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OMRI: Pursuing Balkan Peace, No. 44, 96-11-05
From: Open Media Research Institute <http://www.omri.cz>
Pursuing Balkan Peace
No. 44, 5 November 1996
CONTENTS
[01] MONITOR -- BUT DON'T TOUCH
[02] BOSNIAN SERBS TO FIRE ACCUSED WAR CRIMINALS FROM POLICE.
[03] BOSNIAN REFUGEES ORGANIZE ACROSS ETHNIC LINES.
[04] IZETBEGOVIC "TO MOVE" CONTROVERSIAL BOSNIAN DEFENSE OFFICIAL.
[05] BOSNIAN SERB WRAPUP.
[06] INDEPENDENT MEDIA IN REPUBLIKA SRPSKA RESIST GOVERNMENT PRESSURE . . .
[07] . . . AND SCORE AT LEAST SOME SUCCESS.
[08] BOSNIAN SERBS THREATEN TO BAN FEDERATION PARTIES FROM MUNICIPAL POLLS.
[09] FORMER YUGOSLAV STATES OPPOSE AUTOMATIC UN MEMBERSHIP FOR BELGRADE.
[10] FEDERAL YUGOSLAV AND CROATIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS MEET.
[11] BATURIN: RUSSIA WANTS BASE IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA.
[12] MILOSEVIC BACKERS AHEAD IN FEDERAL YUGOSLAV ELECTIONS.
[13] MYSTERIOUS KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY STILL ON THE MOVE.
[14] STOYANOV WINS BULGARIAN PRESIDENCY.
[15] THE SURPRISE IN THE BULGARIAN ELECTIONS.
[01] MONITOR -- BUT DON'T TOUCH
In a major embarrassment to the international institutions supervising the
implementation of the Dayton peace accord, the press last week found six
Bosnian Serbs who had been indicted by The Hague-based tribunal for alleged
war crimes. Most importantly, the six were working as policemen or
officials in Prijedor, Omarska and Bosanski Samac. In a series of three
articles The Boston Globe revealed the men's names and present positions
in the Republika Srpska. Meanwhile, OMRI's own investigation unearthed an
RS government document proving that officials in Pale had maintained
official contacts with yet another indicted war criminal, Milan Martic. The
letter, written on official stationery and signed by RS Information
Minister Dragan Bozanic at the beginning of October, identifies Martic and
refers to him as "President of the Republika Srpska Krajina," the title he
had assumed until the defeat of his self-proclaimed statelet in August
1995. The document discusses Martic's wish to reclaim radio station
equipment taken from his associates by the Bosnian Serb Army, which is at
odds with the Bosnian Serb civilian leadership.
Reacting to questions touched off by the reports in the Globe, spokesman
Colum Murphy at first acknowledged that the Office of the High Representative
(OHR) had known for "several weeks" about four of the indicted war criminals
serving as policemen in Prijedor and Omarska. That office had even sent a
letter on the matter to the Pale government. But IFOR, the UN International
Police Task Force (IPTF) and the OSCE claimed to have no previous knowledge of
these facts. A day later Murphy retreated from his earlier statement, now
claiming that the OHR had found out about the whereabouts of these indicted
war criminals only two days before and apologized for misleading the press by
"citing from memory a wrongly dated document."
And the plot thickened. That same day, the IPTF had to acknowledge that it has
been informed of the details by the Globe more than a week earlier. On 31
October, IPTF Commissioner Peter Fitzgerald confirmed that the first IPTF
report on this matter was in fact written more than three months ago -- on 12
July. He said, however, that the document remained in the files of IPTF's
Banja Luka office and had never reached Sarajevo headquarters.
Meanwhile, OMRI acquired another document confirming that monitors of the
European Commission Monitoring Mission (ECMM) knew as early as the beginning
of May that another indicted war criminal, Blagoje Simic, holds the position
of vice president of the local governing Serbian Democratic Party (SDS)
in Bosanski Samac. And an additional ECMM document made available to OMRI
suggests that European Monitors have met with at least some officials in this
town on several occasions since their first visit on 23 February. ECMM
Sarajevo was unwilling to comment.
All international representatives seem to have been caught unprepared by the
press revelations. Aside from expressing verbal outrage, all their outlets and
media representatives hurried to stress the limits of their specific mandates,
repeating that Dayton leaves the responsibility for sending indicted war crime
suspects to The Hague with the respective parties. To a man they also avoided
any kind of criticism against the government of the Republika Srpska. So far,
the strongest statement from the OHR was issued on Saturday and said only that
"indicted war criminals running loose around the country unhindered,
unaccountable and unsought by anyone" was "a scandal that haunts those who
were negligent and that insults its victims." The OHR thus failed to let the
RS government know publicly that its willingness to shelter and even employ
indicted war crimes suspects amounts to factual noncompliance with the peace
treaty and, as such, calls for immediate consequences.
It has thus become increasingly difficult to believe the claims that neither
IFOR -- with its professional intelligence structures organized down to
regimental level -- nor the IPTF, ECMM, or OSCE -- with hundreds of officials
in dozens of regional centers throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina -- are unable to
identify in their areas of operation indicted war criminals holding public
office or openly serving as policemen. Printed on the Tribunal's "wanted"
poster are not only the photographs of some indicted war criminals but even
their exact addresses. Still, Stevan Todorovic -- indicted for major
atrocities against non-Serb civilian population during "ethnic cleansing" in
1992 -- manages to commute every day to his work as deputy commander of the
state security police in Bosanski Samac on a IFOR-patrolled road, as revealed
by the Globe. Twice a day he passes by the gate of the U.S. IFOR Camp Colt
base where his photograph and full address on the Hague poster can be
studied.
OMRI interviewed three different IFOR sources about NATO's policy concerning
war criminals. All of them told OMRI that in the case of Prijedor, British
IFOR intelligence knew about "these and many more cases" since March. "We
are soldiers and act upon orders. Since the very start of this mission there
is one order which we nicknamed 'monitor but don't touch.' With a different
order we could sack them [indicted war criminals] within hours," one of the
sources said. IFOR's spokesman denied the existence of any such orders,
claiming that the "mandate allows IFOR to arrest indicted war criminals only
if they are encountered in the normal course of duties." In his Saturday's
statement High Representative Carl Bildt said: "Infantry battalions are not
designed and are not trained for criminal investigations or other law-
enforcement activities. But if this is the case... we must look at ways of
creating the instruments which will be necessary in selected cases in order to
ensure that the one faction or the other simply does not make a complete
mockery of the international community." Bildt's statement seemingly does not
address those cases when the international community makes a complete mockery
of itself.
OMRI has obtained a copy of a document which proves that, in summer 1996, the
British Foreign and Commonwealth Office recommended Simo Drljaca, then
Prijedor police chief, as possible invitee to a high-level "Bosnian Workshop
on Reconciliation" in Great Britain later this year. Drljaca, who is
under investigation by The Hague, has commanded three already indicted war
criminals. He had to step down from his post after a showdown with an IFOR
patrol revealed undeclared weapons in his car and office. The international
organizers of this workshop have asked experts on Bosnia from all over Europe
to name as possible participants only persons with an "open mind" and no
"reputation for hard-line shouting." -- Jan Urban in Sarajevo
[02] BOSNIAN SERBS TO FIRE ACCUSED WAR CRIMINALS FROM POLICE.
Republika Srpska President Biljana Plavsic told U.S. human rights envoy John
Shattuck that the four indicted war criminals recently identified as serving
with the Bosnian Serb police will be fired (see above). She refused, however,
to turn the men over to the Hague-based war crimes tribunal, in response to
which Shattuck threatened "negative political and economic consequences,"
Oslobodjenje reported on 5 November. -- Patrick Moore
[03] BOSNIAN REFUGEES ORGANIZE ACROSS ETHNIC LINES.
On a somewhat cheerier note, representatives of Bosnian Muslim, Serb, and
Croat refugees who want to go back to their homes despite nationalist
opposition have formed a group in Sarajevo to coordinate their efforts,
Oslobodjenje reported on 31 October. The Coalition for Return says it
rejects "the ideology of ethnic separation." Elsewhere, the president of the
Community of Croatian Refugees in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Stef Masatovic, charged
that none of the three sides is interested in letting refuges go home and that
there is no infrastructure available for those people. He added that the only
solution is to build new towns for refugees, Oslobodjenje wrote on 1
November. -- Patrick Moore
[04] IZETBEGOVIC "TO MOVE" CONTROVERSIAL BOSNIAN DEFENSE OFFICIAL.
Turning to military matters, President Alija Izetbegovic said that Deputy
Defense Minister Hasan Cengic will be transferred to another job as part of a
government reshuffle. Izetbegovic thereby apparently refused to bow to U.S.
pressure and openly sack the minister, whose removal Washington said was a
precondition to the resumption of U.S. military aid, AFP noted on 3 November.
The public but murky imbroglio has dragged on for nearly two weeks. American
spokesmen have given two differing reasons as to why they want Cengic to go:
because he was allegedly blocking the integration of the Croat-Muslim joint
command; or because of his purported links to Iran. Izetbegovic has denied
that Cengic or any of the Bosnian military have links to Iran, saying that "we
chose military cooperation with the United States [over that with Iran],
because that gives more guarantees in preventing aggression in the future."
The Americans, however, said they will not resume arms shipments until Cengic
is definitely gone. Nor has Washington concentrated its attention purely on
the Muslims. The U.S. and OSCE have charged that the Bosnian Serbs are
violating the arms control provisions of the Dayton agreement by keeping a
"significant number" of extra World War II tanks in service. The Serbs have
exploited a loophole in the text that allows parties to hold onto such weapons
if they are intended for export, research, or museums, Reuters noted on 30
October. -- Patrick Moore
[05] BOSNIAN SERB WRAPUP.
Meanwhile in Athens, Plavsic said that her government has no intention of
turning over indicted war criminals Radovan Karadzic and Gen. Ratko Mladic to
the Hague-based tribunal, AFP reported on 29 October. That same news agency on
2 November noted that Greek television had interviewed Orthodox monks from Mt.
Athos, who claimed that preparations are under way for Karadzic to take up
residence in a monastery there. There has been no independent confirmation of
the monks' story. In Banja Luka, Britain's Duke of Kent, a cousin of Queen
Elizabeth II, met with top officials of the Republika Srpska on 29 October. A
delegation of British businessmen is expected to follow. And in Pale, business
links are developing in other directions, too. One of the biggest Russian
exporters, Selkhozpromexport, held talks in Pale and Bijeljina about opening a
$50 million credit for the RS and establishment of joint ventures. -- Patrick
Moore and Jan Urban
[06] INDEPENDENT MEDIA IN REPUBLIKA SRPSKA RESIST GOVERNMENT PRESSURE . . .
Turning to press matters, on 28 October representatives of the major
independent Bosnian Serb media met in Banja Luka to discuss their response
to a recent government campaign against dissident media voices. The
representatives of Novi Prelom, Nezavisne Novine and Radio Krajina from
Banja Luka, Alternativa from Doboj, and Extra Magazin and Panorama
from Bijeljina debated coordinating their marketing, starting an
independent journalists' union, and possibly setting up an independent
printing house. The government- owned printing office Glas Srpski recently
refused to print dissident periodicals. Radio Krajina faces attempts by the
Information Ministry to take away its equipment and broadcasting
frequency. Two Alternativa journalists face flimsy libel charges by two
officials of the governing Serbian Democratic Party. -- Jan Urban in
Sarajevo and Patrick Moore
[07] . . . AND SCORE AT LEAST SOME SUCCESS.
But at least Alternativa is again available on the newsstands. After Glas
Srpski refused to continue printing it, the Dnevnik firm in Novi Sad decided
to help and print one issue under rather clandestine conditions. This is
obviously no long-term solution to the printing problems the independent
newspapers face, but, as one Doboj journalist said to OMRI, "it proves the
vitality and persistence of free minds -- and it produces a lot of puzzlement
in the government as to how to deal with it." One way the authorities do deal
with these "free minds" was shown in Doboj late last week when one seller of
Alternativa was beaten up twice, including once by a policeman. -- Yvonne
Badal in Sarajevo
[08] BOSNIAN SERBS THREATEN TO BAN FEDERATION PARTIES FROM MUNICIPAL POLLS.
Nor is toughness in the RS reserved for the press. Dragan Kalinic, head of
the Bosnian Serb parliament, threatened on 26 October to ban parties from
the mainly Muslim and Croat Federation from taking part in municipal
elections in the Republika Srpska, AFP quoted BETA as saying. Kalinic said
the parties from the Federation must be registered according to RS laws
defining the rights of national minorities, which include Muslims and
Croats. Meanwhile, the Liberal-Bosniak Organization (LBO) said that more
than 800 Muslims were expelled from their homes in Banja Luka during the
previous month, Oslobodjenje reported on 29 October. -- Daria Sito Sucic
[09] FORMER YUGOSLAV STATES OPPOSE AUTOMATIC UN MEMBERSHIP FOR BELGRADE.
Turning to broader issues facing the former Yugoslav republics, the UN
ambassadors of Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia sent an appeal to
Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali requesting that Serbia-Montenegro not
automatically inherit the UN seat of Tito's Yugoslavia. The four asked that
Belgrade be required to apply for membership like any other new candidate lest
the move "make an impact on the division of common assets," Onasa noted on 30
October, citing BETA. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia claims that it is the sole successor to Tito's state and hence
that it alone is entitled to its rights and properties, a point that the other
four states dispute. -- Patrick Moore
[10] FEDERAL YUGOSLAV AND CROATIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS MEET.
Mate Granic of Croatia and Milan Milutinovic of Serbia-Montenegro meanwhile
met in Zagreb on 29 October to discuss the further implementation of the
agreement on normalizing relations between the two countries, Croatian and
Serbian media reported. The two ministers signed an agreement abolishing visa
requirements for diplomats and government officials. But other federal
Yugoslav citizens will still need visas to enter Croatia, and Croatians must
pay border-crossing fees and deposit their passports at the border when they
cross into Serbia- Montenegro. Granic and Milutinovic announced that a number
of agreements regulating internal affairs and social and economic issues will
be signed at the end of the year. Commissions for railway and road restoration
will start in early November. During Milutinovic's visit, President Franjo
Tudjman discussed the peaceful reintegration of eastern Slavonia into Croatia
with him. Tudjman said Croatia could not accept a six- or 12- month extension
of the UNTAES mandate but only a "three plus three" extension, because of
pressure by the general public. -- Daria Sito Sucic
[11] BATURIN: RUSSIA WANTS BASE IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA.
Nor are only people living in the former Yugoslavia thinking about that
region's strategic future. Russian Defense Council Secretary Yurii Baturin
told the radio station Ekho Moskvy on 31 October that he would like to see a
continued Russian military presence in the former Yugoslavia even after the
eventual withdrawal of UN and NATO-led peacekeeping forces, including UNTAES.
He said "it would not seem strange," if Moscow raised the question of having a
military base in the area, since he claimed the U.S. is already planning to
establish military bases there. He added that the idea of Russian bases "has
become particularly topical in view of the proposed NATO expansion eastward."
Baturin did not specify from which Yugoslav successor state Moscow might ask
for base rights, although Russia has closer ties with Belgrade and Pale than
with the other centers. -- Scott Parrish
[12] MILOSEVIC BACKERS AHEAD IN FEDERAL YUGOSLAV ELECTIONS.
But the big story in Belgrade was the 3 November elections. With over half the
votes counted, parties loyal to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic held a
convincing lead as of Tuesday morning. Beta reported that 48.15% of votes
counted went to Milosevic's coalition, 23.94% to the heterogeneous opposition
Zajedno (Together) coalition, and 18.47% to the ultranationalist Serbian
Radical Party (SRS). In terms of representational breakdown for the 138-member
legislature, Reuters reported that Milosevic's coalition so far is guaranteed
50 seats, while Zajedno has 21 and the SRS 13. Meanwhile, Montena-fax said
that in the Montenegrin republican elections, the governing Democratic
Socialist Party has an absolute majority of 45 out of 71 seats with nearly all
ballots counted. Only in local voting did the opposition manage to make
inroads. In Belgrade, Democratic Party leader Zoran Djindjic nearly won a
majority in the mayor's race but will have to face a 17 November run-off. --
Stan Markotich.
[13] MYSTERIOUS KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY STILL ON THE MOVE.
Still in federal Yugoslavia, despite a wave of arrests since early October,
the shadowy Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) continued attacking Serbian
government officials, mainly police officers. In the latest case the group
shot a Serb police officer and a civil servant on 25 October near
Podujevo.
The UCK first made itself known when it firebombed Serb refugee homes in
Kosovo on 11 February. Since then, it is believed to have killed at least nine
people and injured many more. The group has already claimed responsibility for
most such attacks, which were carried out in a similar manner. In its latest
letters to Kosovar media, the UCK also threatened to kill any ethnic Albanians
whom they regard as collaborators with the Serbian authorities.
The group, which uses mostly automatic weapons and hand grenades, has so far
aimed its attacks primarily at smaller police stations, police cars or
individuals. It has not attacked prominent or well-protected representatives
or institutions of the Serbian administration, which suggests that it is
avoiding waging highly sophisticated operations. Instead, they prefer easy
targets which pose no or minimal risk. In probably the most violent incident,
in April they sprayed machine-gun fire at a street cafe popular with Serbian
policemen, killing three persons. While the way it carries out its operations
suggests some things about the group, it is not known when the UCK was set up,
how many members it has, who funds it, or who its leaders are.
The first 15 arrests of suspected members of the Liberation Army came in early
October. Nonetheless, subsequent killings proved that the group was still able
to operate, and it remains highly doubtful whether the police actually
arrested the real culprits or just some young Albanian males as scapegoats and
as a way of demonstrating success in investigations. After the 25 October
attack, police arrested over 30 people in Surkis near Podujevo, but it remains
unclear if there is any evidence linking these Albanians to the armed
group.
In its declarations, the UCK denies being nationalistic. It claims to fight
against an occupation force, arguing that the abolition of the province's
autonomy in 1989 was a violation of then-Yugoslav constitution, which dated
from 1974. The group says its aim is the independence of the self-declared
Republic of Kosovo from Serbia, but not unification with Albania. They are
thus more moderate in their political program than some other small and
extreme right-wing political parties in Kosovo and Albania, which want an
"ethnic Albania," including parts of Montenegro, Serbia proper, Macedonia, and
Greece, as well as all of Albania and Kosovo.
The Liberation Army says instead that the shadow-state's official strategy of
non-violent resistance has failed, but it does not challenge the shadow-
state's overall goals. The strategy of the UCK seems to be to create a climate
of fear, rather than to gain rapid military victories. It apparently hopes not
just to prevent reconciliation between Albanians and Serbs, but to aggravate
tensions. This could ensure that the Albanians grow increasingly reluctant to
compromise on independence.
In a next step, the Liberation Army could destroy the basis of the broad
social consensus supporting non-violent resistance and recruit more supporters
for an armed struggle for independence. So far the group has been very
effective in aggravating tensions. Before the funeral of the last victims on
27 October, the Deputy Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
Nikola Sainovic, and Serbian Interior Minister Zoran Sokolovic visited
representatives of the Serbian community in Podujevo. Sokolovic promised that
a police intervention unit would be stationed in the town, and said he would
ask the federal government to set up a Yugoslav army garrison in Podujevo. --
Fabian Schmidt
[14] STOYANOV WINS BULGARIAN PRESIDENCY.
Meanwhile in Bulgaria, electoral politics were in the news. Petar Stoyanov of
the united opposition will assume office as the next Bulgarian president on 22
January 1997. He and his running mate Todor Kavaldzhiev handily won the second
round of elections on 3 November. The opposition not only retained the
presidency but also seems to have a realistic chance of winning early
elections, should they take place. The governing Bulgarian Socialist Party
(BSP), meanwhile, will probably have to think about the serious consequences
of this humiliating defeat.
Stoyanov and Kavaldzhiev received 59.96% of the vote in the runoffs, according
to preliminary results from the Central Electoral Commission the following
morning. The BSP candidates -- Culture Minister Ivan Marazov and Deputy
Foreign Minister Irina Bokova -- trailed far behind, getting 40.04%. The
turnout was 61.72%.
Stoyanov garnered 70-75% in Sofia and in his hometown of Plovdiv, both of
which are opposition strongholds. He also managed to win around two-thirds of
the vote in the other big towns. More telling, Stoyanov also appears to have
won a slight majority in many small towns and villages, which traditionally
backed the BSP. Marazov seems to have come out on top only in the
traditionally leftist northwest of the country, and even there only by a
relatively narrow margin.
In his first election night statements, Stoyanov said he will act as president
of all Bulgarians, stressing that drawing Bulgaria closer to the EU and NATO
are his foreign policy priorities. Meanwhile, the leaders of the united
opposition--Ivan Kostov of the Union of Democratic Forces, Anastasiya
Dimitrova-Mozer and Stefan Savov of the People's Union, and Ahmed Dogan of the
ethnic Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedom -- made a display of unity
during their election night press conference. This suggests that they consider
Stoyanov's triumph just the first in a series of victories for the non-
socialist camp.
Indeed, the next opposition goal is to work toward early 1997 parliamentary
elections and drive the Socialists from power. Political analysts and
activists close to the opposition have already started working on electoral
strategies.
The BSP, meanwhile, has to recover from its most humiliating defeat since
1990. Prime Minister and party chairman Zhan Videnov refused to say on
election night what consequences there may be for the government and the BSP.
Several Sofia newspapers nonetheless reported Videnov will try to dispel
pressures from inside the party and ask for a confidence vote as party leader
at an extraordinary congress at the end of the year or in January. Influential
BSP circles -- mostly with a Social Democratic orientation -- have
repeatedly called for Videnov's resignation and threatened to split the party.
Whether Videnov can hang on until the end of the year remains unclear. A
plenary meeting on 11 November will discuss the election results and should
give a first indication of the party's future course. -- Stefan Krause
[15] THE SURPRISE IN THE BULGARIAN ELECTIONS.
But there was more to the story, namely a rather unexpected development in the
first round. Bulgarian Business Block Leader (BBB) and populist figure Georges
Ganchev won the surprisingly high share of 21.87% of votes in the first round
of the 27 October presidential elections. He finished third after Stoyanov-
Kavaldzhiev (44.07%), and Marazov-Bokova (27.01%). The real surprise was not
that Ganchev came in third, but that his showing was so strong, especially in
regions with an ethnically mixed population and regions that were once
bastions of the BSP.
In the 1992 presidential elections he had garnered only 17% of the vote, but
even then he nonetheless managed to present the results in his typically
flamboyant style as some sort of stunning political victory. In the 1994
parliamentary elections came what was really his biggest political success to
date, namely overcoming the 4% hurdle. He has declared many times that he had
abandoned his successful business and promising artistic career in the West
for the sake of Bulgaria. He even seemed to believe his own rhetoric, which
he often expressed through media sound-bites replete with songs and
picturesque language. With "a big bludgeon in hand" and "within 45 days" he
promised to stop street crime -- if elected president in 1996 -- as well as
help small- and medium-sized companies out of the doldrums that characterize
Bulgaria's economy.
In the 27 October balloting Ganchev capitalized on the negative attitude of
those disillusioned with both the governing Socialists and the opposition.
Analyses by polling agencies after the first round showed that the nationalist
vote, which traditionally goes to the BSP, is shifting to Ganchev. He himself
has adopted a nationalist stance, stressing his "patriotism." Two major
pollsters (NOEMA and MBMD) describe Ganchev as a "dangerous" phenomenon,
comparable with that of the rightist French political leader, Jean-Marie Le
Pen.
It thus should not come as a surprise that Ganchev is popular in regions with
an ethnically mixed population and among people with a relatively low
educational level, since many of them seem receptive to his formulas of easy
solutions to complex problems. But his supporters cross many social and
demographic lines, too. Around 28% of them were young people, including ones
with higher education, whom he promised to create a "positive climate" in
order to stem the brain-drain. In short, his radical-sounding promises
appealed -- especially in the last six months -- to Bulgarians who are in
their most economically productive years (18-50) but who are suffering under
adverse economic conditions.
Both the BSP and the opposition tried to woo Ganchev and his supporters in the
tense week between the two rounds of the presidential vote. The BBB leader
defined himself at a press conference after the 27 October election as being
closer to the right than to the left on the political spectrum. But Ganchev,
after a meeting with BSP officials on 30 October, said he would simply ask his
supporters to vote their conscience in the second round. Polls suggested that,
in the second round about half of his supporters would not bother to vote, and
the remainder would support Stoyanov over Marazov by a 2-1 margin. -- Maria
Koinova
Edited by Patrick Moore
This material was reprinted with permission of the Open Media
Research Institute, a nonprofit organization with research offices in
Prague, Czech Republic.
For more information on OMRI publications please write to [email protected].
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