RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 4, No. 94, 00-05-16

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From: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty <http://www.rferl.org>

RFE/RL NEWSLINE

Vol. 4, No. 94, 16 May 2000

CONTENTS

[A] TRANSCAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

[01] NEW ARMENIAN PREMIER FIRES SEVERAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

[02] ARMENIAN WAR VETERANS QUIT PARLIAMENT MAJORITY BLOC

[03] GUARD INJURED IN ATTACK ON ARMENIAN GENERAL'S RESIDENCE

[04] AZERBAIJAN WANTS GREATER ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA

[05] ANOTHER AIRCRAFT SMUGGLING SCANDAL HITS KAZAKHSTAN

[06] INDEPENDENT KAZAKH NEWSPAPER UNDER PRESSURE

[07] KYRGYZSTAN'S SUPREME COURT REJECTS ELECTION APPEAL

[08] PAKISTANI LEADER VISITS TURKMENISTAN

[09] TURKMEN PRESIDENT REMAINS LUKEWARM ON CIS

[B] SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

[10] SERBIAN OPPOSITION REMAINS DEFIANT...

[11] ...WHILE BELGRADE KEEPS UP INTIMIDATION

[12] WHO WAS MILIVOJE GUTOVIC?

[13] WHY DID MOSCOW HOST INDICTED WAR CRIMINAL?

[14] BELGRADE REGIME LAUNCHES APARTMENT-BUILDING CAMPAIGN

[15] EU SUPPORT FOR MONTENEGRO

[16] BULGARIAN PRESIDENT PRAISES INDEPENDENT MACEDONIA

[17] RACAN SPELLS OUT CROATIAN 100-DAY PLAN

[18] U.S. SUSPENDS MILITARY SUPPORT FOR BOSNIAN CROAT MILITARY

[19] SMUGGLING CONTINUES TO MEAN BIG LOSSES FOR BOSNIAN

[20] ROMANIAN MONEY-LAUNDERING SCANDAL LINKED TO ILIESCU'S

[21] ...WHILE MAIN OPPOSITION PARTY ATTACKS RULING COALITION

[22] ROMANIANS TAKE COLD SHOWERS

[23] CORRECTION:

[24] AFGHAN VETERANS PROTEST IN MOLDOVA

[25] BULGARIAN PRESIDENT SAYS CABINET WILL SURVIVE CONFIDENCE

[C] END NOTE

[26] REGIONS, REPUBLICS, AND REFORM

[A] TRANSCAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

[01] NEW ARMENIAN PREMIER FIRES SEVERAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

government officials with ties either to the Yerkrapah Union

of Veterans of the Karabakh war or to the former ruling

Armenian Pan-National Movement, RFE/RL's Yerevan bureau

reported. They are Andranik Kocharian (no relation to

President Robert Kocharian), who is an aide to sacked Prime

Minister Aram Sargsian; chief of government staff Shahen

Karamanukian; and the head of the government press and

information department, Tigran Hakobian. Government sources

told RFE/RL that it is unlikely that either Minister for

Industrial Infrastructure Vahan Shirkhanian or Minister for

State Revenues Smbat Ayvazian will retain their posts in the

new government. Both men are leading members of the Yerkrapah

Union. LF

[02] ARMENIAN WAR VETERANS QUIT PARLIAMENT MAJORITY BLOC

15 May, 10 parliamentary deputies belonging to Yerkrapah

informed parliamentary speaker Armen Khachatrian that they

are quitting the majority Miasnutiun bloc. The same day, two

other Yerkrapah members quit the second-largest parliamentary

faction, Kayunutiun, Noyan Tapan and RFE/RL's Yerevan bureau

reported. Their transfer of allegiance leaves Miasnutiun with

a total of 50 deputies in the 131-member legislature, while

Kayunutiun now has 20 deputies. LF

[03] GUARD INJURED IN ATTACK ON ARMENIAN GENERAL'S RESIDENCE

guard was seriously injured on the night of 14 May when

unidentified persons tried to attack the home of Major

General Arkadii Ter-Tadevossian, ITAR-TASS and Noyan Tapan

reported. Ter-Tadevossian told journalists in Yerevan on 15

May that he is certain the attack was connected with his

creation last week of a parallel organization to Yerkrapah.

The new organization, like Yerkrapah, also aims to defend the

interests of Karabakh war veterans (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 11

May 2000). LF

[04] AZERBAIJAN WANTS GREATER ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA

Minister for CIS Affairs Leonid Drachevskii, Azerbaijan's

President Heidar Aliev called for increasing bilateral

cooperation in the agricultural sector and offered to export

early fruits and vegetables to the Russian Federation, ITAR-

TASS reported. Other senior Azerbaijani officials have in

recent months advocated intensifying economic cooperation

with Russia. Drachevskii, for his part, expressed interest in

closer cooperation in the energy sector. He reportedly also

tried to persuade Aliev to drop his opposition to the

creation of a CIS free-trade zone, according to Turan. That

issue is to figure prominently on the agenda of the 21 June

CIS summit, at which Aliev is expected to hold another round

of confidential talks with his Armenian counterpart. LF

[05] ANOTHER AIRCRAFT SMUGGLING SCANDAL HITS KAZAKHSTAN

of 22 aircraft engines and 40 engines for missiles, all

designated as scrap metal being shipped by a company in

southern Kazakhstan, were confiscated by Russian customs

officials on the Russian-Finnish border last week, RFE/RL's

Almaty bureau reported on 16 May, quoting National Security

Committee spokesman Kenzhebulat Beknazarov. LF

[06] INDEPENDENT KAZAKH NEWSPAPER UNDER PRESSURE

Esergepov, editor of the Almaty-based paper "Nachnem s

ponedelnkia," told journalists in the former Kazakh capital

on 16 May that municipal officials are trying to evict the

newspaper from its premises, RFE/RL's Almaty correspondent

reported. Esergepov said that pressure is politically

motivated and a response to articles the newspaper had

recently published criticizing Almaty Mayor Viktor Khrapunov.

LF

[07] KYRGYZSTAN'S SUPREME COURT REJECTS ELECTION APPEAL

Supreme Court on 15 May rejected an appeal by arrested

opposition Ar-Namys party chairman Feliks Kulov to annul the

outcome of the run-off election he contested in the southern

constituency of Kara-Buura in March, RFE/RL's Bishkek bureau

reported. Kulov had polled 40 percent of the vote during the

first round on 20 February, but according to official

returns, which were subsequently widely disputed, he garnered

only 36 percent in the 12 March runoff (see "RFE/RL

Newsline," 15 and 22 March 2000). On 11 May, the Supreme

Court upheld a 4 April ruling by a local court annulling the

second-round election victory of opposition politician Dosbol

Nur Uulu. LF

[08] PAKISTANI LEADER VISITS TURKMENISTAN

to a former Soviet republic, General Parvez Musharraf met in

Ashgabat on 15 May with Turkmenistan's President Saparmurat

Niyazov to discuss boosting political and economic

cooperation, Interfax reported. Among concrete projects

discussed was the construction of rail and road links and the

planned natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan via

Afghanistan to Pakistan. The implementation of that last

project is contingent on an end to the civil war in

Afghanistan (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 8 December 1998 and 7

March 2000). LF

[09] TURKMEN PRESIDENT REMAINS LUKEWARM ON CIS

Secretary briefed Niyazov in Ashgabat on 15 May about the

agenda for the upcoming CIS summit, ITAR-TASS reported. But

the Turkmen president repeated his earlier preference for

bilateral, rather than multilateral, cooperation within the

CIS, adding that there is no point in signing CIS documents

if there is doubt whether they will be effective. Niyazov

noted that the CIS Bank has failed to recover debts by other

CIS member states to Turkmenistan for supplies of natural

gas. LF

[B] SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

[10] SERBIAN OPPOSITION REMAINS DEFIANT...

demonstrated in Belgrade on 15 May in support of the Otpor

(Resistance) student organization, which the authorities

claim is behind the recent murder of Bosko Perosevic, a top

official in Vojvodina (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 15 May 2000).

The rally passed without incident, RFE/RL's South Slavic

Service reported. The Serbian Renewal Movement's (SPO) Vuk

Draskovic called the authorities "terrorists and murderers"

for their crackdown on Otpor. The Democratic Party's Zoran

Djindjic called upon the army and the police to cease obeying

Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and "save the people

painlessly and end the crisis in the country quickly." He did

not elaborate. Djindjic later told Reuters that he hopes

"Milosevic got the message that if the repression against

Otpor continues, it will provoke a chain reaction, the end of

which no one can predict." PM

[11] ...WHILE BELGRADE KEEPS UP INTIMIDATION

hoped for a larger turnout for the Belgrade protest on 15 May

and believe that many people stayed home because they feared

regime violence, Reuters reported. The authorities put up

"wanted posters" for two Otpor members in conjunction with

the Novi Sad killing, but Otpor spokesmen said that the two

activists were visiting their relatives in the Republika

Srpska at the time of the murder. Meanwhile, Yugoslav

Information Minister Goran Matic stressed that Otpor is an

"unregistered, fascist organization" and will be treated

accordingly. In response, Milan Protic and several other

opposition leaders joined Otpor in a show of solidarity.

Leading Serbian nationalist writer Dobrica Cosic joined the

student group the previous week. PM

[12] WHO WAS MILIVOJE GUTOVIC?

person of Perosevic's assassin and his possible motives,

"Vesti" reported on 16 May. Spokesmen of both Otpor and the

SPO denied that he was a member of their respective

organizations, although the authorities claim he was. Two

weeks before the killing, Gutovic had praised Milosevic at a

funeral that was attended by 200 people, "Vesti" continued.

Several people in his community said that some of Gutovic's

recent public remarks about Lenin and Stalin had caused some

people to question his mental stability. Elsewhere, an

unidentified Democratic Party official told London's "The

Guardian" that Gutovic was known locally in Novi Sad as a

supporter of Milosevic's Socialist Party, of which Perosevic

was a high official. PM

[13] WHY DID MOSCOW HOST INDICTED WAR CRIMINAL?

Carla Del Ponte, who is the Hague-based war crimes tribunal's

chief prosecutor, said on 15 May that she is "alarmed" by

reports that Yugoslav Defense Minister Dragoljub Ojdanic

recently visited Moscow (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 15 May 2000).

The spokesman added: "It's likely the prosecutor will enquire

directly of the Russian embassy in The Hague whether the

reports are accurate and why the Russian authorities did not

take any steps to arrest a person under indictment by the

tribunal.... To my knowledge, this is the first time any of

the individuals indicted last 26 May...have traveled outside

Yugoslavia since the indictment. This is a remarkable

occurrence," Reuters reported. Meanwhile, Yugoslav Foreign

Minister Zivadin Jovanovic arrived in Moscow on 15 May.

Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said the next day that

his talks with Jovanovic about Kosova "will enable us to

continue helping to achieve a settlement of the problem and

to stabilize the situation in the entire Balkan region." PM

[14] BELGRADE REGIME LAUNCHES APARTMENT-BUILDING CAMPAIGN

authorities began a campaign across Serbia on 15 May to build

100,000 new apartments for young couples, military personnel,

and police. The apartments will be built at the rate of

10,000 annually for the next 10 years, Reuters reported. PM

[15] EU SUPPORT FOR MONTENEGRO

commissioner for foreign affairs, said in Podgorica on 15 May

that Brussels will provide $50 million in aid to bolster

President Milo Djukanovic's government against pressure from

Milosevic. Patten called the partnership between Brussels and

Podgorica "good and effective," AP reported. Patten denied

that the aid is intended to help Djukanovic in the 11 June

local elections, adding that the money is "support for a

government that believes in elections. Where countries opt

for democracy we want to place ourselves generously on their

side." Patten stressed: "I believe that the EU aid will

reaffirm the will of Montenegrins to follow our democratic

policies." PM

[16] BULGARIAN PRESIDENT PRAISES INDEPENDENT MACEDONIA

Skopje on 15 May, Petar Stoyanov commented, "Long live

independent Macedonia. We must not miss this historical

opportunity to live as friends and respect each other,"

Reuters reported. He and Macedonian President Boris

Trajkovski signed nine bilateral agreements and issued a

joint declaration expressing concern about "extremism in the

region," AP reported. PM

[17] RACAN SPELLS OUT CROATIAN 100-DAY PLAN

Racan told journalists in Zagreb on 15 May that "in the next

100 days, the focus of our work will be the central, dramatic

issue of the economy. Our aim is to strengthen the economy,

stimulate growth, employment, [and] exports," Reuters

reported (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 15 May 2000). The government

is considering cutting value-added tax from 22 percent to 19

percent in the hope of encouraging investment, he added.

Deputy Prime Minister Slavko Linic said that the leading

insurance company, Croatia Osiguranje, will be put up for

sale later in the year. It failed to find a buyer in 1999.

Among other companies slated for privatization are the oil

and gasoline enterprise Ina and the power company HEP, he

added. PM

[18] U.S. SUSPENDS MILITARY SUPPORT FOR BOSNIAN CROAT MILITARY

a statement on 15 May, the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo confirmed

local press reports that the Defense Department has stopped

military support for the Bosnian Croat military. According to

that statement: "The United States has suspended selected

training and advisory activities conducted by the U.S. firm

Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) for the Bosnian

Croat component of the [mainly Muslim and Croat] federation

army. The suspension is indefinite and will continue until

the United States receives confirmation that the Bosnian

Croat component has taken the required steps toward

integration [with the Muslim military]. In addition, the U.S.

government has suspended International Military Education and

Training-funded training for Bosnian Croat members of the

federation military scheduled to begin on or after 12 May

2000," Reuters reported. PM

[19] SMUGGLING CONTINUES TO MEAN BIG LOSSES FOR BOSNIAN

Bosnian federal officials have concluded that

smuggling along some 450 "illegal roads" crossing the

federation's frontiers costs Sarajevo some $200 million

annually. The officials stress that only solution is to

intensify cooperation with neighboring countries, but so far

Croatia has not responded to Bosnian requests on this matter,

"Dnevni avaz" reported on 16 May. PM

[20] ROMANIAN MONEY-LAUNDERING SCANDAL LINKED TO ILIESCU'S

Romanian customs officials are investigating

possible fraud related to the import of campaign materials

used by former President Ion Iliescu in the 1996 presidential

campaign, Romanian media reported on 14 May. Customs Office

Director Nini Sapunaru announced that there is a strong

suspicion that 1 million electoral posters printed by one of

Romanian-born Adrian Costea's companies in France were

imported tax-free. Costea is currently under investigation by

a French commission on money-laundering charges. ZsM

[21] ...WHILE MAIN OPPOSITION PARTY ATTACKS RULING COALITION

opposition Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR) called

the money-laundering scandal an "extremely aggressive

negative campaign" orchestrated by the current ruling

coalition against the PDSR, the daily "Adevarul" reported on

13 May. It also noted that PDSR officials involved in the

investigation as witnesses will no longer make any public

declarations. However, PDSR President Ion Iliescu on 15 May

admitted that Costea supported his 1996 campaign by printing

various materials and also assisted in the translation of one

of his books. But he denied having made a profit from the

activities. The same day, PDSR Senator Radu Timofte accused

President Emil Constantinescu of staging the scandal to end

Iliescu's candidacy for the presidency and of wanting to

reinstate the monarchy. ZsM

[22] ROMANIANS TAKE COLD SHOWERS

provider, Termoelectrica, announced on 15 May that it has

ceased providing services to local partners with major debts,

Romanian media reported. As a result, some 6 million people--

including most of the residents of Bucharest and several

major cities--were left without hot water. Termoelectrica,

which provides energy to some 40 percent of Romania's

households, needs to collect some 3.5 trillion lei ($175

million) from local distributors, which blame the problem on

non-paying owner associations. ZsM

[23] CORRECTION:

Venice Commission was incorrectly referred to as an expert

body of the EU. It is, in fact, a body of the Council of

Europe.

[24] AFGHAN VETERANS PROTEST IN MOLDOVA

veterans of the war in Afghanistan demonstrated on 15 May in

Chisinau against cuts in their benefits, Reuters reported.

The veterans called for the dissolution of the parliament,

the resignation of President Petru Lucinschi, and early

elections. They also demanded that benefits eliminated in

April be reinstated. There are some 12,000 veterans of the

Afghan war living in Moldova. PB

[25] BULGARIAN PRESIDENT SAYS CABINET WILL SURVIVE CONFIDENCE

Petar Stoyanov said on 15 May in Sofia that the

government of Premier Ivan Kostov will pass a no-confidence

motion to be held this week, BTA reported. Stoyanov said,

however, that each no-confidence vote "should provide ground

for reflection to the incumbents." He said Kostov's cabinet

ministers should "decide how they will rule until the end of

their term." In other news, Bulgarian troops took part in the

"Linked Seas 2000" military exercises near Lisbon, Portugal

on 14 May. Dimitrov Mikhov, the Bulgarian chief of staff,

said the maneuvers provided "an important boost" to the

country's bid to join NATO. PB

[C] END NOTE

[26] REGIONS, REPUBLICS, AND REFORM

President Vladimir Putin's creation of seven new

federal districts headed by presidential appointees is

clearly intended to re-establish Moscow's control over

the Russian Federation's far-flung regions. But it

appears almost certain that it will have just the

opposite effect.

Coming on the heels of his efforts to rein in

regional governments in Bashkortostan and Ingushetia

last week, Putin's 13 May decree sets the stage for a

new kind of regional politics, one that could lead to an

intensification of the ongoing struggle between the

center and the periphery.

And just as was the case at the end of the Soviet

period, when Mikhail Gorbachev tried to retake control

over the union republics, that struggle could have a

powerful impact on Putin's ability to govern and to

promote whatever reforms he says he would like to

introduce.

There are three reasons for this conclusion: First,

Putin's 13 May decree also calls for the elimination of

the system of presidential envoys attached to the

regional governments. This suggests the decree itself

was a compromise between those who wanted to re-

establish Moscow's control over the periphery and those

who like things the way they are. More important, Putin

is removing the very stratum of officials his

predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, had unsuccessfully sought to

use to control the regions without creating a system

that has any more powers, even on paper, to intervene in

the actions of regional and republic governments.

Second, Putin's action was, after all, by decree.

To make this system work, the Russian president may well

have to seek a constitutional amendment, a process that

at the very least will spark a new regional politics and

one that Putin and his allies cannot be sure of winning.

If these seven new federal districts are not

constitutionalized, regional leaders are likely to view

them either as an annoyance that they can ignore, the

base for the projection of their own power if the

district capital is the same as their own, or a new

forum in which they can combine to advance their

interests.

If regional leaders seek to ignore these new

bodies, then Putin will either have to invest them with

force or watch them turn into the latest stillborn

creation of the post-Soviet period. But if they either

try to take control of these bodies or combine to oppose

them, he may find himself confronted by larger and more

powerful combinations of regions, hardly the outcome he

and his aides say they want.

And third, the actual powers these presidential

representatives will have, either legally or

politically, remains far from clear at the moment. Much

depends on whom Putin selects, the powers he gives them,

and their ability and willingness to work with the

governors and republican presidents under their control.

If Putin names politically significant people to

these posts, at least some of them are likely to take

advantage of the situation to build their own power

bases, especially since in the absence of force or other

resources, they will likely have to develop good working

relations with the regional elites if they are to

accomplish anything. But if he names faceless members of

the bureaucracy, the elected regional governors and

republic presidents are likely to view these new

representatives with little or no more respect than they

did Yeltsin's envoys to their own territories, thereby

severely limiting the representatives' utility to

Moscow.

That, in turn, could prompt Putin either to reach

new compromises with regional elites or to rely ever

more on the use of force. Either of these strategies

will limit Moscow's ability to pursue a country-wide

pattern of reform, and both could represent a threat to

the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.

Except for his actions in Chechnya, Yeltsin during

his presidency tolerated both diversity and autonomy

across the Russian Federation, arrangements that limited

Moscow's power but purchased a certain amount of

stability, decentralization, and popular control.

Now Putin, whose actions in Chechnya have been far

more brutal than Yeltsin's ever were, has decided to

rein in the regions. But his 13 May decree seems more

likely to set the center and periphery on a new

collision course, one that may threaten even the limited

moves toward democracy and federalism Yeltsin sponsored.

16-05-00

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URL: http://www.rferl.org

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