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OMRI: PURSUING BALKAN PEACE, V1,#3, Jan. 23, 1996
CONTENTS
[01] INTRODUCTION.
[02] AN EVENTFUL WEEK IN BOSNIA.
[03] IFOR TO HELP INVESTIGATE ATROCITIES.
[04] INVESTIGATION OF WAR CRIMES COULD NOW START IN EARNEST.
[05] DID SERBS USE POISON GAS AT SREBRENICA?
[06] THE QUESTIONABLE FATE OF MUSLIM REFUGES IN SERBIA.
[07] ANOTHER SERBIAN WAR CRIMINAL ARRESTED
[08] LAST MUJAHIDIN LEAVING BOSNIA?
[09] MOVEMENT ON THE BOSNIAN POLITICAL FRONT.
[10] MURATOVIC "RELUCTANTLY" ACCEPTS NOMINATION FOR BOSNIAN PREMIERSHIP.
[11] A NEW SERBIAN POLITICAL PARTY?
[12] PALE CHANGES TACTICS ON SARAJEVO.
[13] WHAT ARE THE SERB GOALS IN SARAJEVO?
[14] SERBS IN ILIDZA, AROUND SARAJEVO.
[15] IFOR CONTROLS KEY UTILITY PLANTS IN SARAJEVO.
[16] BOSNIA MODIFIES LAW ON MILITARY DRAFT.
[17] SERBIAN-CROAT CONTACTS REESTABLISHED.
[18] BULGARIA WANTS TO HELP WITH RECONSTRUCTION.
[19] PROBLEMS AHEAD FOR HERZEGOVINA'S MARIJUANA INDUSTRY?
[20] BELGRADE TO OFFER CITIZENSHIP TO SERBIAN REFUGEES?
[21] MILOSEVIC ENDORSES AMNESTY.
[22] REGIONAL PEACE AND MILOSEVIC'S "WAR ON CRIME."
[23] MOVEMENT IN KOSOVAR POLITICS IN THE WAKE OF DAYTON AGREEMENT.
[24] THE DILEMMAS OF A BOSNIAN WAR CRIMES INVESTIGATOR
OMRI SPECIAL REPORT: PURSUING BALKAN PEACE
Vol. 1, No. 3, 23 January 1996
[01] INTRODUCTION.
Welcome to "Pursuing Balkan Peace," the second in OMRI's series of
special reports on developments in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union. Distributed as a supplement to the OMRI Daily Digest, "Pursuing
Balkan Peace" will appear weekly and contain the latest news about
developments in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The OMRI Daily
Digest will continue to include major stories from the region that do
not appear in this supplement.
[02] AN EVENTFUL WEEK IN BOSNIA.
The period between 16 and 23 January
witnessed developments in a number of areas. First, by the 20th the
respective armies had generally met the Dayton deadlines to withdraw
their forces from the Zone of Separation and remove mines and barbed
wire. Many mines and obstacles remained, but this seemed due more to
negligence and to the magnitude of the problem than to design. Second,
deadlines for releasing prisoners and for reuniting Mostar came and
went. The problem stemmed from demands by the Bosnian government that
the Serbs account for all missing persons, and that they also free
nearly 1,000 Muslims believed to be held at a forced labor camp but who
did not appear on the Serbs' official lists of prisoners. The
government's concern was to make the Serbs own up for the massacres at
Srebrenica, Zepa, and elsewhere, and to save the forced laborers from a
similar fate. The Bosnian government was nonetheless warned on several
occasions by top U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Warren
Christopher and top regional envoy Richard Holbrooke to stop holding
things up and to observe the letter of the treaty. Holbrooke
specifically mentioned the key issue at stake for Washington, namely
that no one side try unilaterally to change the provisions of the Dayton
agreement lest the whole structure collapse. As to Mostar, the
restoration of freedom of movement seemed to be snagged on legal
technicalities, but top international officials kept up the pressure,
particularly on the Croats, to try to put things back on track. --
Patrick Moore
[03] IFOR TO HELP INVESTIGATE ATROCITIES.
Another key issue was IFOR's
mandate and the investigation of atrocities. It appeared to be finally
resolved when IFOR commander U.S. Admiral Leighton Smith met Justice
Richard Goldstone of the Hague war crimes tribunal on 22 January in
Sarajevo. The meeting followed calls from the tribunal, from U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights John Shattuck, and others
for a prompt investigation of probable mass graves and other sites of
atrocities. Goldstone and Smith reached an agreement whereby NATO will
help protect investigations into war crimes, the BBC said. NATO has so
far refused to guard suspected mass grave sites in the fear that it will
be taking on missions other than those assigned to it in the Dayton
peace accords. The Washington Post on 23 January reported Smith as
telling Goldstone that "If you don't push me and make me say what I'm
going to do, I'll do a lot." -- Michael Mihalka
[04] INVESTIGATION OF WAR CRIMES COULD NOW START IN EARNEST.
The head of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia then told
international media that his team might begin work in the field in as
soon as two weeks. The investigators are concerned that the Serbs might
try to destroy evidence of atrocities in the meantime, and Reuters said
that the Serbs are keeping foreigners out of the Srebrenica area.
Elsewhere, the International Herald Tribune reported on 23 January that
the U.S. intelligence community has been told to help the tribunal, even
if it means investigating charges that Serbian President Slobodan
Milosevic is responsible for war crimes. Goldstone had earlier
criticized the Americans for being slow to provide evidence, but
Washington now seems willing to help. This apparently also means tracing
atrocities to the doorstep of the man who was so central to Richard
Holbrooke's diplomatic efforts last year. -- Patrick Moore
[05] DID SERBS USE POISON GAS AT SREBRENICA?
There have been occasionalcharges in the Wars of the Yugoslav Succession that the Serbs used
poison gas, but the BBC reported on 23 January that only now has one
such claim apparently been verified. A British expert said that he had
seen evidence of empty BZ gas canisters and shells at Srebrenica, which
fell to the Serbs after a tough fight in July. The expert also spoke to
survivors, and their descriptions of the events and the exposed Bosnian
soldiers' reactions afterwards strongly indicated that they had been
shelled with BZ. The gas is a hallucinogen that apparently caused the
previously stout defenders of Srebrenica to become disoriented and hence
easy pickings for Serb gunners. The Serbs seem to have used the gas only
at one point on the Bosnians' defensive line and did not use it
indiscriminately against civilians. The investigator said he would pass
his findings on to The Hague. -- Patrick Moore
[06] THE QUESTIONABLE FATE OF MUSLIM REFUGES IN SERBIA.
On 19 January
Bratislava Morina, commisioner of refugees for Serbia, told Tanjug that
the Muslim refugees who fled to rump Yugoslavia from Srebrenica and Zepa
last summer are being well-treated and are under UNHCR care and
supervision. Morina, responding to charges in international media that
the refugees were ill-treated and abused, argued they never lacked food
or medicine. On that same day, however, the BBC's monitoring service,
citing Austria's ORF TV, said that the some 1,000 Muslims who managed to
escape from the enclaves as Serb forces overran them are "being held in
a Serbian police camp, completely isolated from the public." The BBC
notes that ORF is the only television station that has been allowed to
go into the prison camp. -- Stan Markotich
[07] ANOTHER SERBIAN WAR CRIMINAL ARRESTED.
A federal court in Karlsruhe,
Germany said on 18 January that a Serb suspected of taking part in the
mass killings of Bosnian Muslims in 1992 was arrested in Munich, AFP
reported the same day. The suspect, who was not identified, was linked
to a 21 April 1992 incident in the village of Djedjevo, where Serb
soldiers arrested 50 Muslims and shot dead 13 . The suspect was also
implicated in a 22 June 1992 incident in the village of Trnovace in
eastern Bosnia, where 14 Muslims were massacred. A month earlier, German
police at Dusseldorf airport arrested a further Serb suspected of
genocide. -- Daria Sito Sucic
[08] LAST MUJAHIDIN LEAVING BOSNIA?
Beta on 17 January quoted a NATOspokesman as saying that the last group of 135 foreign Islamic fighters
left Bosnia the previous day, just ahead of the Dayton deadline for
foreign troops to leave. Reuters on 15 January said that small groups of
mujahidin in Bihac were escorted by regular Bosnian army troops to the
Croatian border and on to Zagreb for flights out of the region. They
were unarmed and wearing civilian clothes. On the 18th, however, the
British had to seal off a group of 100 foreign mujahidin following an
ugly incident between the Islamic fighters and Canadian troops. The
men's departure had been held up by administrative difficulties on the
Croatian side. Smith had earlier talked to Bosnian military and
political officials in Bihac about moving the fighters out and appeared
to be satisfied with their progress. IFOR in public has generally tried
to play down the idea that the mujahidin might be a lasting problem.
Reuters added that the Bosnian government has allowed some foreign
mujahidin to remain -- including those married to local women -- and
given them passports provided they behave like other citizens. The
International Herald Tribune on 17 January nonetheless reported that
some foreign mujahidin had stayed behind and gone underground. A U.S.
army officer there called them a "passive threat." The State Department
expressed concern on 22 January that the foreign mujahidin might pose a
continuing problem. Local Bosnian mujahidin are, of course, allowed to
stay, but the Bosnian authorities are expected to keep them under
control. -- Daria Sito Sucic and Patrick Moore
[09] MOVEMENT ON THE BOSNIAN POLITICAL FRONT.
Key developments centered not
only on the implementation -- or lack of it -- of the Dayton agreement,
but also with changes that potentially could deeply affect the political
landscape. Such a major development would be the breakup of the three
ethnically based parties under the weight of their own internal
contradictions due to opposing philosophies, personalities, and regional
interests. New coalitions and alignments might then emerge. Conflicts in
the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) to date have centered on the
clashes of interest between the Croats of Bosnia, who seek to work with
the Muslims, and those of Herzegovina, who prefer to treat their region
as part of Croatia proper. Disputes among the Muslims' Party of
Democratic Action (SDA) have been chiefly along the fault-line of
secularism and a multiethnic society on the one side vs. a strong
Islamic orientation on the other. Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic has
impeccable Islamic credentials as a scholar and an official of the
former Yugoslav Islamic organization, but he favored the multiethnic
course. He also had a long-standing feud with the hard-liners in the
SDA. Oslobodjenje reported on 22 January, however, that the previous day
he threw in the towel, saying that he would not be a candidate for prime
minister in the new Bosnian government, which he feels will not be
sufficiently strong. There is currently a game of political musical
chairs going on in Sarajevo for power and influence in the future
government, and Silajdzic's move should also be seen against this
background. -- Patrick Moore
[10] MURATOVIC "RELUCTANTLY" ACCEPTS NOMINATION FOR BOSNIAN PREMIERSHIP.
Minister for Relations with IFOR Hasan Muratovic has said he will
accepting the job, albeit reluctantly. "Silajdzic is the man we need,
but unfortunately he has refused to be prime minister," AFP quoted him
as saying. Muratovic was nominated for the premiership at an emergency
session of the executive board of the SDA after Silajdzic's statement.
The next day, the collective Presidency endorsed the SDA's decision,
Oslobodjenje reported on the 22nd. Muratovic, who is not a member of the
SDA , was considered a close Silajdzic ally. AFP quoted President Alija
Izetbegovic as telling state television on 21 January that Silajdzic's
exit was based on "caprice." -- Daria Sito Sucic
[11] A NEW SERBIAN POLITICAL PARTY?
There has been movement not only inMuslim ranks but in Serbian ones as well. Oslobodjenje on 22 January
reported that the anti-nationalist Serbian Civic Council (SGV) issued a
declaration that could imply that the group may consider becoming a
political party. The statement indicated that the SGV is testing the
waters by talking not only to key individuals and groups in areas
controlled by the Sarajevo government but also with democratic
opposition parties in Banja Luka and in Belgrade. It was manipulation of
the "Serbian question" that enabled Slobodan Milosevic to rise to power
to begin with; and the future of democracy and stability in the former
Yugoslavia will most likely depend on the future political course of the
Serbs. Groups like the SGV have been trying to steer Serbian political
life in the direction of democracy and a multiethnic society and away
from the nationalist assertion that living together has become
impossible. -- Patrick Moore
[12] PALE CHANGES TACTICS ON SARAJEVO.
Meanwhile, the leaders in Pale were
busy, too. A top-level meeting of the Bosnian Serb leadership held on 15
and 16 January decided to try a new approach to force a change in the
Dayton agreement's provision that certain Serb suburbs will pass to
government control. This has been a key issue because the Serbs have in
effect been calling for the revision of the treaty, which the
international community has firmly refused to do. But now, instead of
talking of a "possible" mass exodus and torchings if the Serbs do not
get their way, Radovan Karadzic and parliament speaker Momcilo Krajisnik
told SRNA that they would work with the international community's
civilian affairs chief Carl Bildt. They want him or international
arbitrators to agree to maintain the status quo until elections are held
between mid-June and mid-September. In the meantime, they will tell
their people to stay put. -- Patrick Moore
[13] WHAT ARE THE SERB GOALS IN SARAJEVO?
AFP reported on 16 January thatPale has apparently decided that an exodus would deprive it of any say
in the future running of Sarajevo. Earlier reports had suggested that
Pale wanted to send the Sarajevo Serbs to Brcko to firm up Serbian
claims to the disputed strategic corridor there. Subsequent talks
between Bildt's deputy Michael Steiner and the Serbs indicated that the
latter want a strong local administration. Steiner said that he and the
Serbs concluded that the agreement would be implemented without any
changes but that Serbian concerns would be taken into account. The
Sarajevo Dnevni Avaz noted on 17 January that anti-nationalist Serbs
around the SGV are seeking IFOR's help to prevent an exodus and want to
reassure the population through a formal amnesty for ordinary Bosnian
Serb soldiers. -- Patrick Moore
[14] SERBS IN ILIDZA, AROUND SARAJEVO.
The Belgrade weekly Vreme on 20
January features a series of portraits of life in the Sarajevo suburb of
Ilidza as well as other territories occupied by Serbs which according to
Dayton come under Bosnian government control. The portraits are
dominated by images of a Serb population with mixed feelings about
political circumstances, and with wide-spread public fears about
retribution and life under Bosnian government administration. Some Serbs
do not want to leave, despite having made preparations to do so. Among
the most radical reactions has been that by members of the community who
have opted to exhume and move the remains of dead relatives. One
sentiment expressed by some individuals is that of abandonment, or an
underlying fear of living as displaced persons. In the words of one
individual, even refuge in Serbia or the rump Yugoslavia, holds no or
little promise of a normal life: "It seems to me now that my children
have to lie, that they have to say their father died in something like a
traffic accident. . . . We watch televsion from Serbia and I am
terrified about how, say people in Belgrade, would react if my sons were
to say--Our father died for the Republika Srpska. Wouldn't somebody
scorn them?" -- Stan Markotich
[15] IFOR CONTROLS KEY UTILITY PLANTS IN SARAJEVO.
On 16 January French NATO
troops, fearing sabotage by elements in the Serb community, moved in to
guard key utilities for the maintenance of the Bosnian capital-- among
them gas, water and electricity installations-- Nasa Borba reported next
day. The operation had been planned in secret, after the Bosnian
government accused Serb leaders of ordering the destruction of vital
utilities. During the fighting, Serb forces had used control over them
as a means of blackmailing the government side. The French troops moved
in the Serb-held suburb of Butila to protect a gas regulation station,
in Bacevo to guard a water pump, and in Reljevo and Blazuj, where
electrical stations are located. A NATO spokesman said that this action
was taken as a precaution, while a French commander said that the troops
met no opposition by Serb forces, Reuters reported on 17 January. Serb
authorities and others in the city were informed of the deployment only
after it was completed. -- Daria Sito Sucic
[16] BOSNIA MODIFIES LAW ON MILITARY DRAFT.
In accordance with its November
decree on the demobilization of males over 45 and of experts and
specialists needed to rebuild the economy, the Presidency of Bosnia-
Herzegovina on 18 January modified a 1992 law on the mobilization of all
men from 16 to 60, AFP reported the same day. The move follows a
December decision to downgrade the state of war and replace it with a
state of immediate threat of war. This stems from the Dayton treaty and
is linked to the forthcoming elections, which cannot be held if the
country is still officially at war. Meanwhile, Oslobodjenje on 22
January reports that the SGV continues to press for a law on amnesty,
arguing that the current declaration of amnesty does not guarantee
protection for either the people on the Serbian side or for the
returnees, including draft evaders and army deserters. -- Daria Sito
Sucic
[17] SERBIAN-CROAT CONTACTS REESTABLISHED.
The second official meeting
between representatives of Zagreb INA and Belgrade Jugopetrol oil
companies, focusing on an December agreement on oil trade and delivery,
was held on 19 January in Zagreb, Vecernji list reported next day. They
concluded a trade agreement; agreed that oil would be delivered by rail
once the network is fixed; and will hold further negotiations. At the
same time, a Croatian delegation visited Banja Luka where the two sides
agreed on the need for free movement of people and renewed economic
cooperation, Nasa Borba reported on 22 January. The head of Bosnian Serb
delegation, Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic, and Slobodan Lang, Croatian
President Franjo Tudjman's chancellor for humanitarian issues, also
agreed on points involving freedom of religion, free movement for the
clergy, and shipment of humanitarian convoys. -- Daria Sito Sucic
[18] BULGARIA WANTS TO HELP WITH RECONSTRUCTION.
It is not just the major or
wealthiest countries that seek to help put Bosnia back on its feet.
Bulgaria's President Zhelyu Zhelev visited Sarajevo on 19 January, where
he met Izetbegovic and expressed Bulgaria's willingness to participate
in the post-war reconstruction, Reuters reported the same day. Zhelev
told reporters that in this way his country shows the desire to help the
Bosnian people and expresses solidarity with Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Izetbegovic recalled that Bulgaria was the first country to recognize
Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence in 1992. During this visit Zhelev also
discussed Bosnian reconstruction with Carl Bildt. -- Daria Sito Sucic
[19] PROBLEMS AHEAD FOR HERZEGOVINA'S MARIJUANA INDUSTRY?
There seems to be arelationship between drugs and war, and the current conflict in the
former Yugoslavia has proven no exception. The role of alcohol has been
particularly pronounced, but other drugs have turned up in abundance as
well. The smoking of marijuana and hashish is, furthermore, no stranger
to the urban culture of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and rural Herzegovina
was a traditional center for the trade. Add these factors together, and
revelations like those in Dnevni Avaz of 22 January come as no surprise.
The article said that in some areas about "every square meter" is given
over to marijuana cultivation, and that it has become "big business."
The most money comes from shipping the product out to Croatia, where it
can fetch good prices in Split and Zagreb. The local mafia (see OMRI
Special Report, 16 January 1996) does well by the trade and deals with
all parties regardless of politics. The article suggests that the
problem -- and the power of the Mostar-area mafia -- has become such
that IFOR may be tempted to try defoliation. -- Patrick Moore
[20] BELGRADE TO OFFER CITIZENSHIP TO SERBIAN REFUGEES?
Tanjug on 16 Januaryreported comments made the previous day by Branislav Ivkovic, the
Serbian government's chief liaison official for refugees from Krajina,
in which he remarked that Belgrade may be prepared in 1996 to offer
citizenship to some 30,000-40,000 Krajina refugees. Ivkovic said that
Belgrade prefers an option which would see all refugees resettled to
areas from where they came, but hinted that political circumstances may
make this an unrealistic assumption. The issue is touchy because the
refugees could turn into an anti-Milosevic bloc of voters, since they
blame him for their loss of Krajina. -- Stan Markotich
[21] MILOSEVIC ENDORSES AMNESTY.
Nasa Borba on 18 January reported that
Serbia's President Slobodan Milosevic has added his voice to those
calling for amnesty for individuals refusing to serve in the wars
throughout the former Yugoslavia. According to the report, it was the
rump Yugoslavia's Supreme Defense Council which has called for the
drafting of legislation that would unconditionally pardon some 12,455
individuals indicted by military courts for refusing to serve.
Milosevic, along with other high-level political officials such as
Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic and federal President Zoran Lilic,
sit on the Council, which is the country's highest executive military
authority. Meanwhile, Vojislav Seselj's influential and ultranationalist
Serbian Radical Party (SRS) alleged on 18 January that the only reason
Milosevic backs an amnesty is because of international pressure to do
so. -- Stan Markotich
[22] REGIONAL PEACE AND MILOSEVIC'S "WAR ON CRIME".
The independent Belgrade
weekly Vreme on 20 January ran a piece that chronicles the development
of Milosevic's latest policy, the "war against criminality," an
initiative featured prominently in the Serbian president's New Year's
address. The weekly suggests that during the period rump Yugoslavia was
under international sanctions for its role in fomenting the wars
throughout the region, smuggling and black marketeering flourished, a
development that was not only tolerated but condoned by the regime. Yet
now with Milosevic's stated support for the peace process and his
involvement with the Dayton accord in order to win the easing of
sanctions, Milosevic will have to seek legitimacy and respectability.
These are the realities, suggests Vreme, which have prompted Milosevic's
new war on crime. Yet the weekly adds that Milosevic's commitment to
stemming criminality should not suggest that the repressive regime
itself has fundamentally changed, or that Milosevic has undertaken
anything apart from a new tactic by which to stay in power. If the
battle cry "war on crime" fails to win public enthusiasm, suggests
Vreme, Milosevic may try to recast the policy in leftist ideological
terms, as a struggle of the poor against the exploiting rich. -- Stan
Markotich
[23] MOVEMENT IN KOSOVAR POLITICS IN THE WAKE OF DAYTON AGREEMENT.
The Kosovo
political scene continues to be in flux in the wake of the Dayton
agreement, which has provided impetus to many to argue that the time is
now ripe for an end to the political deadlock in the mainly Albanian but
Serbian-ruled province. The 15 January meeting of 27 Kosovar political
parties and shadow-state institutions (see OMRI Special Report ,16
January 1996) concluded that outstanding differences among them are
still significant. It was resolved that such round table meetings should
be institutionalized if negotiations with Belgrade on a new deal for
Kosovo start. Nasa Borba observed this may end the current political
monopoly of the ruling shadow-state Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK).
Beta on 19 January quoted shadow-state President Ibrahim Rugova as
praising the meeting as a "positive step in the search for the solution
of the problem." The weekly Koha, meanwhile, organized a similar round
table, but no LDK representatives came. The group concluded that the
Kosovars will get no foreign support for a change of rump-Yugoslavia's
borders and that the legal basis for talks has to be the constitution of
1974, which gave Kosovo broad autonomy. Meanwhile, the head of the
working group for ethnic minorities at the Geneva Conference, Gert
Ahrens, met with Rugova and the governor of Kosovo Milos Nemovic. Ahrens
said there is "good will" for a solution of the crisis from Neskovic's
side. Rugova said that the U.S. should play a key mediating role. --
Fabian Schmidt
Compiled by Patrick Moore
[24] THE DILEMMAS OF A BOSNIAN WAR CRIMES INVESTIGATOR
By Jan Urban
As a Deputy Prosecutor General, Zlatan Terzic is one of two men in the
Sarajevo Judicial District charged with prosecuting war crimes. In an
interview with OMRI, he described both the importance of his task and
the obstacles that have kept him from making great progress. Until last
August, he said, all war crimes cases went to military courts. Since
then they are being processed in Bosnia's nine higher courts under terms
of both International conventions and Yugoslav criminal law. Altogether
the Sarajevo region has 550 active files on war crimes. Terzic himself
is responsible for some 250 cases, of which 150 involve charges of
shelling and sniping at civilians. He said there were 200 witnesses and
400 victims in these cases originating between 1992 and 1995.
Altogether, more than 250 people have so far been indicted by his
office, among them senior officials of the Pale leadership such as
Nikola Koljevic, Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic. Only one case,
however, has gone to trial and judgment. The defendant, a soldier of the
Bosnian Serb Arm (BSA), was given a 12-year sentence for crimes of
murder, rape and genocide committed when he was still a juvenile. Terzic
says he feels overwhelmed and complains candidly about the limited
resources he has received from the government. He contrasts the
impoverished conditions in which he tries to carry out his duties with
the much better equipped and funded Government Commission for
Investigation of War Crimes, which has links to the international
tribunal in The Hague, but which has found itself under the influence of
political forces and police authorities. "We are outside this game,"
said Terzic in his interview with OMRI. Referring to the case of Dusko
Tadic, the lone defendant so far standing accused before the tribunal,
Terzic declared "The Tadic case has five prosecutors working on it and
they needed six months to bring it to court." The prosecutor added: "We
have thousands of cases and would need ten years to work; The Hague has
millions of dollars and takes care of one case." Moreover, Terzic
complained that officials from the international tribunal refused to
share information with his office, preferring to rely on and protect
their own contacts in the police. "The police are ruling over
everything," he said. "They and the government army (ABH) are hiding
evidence and I have no means how to get it from them. Sometimes I see
evidence on television and I cannot get it officially. What I am getting
are just crumbs from a table. Legally I can order anybody to bring
evidence they hold and I did that many times but they just do not
bother. I remind them for six or seven months and they just do not
answer. I know the ABH has many details on BSA command orders concerning
shelling. We wanted a meeting with the army on an official level to
discuss how to break the situation but they did not even turn up. I
could try to sue the army for obstructing justice or go to a
Constitutional Court, but it is helpless.'' He went on to say that in
December all the prosecutors from the nine Higher Courts who were
dealing with war crimes met in Zenica with Government and military
officials and heard them promise to forward all necessary information
and evidence. "But until now is still only a promise," he said. Terzic
continued in undisguised frustration, talking of political interference
in the judicial process and of figures in the Ministry of Justice he
claimed were more interested in politics than in the hard work needed to
build an independent and effective legal system. "We are in the first
phase of building a state -- separating powers. But now both executive
and legislative authority are in the hands of one group recruited from
two ethnic parties and on the Serbian side there is only one party
controlling everything. Everything is over-politicized." While
emphasizing his problems and his worries, the prosecutor mentioned a few
events he described as hopeful. He was pleased with plans for a workshop
on an independent judiciary to be held in two weeks and with the work
that has already begun to translate all international legislation
concerning human rights. "If we do not investigate war crimes and do not
run them through a judicial system, we are preparing the ground for
future terrorism. Our parents generation made that mistake in 1945."
Jan Urban is OMRI's special correspondent, currently in Sarajevo
Copyright (c) 1996 Open Media Research Institute, Inc. All rights
reserved.
This material was reprinted with permission of the Open Media Research Institute, a nonprofit organization with research offices in Prague, Czech Republic.
For more information on OMRI publications please write to [email protected]
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