktas had already mentioned during his trip to Malaysia recently that he would possibly meet Annan.

Prime Minister had sent a message to Denktas via the media, in which he urged Denktas to resume the negotiations. The fact that Denktas made his disclosure [about his possible meeting with Annan] immediately after Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit's message to him naturally drew attention.

However, Denktas had made it obvious that he was reluctant to resume the negotiations as soon as he returned to north Cyprus. He openly said that a potential meeting with Annan did not mean that the negotiations would be resumed.

It is understood that Denktas is determined not to resume the proximity talks in order to impose some compromises for the benefit of north Cyprus by causing political tension. However, there is a serious problem. The number of people who believe in the logic behind this tactic is decreasing in Ankara. Ecevit's recent disclosure, "We support the proximity talks despite everything" clearly states this.

If we consider the main issue boldly, Denktas did not gain anything by terminating the proximity talks. To the contrary, he lost advantage for having left the scene.

For example, many individuals in Ankara believe that, especially due to the tense atmosphere, the European Court of Human Rights made its last decision, which was against Turkey, relatively more easily.

The fact that Denktas' side considered this a political decision confirms this indirectly. He says, if the negotiations had been ongoing, the Court would have made this political decision more hesitantly. This is one side of the coin. The other side of the coin is as follows:

By terminating the proximity talks, Denktas has created a very convenient and advantageous atmosphere for the Greek side. When we look at the issue objectively, the Greek side has no reason to resume the proximity negotiations without imposing a few requirements on the UN, especially when everything goes so well for them on the UN front.

The Greek side's envoy, talking to The Financial Times, recently expressed that the Clerides administration is sure about their accession to the EU. The envoy said that they will become EU member no matter what Turkey's stand is.

But his later remarks were really striking. Because he said that after the Greek side becomes EU member they will veto Turkey's EU membership if it does not change its approach to the Cyprus issue. The Greek Cypriots' confidence signals that Turkey will face serious problems in the future if it does not adopt thorough and wise diplomacy.

Let us assume that Ankara supports Denktas' decision not to resume the negotiations and that Ankara even disregards the EU's opinion on this issue. What will happen afterwards? Will north Cyprus be able to overcome the economic, political and societal depression that it suffers from? Will Turkey be able to provide the opportunities it had not been able to provide for 27 years, all of a sudden, and miraculously? Meanwhile, how will Turkey establish its own future?

Will the number of people in Turkey who think that Cyprus is a big burden on Turkey increase? On the other hand, will the existing unease in north Cyprus grow?

Those who have long term plans for these issues have to answer these questions. Because the politics, which is aimed at saving the day, and the heroic folk songs are not helping us to keep our political ground in the international arena�.

[06] Letter by the Turkish Cypriot leader to Semih Idiz of �Star� newspaper

The column, with the title: �Letter From President Rauf Denktas�, is as follows:

�I received a letter from President Rauf Denktas of the TRNC [Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus] after my last article on the subject of Cyprus. I am presenting below without comment the entire text of the letter to the readers, by considering the limited space in the column:

"I read your article published in the 4 August issue of the Star newspaper with the title, 'Denktas and the Cyprus Negotiations.' When we announced that the sixth round of negotiations could not continue under the same conditions after the fifth round, I also stated that 'we were in favour of the continuation of the goodwill function of the UN [United Nations] Secretary-General." Consequently, there was no need for an invitation or a pressure from Ankara for me to accept the 'exchange of views' invitation that would come from the Secretary-General.

"I invited Mr. De Soto to Cyprus because I wanted to continue our contacts with the Secretary-General. It must be in connection with this that the Secretary General invited me to New York. As a result of the contacts, it was decided to hold a meeting in Salzburg on 28 August.

"You are writing to tell me, 'return to the negotiation table.' To which negotiation table? To the 'table' that we left with the approval of the Government and Parliament of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which was also approved by Ankara? The document placed in front of us at that table is nothing but a Greek Cypriot document, strengthened by pre-conditions that our people on Cyprus cannot accept and to which Turkey cannot say yes.

"Consequently, the UN Secretary-General cannot request me to discuss this document with him. We have been explaining the reasons to the entire world in a detailed manner. A section of the Turkish media, whatever the reason is, does not want to remember these. Even the 20 July Peace Operation was not remembered by a significant section of the Turkish media. If it is recalled, then it must be because of the fact that the subject of the rights and freedoms obtained as the result of so many self-sacrifices by the Turkish nation, cannot be sacrificed just because 'others want it that way,' will also come onto the agenda.

"Consequently, the Secretary-General is inviting me for talks. Although he is not saying, 'Come and start the negotiations from where we left off,' you are creating an atmosphere as though I had received such an invitation and I am going reluctantly with the pressure of Ankara, which makes it necessary for me to bow my head to such an invitation.

"You wrote that I continue to believe that I could obtain concessions with my attitude, but the number of those believing this in Ankara is gradually decreasing.

"First of all, I am not after concessions. While we were an equal, sovereign founder of the 1960 Republic [of Cyprus], we were excluded from this in a terrible manner. We were considered to be deserving mass graves. Until Turkey came [to help] we had forgotten what it was like to live as human beings. I have been protecting the rights in a Greek Cypriot Republic of the heroic Turkish Cypriots as a minority, who did not permit a repeat of the history of the island of Crete. Against whom? Against a usurping Greek Cypriot administration, which has had itself accepted as the legal Cyprus Government and still considering the Turks to be enemies. What they want me to do is to be satisfied with a specially privileged minority status by recognizing the existence of the Cyprus Government, to help the Greek Cypriot refugees in the framework of the EU [European Union] norms to come and disperse half of our population throughout Cyprus in small enclaves, that is, to let them accomplish by means of the EU what they could not accomplish by force, embargoes, pressure and blackmail for years.

"You are saying that I created an extremely suitable and productive environment for the Greek Cypriot side by leaving the negotiation table. If I had remained at the negotiation table, then within the framework imposed on us, I would have accelerated the accession of Cyprus into the EU (this time, with our consent, when there is still 15-20 years before Turkey's accession). By doing this, I would have officially registered the invalidity of the 1960 agreements and that Turkey, in accordance with these agreements, did not and would not have a right to speak about Cyprus. Ankara has never asked me to be this generous. I do not believe that I have the authority to destroy in favour of Greece the Turkish-Greek balance that has been established with the Cyprus agreements by making this sacrifice on behalf of 65 million people. For me, the most serious and for us the most sacred aspect of the 1960 agreements is the Turkish-Greek balance that has been established for peace and stability on the island and in the region.

"Their petitions to the EU are to upset this balance. It is our right to prevent the accession of Cyprus to the EU before our status is determined and before Turkey also becomes a member. It is up to Ankara to tell me, 'Give up this cause, I gave up this balance, I also gave up Cyprus.' No such voice came from Ankara until the present, except from some columnists!

"It appears that Thepiliou said, 'Whether Turkey likes it or not, Cyprus will become a member of the EU.'

"Turkey has a strong position to prevent this with the 1960 agreements and as a result of the policies by the Greek Cypriots to make Cyprus a Greek Colony, despite these agreements. You as the media, instead of giving an answer to this swaggering of Thepiliou, you tell me 'to continue the negotiations' by tolling the 'bells of danger' and you are also creating an atmosphere as if you are saying these on behalf of the responsible officials in Ankara.

"I am performing my duties based on the general authority given to me by my people (and at the end of consultations with the Motherland). My authority does not include the authority to give up the rights given to Turkey by the 1960 agreements. I cannot see the relation between my returning to the negotiation table and the improvement of our economy.

"We are trying to establish a permanent, new partnership based on the sovereign equality of both sides.

"The side that does not want the partnership, rejects equality and is trying to eliminate the rights given to Turkey with the 1960 agreements, through EU membership, is the Greek Cypriot-Greek side. Do you not also have anything to say about their wrongs?

"With my respects,

"Rauf R. Denktas

"President of the TRNC"

KV/SK

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