From: Boris Soposki <[email protected]>
Comments: This edition of MAK-NEWS contains articles relating to Macedonia and its neighbours, during the past week.
Please Note: Unless otherwise stated, articles are reproduced without permission for fair use only.
Partisan veteran associations of Italy, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Macedonia have appealed to the "breakaway" republics of former Yugoslavia for peace, and a "resolute suppressing of Nazi-fascist ideology". Support was expressed for the letter from the veterans of Dalmatia, which criticized the president of Croatia's " clear intention to restore ... the atmosphere of" the World War II pro-Nazi state. The following is the text of a report by the Tanjug news agency:
Rome, 14th May Representatives of World War II partisans'veteran organizations of Italy, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the breakaway republics of the former Yugoslavia sent Sunday [14th May] an appeal to the states that emerged after the break-up of the former Yugoslavia urging strengthening of "brotherhood among nations", " multi-ethnic co-habitation" and "dialogue between religions".
At the end of the three-day meeting in Ancona, they appealed also for " resolute suppressing of Nazi-fascist ideology, still existing in Europe, and especially in the war on the territory of the former Yugoslavia".
The appeal was signed by the Italian "Garibaldians" and the delegations from Yugoslavia and the former yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, whereas messages of support, as reported by the Italian news agency ANSA, were sent also by the veterans' organizations of Croatia and Slovenia. A separate appeal to the European Union called for "lifting of the unjust and inhuman embargo against Yugoslavia which very negatively reflected also on its neighbours".
The document voiced "pain and high concern" over the continual " suicidal and senseless" war and demanded the EU resolutely call for an "urgent cessation of hostilities". The presidents of the veterans'organizations of Croatia and Slovenia sent a message to the meeting supporting the content of the letter the veterans of Dalmatia (?sent) to Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. In the letter, they strongly criticized Tudjman's "clear intention to restore in Croatia of today the atmosphere of the Independent State of Croatia of Ante Pavelic", a Nazi puppet creation during World War II.
BBC MONITORING SERVICE: CENTRAL EUROPE & BALKANS
WASHINGTON, May 15 (Reuter) - Defence leaders of Macedonia and the United States on Monday discussed security of the former Yugoslav republic and the possibility of increasing U.N. forces there if peacekeeping in Bosnia collapses.
The meeting between Defence Minister Blagoj Handziski and U.S. Defence Secretary William Perry came as the United Nations reviewed its role in the former Yugoslavia following renewed violence and attacks on U.N. soldiers in Bosnia.
The United States has some 500 troops in Macedonia as part of a U.N. contingent of 1,100. Perry reiterated that more U.S. and other troops might be sent to Macedonia if U.N. forces are removed from Bosnia and Croatia.
"In our discussions today, that (additional U.N. troops in Macedonia) will come up only as a contingent possibility," he told reporters at a Pentagon photo opportunity with Handziski.
"We will not be seeking commitments and I'm sure the (Macedonian) government will not be making commitments on that point," Perry added. In addition to the United States, several Nordic countries have peacekeeping troops in Macedonia.
"The security in the entire Balkan region is very important to the United States," Perry said. "In particular, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is in a critical role between the fighting that is going on in Bosnia and the southern part of the Balkans."
Perry and Handziski stressed the importance of keeping U.N. troops in Bosnia. "Were they to be pulled out, then it would be certainly important to consider the possibility of strengthening the U.N. forces that are now in Macedonia," Perry said. "That is something that the countries that are providing the forces would discuss among themselves."
"We believe that the peacekeeping forces in Bosnia have to stay there," Handziski told reporters. "They have a very positive role there and in case they are withdrawan, the situation will become more critical."
U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali last week called for a major review of the U.N. peacekeeping effort in Bosnia, asking senior aides to study alternatives to respond to the new situation. That call was prompted by the deteriorating situation in Croatia, escalating fighting in Bosnia following the expiration of a ceasefire May 1 and increasing attacks on U.N. peacekeeping soldiers.
Handziski told reporters after Monday's meeting that he had asked Washington to help his country press the U.N. to lift an international arms embargo against Macedonia.
That embargo covers all of the former Yugoslavia because of the civil war in Bosnia but he stressed that "Macedonia has in no way contributed to the reasons for placing the embargo."
Handziski also expressed optimism over a settlement of major political differences between Macedonia and Greece that have led Greece to close their border. He said U.S. officials were facilitating contacts with Greece on orders from President Bill Clinton.
"We do expect that very soon, the disputes with the Republic of Greece will be overcome and that full diplomatic relations will be established," Handziski said. "That will significantly influence the relaxation of relations and the overall stability in the southern Balkans."
REUTER NEWS SERVICE
THE VE Day celebrations in Britain told us and the world much about ourselves, and what they told was good. Their chief effect was to remind us of characteristics and advantages which we have long possessed, but which we have recently tended to despise or ignore.
Perhaps the least noticed, but not the least important, was the essential modesty of our political system. In almost any other country the head of the government would have turned the occasion to his own and his party's advantage, making himself the centre of attention. Here Mr Major took an inconspicuous part in proceedings and so arranged it that the relatively little known Lord Privy Seal, Lord Cranborne, who co-ordinated the events so well, was the minister most prominently on show. This confirmed that although our party politics are bitter and opportunistic, those qualities have not infiltrated the heart of our system.
Related to this was the reiteration of the importance of our monarchy. No other nation could begin to match the scene on the balcony of Buckingham Palace, in which three of the five people who stood there in May 1945 stood there once more. And whatever changes the passing of half a century have brought to the lives of those three women, no one can doubt that they stood then for an unpartisan, unfanatical patriotism, and that they do the same today. Above all, the speech and appearances of the Queen Mother fulfilled one of the prime roles of monarchy: one woman embodied what a whole nation did and suffered. She spoke from the heart, and with authority.
But now that the tumult and the shouting have died and the captains and the kings departed, where are we? This VE Day was, in a sense, our last. The day will always be remembered, of course, but from now on it will slide into history, like Waterloo or Trafalgar. And the moving triptych on the balcony was almost as interesting for its omissions as for the scene it presented. Neither the Prince nor Princess of Wales was there, nor were their children. This was appropriate in the circumstances, but also significant. We were seeing the passing of something, a graceful, unstated acknowledgment that Britain's heroic age has ended. In its scale and manner and attitudes, in its place in the world, Britain has become unChurchillian. The loss of greatness, as well as lives, was being commemorated.
Fifty years after Victory in Europe, must we suffer defeat in Europe? No, but we will do so if we do not shed the illusions of the post-war world, of which the most important is that the nation state is discredited by the history of modern war. There is nothing magical or sacred, it is true, about nation states. Some are weak, some are artificial, some are aggressive. None is secure from corruption. But why should it be assumed that Nazism or Bolshevism, the two great engines of mid-20th-century conflict, can be blamed on the nation state? Both are extreme ideologies, purporting to explain the destiny of all mankind and aspiring to control the world in the name of race or class. Both are internationalist. Hitler established what he thought was a new European Aryanism. Communism thought it was throwing off the chains of the workers of the whole world.
And even if the Second World War proved that the German nation cannot trust itself, it proved with equal clarity that the British nation can. In the moment of supreme crisis, people and Parliament knew what to do, and did it alone. This experience is constantly devalued by the assertion, repeated last week by the Foreign Secretary, that it is the European Community, along with Nato, which has kept the peace in Europe. It is true that the construction of the EC reflects the desire of France and Germany to live at peace, but it is the balance of power and the sharing of liberal democratic values, and not the suspension of national independence, which makes war unlikely. And now that the Cold War has passed it is becomingly alarmingly clear that, without the American cocoon, the EC's artificiality blurs the lines of power and disables countries from acting decisively in their spheres of influence. Only the little powers, like Greece in its high-handed treatment of Macedonia, or Ireland in its interference in Ulster, are encouraged. The big ones cannot act either singly or together. Hence the failure to halt the worst war in Europe for half a century, in the former Yugoslavia.
Yet the pieties of internationalism are carrying us onward to the creation of a European order as unreal, though not as vile, as that dreamt of by Hitler; and that order will be dominated by Germany. The chief elements of this are set in motion by the Maastricht Treaty. A central bank, dominated by Germans under no political control, will take away our currency. A European Parliament, with powers added by the Intergovernmental Conference planned for 1996, will supplant our national institutions. A Community less circumscribed than ever by national vetoes will incorporate foreign and defence policy fully into its ambit and forbid member states to act unilaterally. For Germany all this may offer a legitimising cloak for the hegemony it has previously failed to gain by other means. For all other Europeans it will create a new powerlessness, and for Britain, who needs independence most and best knows how to use it, it will mean self-destruction.
In the past half-century we have come to recognise that we are no longer a great power, and that the pretence of being one weakened us. That is a recognition of the truth, but it has led the political class to the false conclusion that because we are no longer great we can no longer be strong and so must throw in our lot with the Continent. The strength of Britain never depended upon an empire flung across the globe, and therefore need not disappear with that empire. It comes from being a free nation with long-established institutions. These, and not a map coloured pink or a "seat at the top table" in Europe, are what we need to prosper, indeed to survive.
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, London
As much as 46% of all illegal border crossing attempts in Bulgaria in 1994 have been recorded along the southwestern border with Macedonia, the Bulgarian news agency BTA reported on 10th May.
A total of 1,350 trespassers were detained in 1994, and another 750 between January and May 1995. The trespassers were of 43 nationalities, including Ethiopians, Somalis, Laotians and Rwandans, but most of them came from Romania and Arab countries. In the past few months Bulgarian Gypsies from different parts of Bulgaria, organized in groups, have been trying to cross over into Macedonia and from there into Greece with the help of guides who charge them 200 to 500 German marks for their services. Some of the people running the human smuggling business have records of several arrests, but there are very few convictions on such charges, the agency said, quoting the local Bulgarian border guard commander in the area, Col Georgiev.
BBC MONITORING SERVICE: CENTRAL EUROPE & BALKANS
Sofia, 10th May: Bulgarian Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Khristov paid a working visit to Greece, Albania and Macedonia between 4th and 9th May. The talks focused on propelling the joint initiative for settling the specific economic problems of the states, that have suffered from the effects of the embargo against former Yugoslavia, Kosta Andreev, head of Northwestern Europe Department with the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry, said. As a result of the talks, Greece and Macedonia have agreed to join the collective demarche on that problem. Albania's answer on the issue is also expected in the nearest future.
The Bulgarian diplomat emphasized that the collective initiative and demarche will seek to find a solution for the specific economic problems, rather than demand lifting of the Yugosanctions. Bulgaria stands for finding a peaceful, just and lasting political solution to the conflict in former Yugoslavia, in parallel to lifting the sanctions, "nothing more than what the contact group has proposed", Mr Andreev said.
During Mr Khristov's visits, in each of the three countries on the agenda were the bilateral relations, the situation in the region, the realization of infrastructure transport projects and in the talks with Greece, the integration into the European structures.
BBC MONITORING SERVICE: CENTRAL EUROPE & BALKANS
Singapore and Macedonia have established diplomatic relations, Singapore radio reported on 8th May. A Singapore Foreign Ministry statement said both governments wished to strengthen and develop friendly ties.
BBC MONITORING SERVICE: CENTRAL EUROPE & BALKANS
NOTE: This document does not contain the graphics referred to in the text. For a copy of the original document with graphics, contact: Mr. Michael FALCON Directorate General IA -- G-24 Co-ordination Unit (SC29 2/21) -- Rue de la Loi, 200 -- 1049 Brussels, Belgium -- Tel: (32) 2/ 299 02 16 -- Fax: (32) 2/ 299 06 02 -- Email: [email protected]
1. Introduction
Since 1990, the equivalent of approximately 74.7 billion ECU in assistance[A] has been committed to the twelve G-24 beneficiary countries of Central and Eastern Europe[B]. Of this cumulative total, 30 percent or over 22 billion ECU took the form of grants. The remainder was provided in loans by the international financial institutions or in loans, credits, guarantees and debt servicing by the bilateral donors.
The European Union and its Member States[C] account for 45 percent of total assistance, with a total contribution of 33.8 billion ECU. The most significant donor country overall is Germany, having committed more than 11.3 billion ECU, immediately followed by the United States (9.6 billion ECU). Other countries having mobilised relatively large amounts of resources include France (5.5 billion ECU), Japan (3.1 billion ECU) and Austria (2.3 billion ECU). Important contributions have also been made by other countries who have made assistance commitments commensurate with their possibilities. The international financial institutions together, with a total contribution of 19.3 billion ECU in loans, account for more than one-quarter of total assistance.[D] Figure 1 illustrates the relative contribution to overall assistance (grant and non-grant) by the major donor groups.
The European Union and its Member States account for approximately 60 percent of all grants. The EU programmes (most notably PHARE), and the United States' SEED programme, both with a very broad geographic and sectoral scope, account each for 25 percent of grant assistance. Germany, the third most important donor in terms of grants, applies an equally broad geographic scope to its assistance, with a particular emphasis on Poland. Other donors or groups of donors have developed assistance programmes which are more targeted to a particular geographic region. For example, the Nordic countries are especially active in the Baltic region and Italy is an important donor in the Balkans, with 34 percent of its grant assistance going to Albania, etc. Figure 2 shows the breakdown of donor participation in terms of grant assistance.
2. General Composition
The assistance recorded by the G-24 Scoreboard is extremely broad in nature, but could be roughly broken down as shown in figure 3. Assistance is composed of a variety of instruments, which range from material or financial donations to grant technical assistance, as well as loans, credit schemes and debt servicing.
Emergency assistance and food aid consist mainly of grants immediately disbursed. Such grant assistance has been concentrated on a few countries (Yugoslavia, Romania, Albania) experiencing acute humanitarian situations. Grant technical assistance, used for augmenting the know-how, skills and productive aptitude required for transition, is the basic instrument for supporting the initial stages of structural reform. Consequently, it is a major component of assistance provided to each country. The progress of structural reforms has led to a subsequent stage in assistance which places increased emphasis on international loans in support of medium-term infrastructure investment. Sector aid represents integral programmes which make use of a combination of the above-mentioned instruments.
The Scoreboard records under the heading "General Programme Assistance" data on the bilateral and multilateral donors' loans for improving the general economic situation of the European countries in transition. Data on debt servicing, within the framework of the Paris Club, are also reported by bilateral donors. Three-quarters of debt reorganisation, which benefited mainly Poland, took the form of debt forgiveness.[E]
The Scoreboard also contains data on bilateral export credits and guarantee schemes extended to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. These types of assistance, which can be drawn upon up to a certain ceiling, total 15.8 and 2.8 billion ECU respectively, or more than a quarter of overall assistance.
3. Evolution of G-24 Assistance, 1990-1994
The overall volume of G-24 assistance to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe from year to year is directly related to the number of recipient countries progressively integrated into the G-24 process, as well as to the particular emphasis given to assistance through the various phases of economic transition in the CEEC. This is made evident by the trends in the use of various assistance instruments which emerge from figure 4.
Poland and Hungary were the first recipients of G-24 assistance and, therefore, account for the greater part of the nearly 7 billion ECU of assistance committed in 1990 (36 percent and 34 percent respectively). Each benefited immediately from comprehensive action plans involving technical assistance and investment from the bilateral and multilateral donors in key economic and productive sectors. In addition, a stabilisation fund was established for Poland and structural adjustment loans were made to Hungary as early as 1990. Emergency assistance and food aid accounted for a relatively small proportion of assistance to Poland and Hungary. Later in 1990, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were welcomed into the G-24 process, bringing the number of recipient countries to five. In the case of Bulgaria, assistance at this early stage consisted mainly of supply programmes in support of agricultural restructuring, environmental protection and humanitarian and food aid. The German Democratic Republic was also admitted in 1990 and remained a beneficiary country for a brief period prior to the re-unification of Germany.
During the year 1991, the G-24 process was extended to the three Baltic States, Romania and Albania, leading to a consequent increase in the total volume of aid. Special assistance aimed at improving the macro-economic situation of certain beneficiary countries was also launched in 1991. For example, Poland signed an agreement with the Paris Club in mid-1991 which provided for a 50 percent reduction in the net present value of debt and an 80 percent reduction in interest due. According to data submitted to the G-24 Scoreboard, this arrangement accounts for almost 100 percent of the nearly 8 billion ECU in debt reorganisation reported in 1991, or one-third of total G-24 assistance in 1991. Exceptional G-24 balance of payments (BOP) assistance, complementary to IMF loans, also began in 1991. Commitments to the first countries to benefit from such BOP assistance in 1991 (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania) amounted to over 2 billion ECU. Also, further to a G-7 decision 1991, the G-24 began to organise the co-ordination of assistance in the field of nuclear safety. These activities, mainly focused on countries belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States, also concern Bulgaria, Lithuania and the Slovak Republic.
By 1992, national and multilateral assistance programmes had gained momentum. The overall volume of technical assistance maintained its upward trend, most notably to education sector, as well as to the environmental, agricultural and industrial sectors. Indeed, by this point in the transition process, G-24 activities aimed at supporting medium-term reforms in specific sectors, such as banking and privatisation, were being intensified. This was also the year in which Slovenia became a recipient of G-24 assistance and, as a new participant, received a substantial initial input of aid, most notably from Germany. The emergency aid required in some cases, such as in Albania and Romania, also continued to increase.
Official support for private investment has been concentrated on three countries, namely Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. A general trend which illustrates the various phases of economic transformation and the assistance required for each, is seen in the decrease of technical assistance since 1993, compensated by an increase in investment projects aimed at building up the economic infrastructure in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This shift in emphasis is reflected by the work of the G-24 Transport Group which has been focusing on strengthening the CEEC economic ties to western Europe by integrating them into the Trans-European Networks (TEN). The year 1993 also saw the arrival of the former yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as a recipient of G-24 aid. Assistance in 1994 is characterised by a continuing decrease in the proportion of grant aid, which peaked at 36 percent in 1992, but now represents 26 percent of overall assistance provide to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, three main periods of G-24 assistance emerge from an analysis of yearly data. The first corresponds to the conception and launching of the various programmes and the response to urgent or exceptional needs, such as emergency aid, macro-financial assistance and debt reorganisation. The second relies mainly on technical assistance in support of structural reforms. The third brings assistance into a phase emphasising investment in medium and long-term programmes, such as infrastructure development.
4. Relative Distribution of Assistance
In terms of total cumulative assistance between 1990 and 1994, the first recipient countries to the G-24 process, Poland and Hungary, are the major beneficiaries, accounting together for over 39 billion ECU, or 52 percent of the total. However, assistance to Poland was mainly provided in the form of grants (41 percent), whereas assistance to Hungary and to the Czech Republic was mainly committed as non-grant aid. As new countries were brought into the assistance co-ordination process, the shares of total resources devoted to Poland and Hungary naturally decreased, with the exception of 1991, the year in which Poland negotiated arrangements for the rescheduling of its external debt. Figure 5 below indicates the percentage of cumulative assistance to each recipient that was provided in grants. Figure 6 illustrates the relative distribution of total assistance by year over the period 1990 through 1994. Figure 7 shows the same distribution, this time in terms of total grant assistance, excluding debt forgiveness.
Figure 8 illustrates the per capita distribution of overall G-24 assistance to the CEEC, indicating that portion which took the form of grants. Poland's and Hungary's standing as the main recipients of G-24 aid is also confirmed in terms of overall assistance per capita (710 and 1,137 ECU respectively). However, the distribution of cumulative grant assistance per capita reveals that some later recipients to the G-24 process, who in many cases required large amounts of humanitarian and food aid, have received relatively large shares of grant assistance per capita. For instance, Albania, who entered the G-24 process in 1991, is second in this category after Poland, with about 250 ECU in grant assistance per capita.
By 1993, all twelve recipient countries had acceded to the co-ordination process. Figure 9, provided as a snapshot of the situation in 1993, therefore, provides a truer picture of the relative distribution of assistance by eliminating a distorting effect on the data series introduced by exceptional debt reorganisation in 1991 and staggered entry into the co-ordination process.
5. Origin of Assistance
Analysis of the origin of grant assistance to each of the recipient countries reveals that, in all cases, the EU and its Member States are the largest contributors, ranging from 45 percent in Estonia to 82 percent in the former yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Again in terms of grant assistance, the United States is consistently the second most important donor, except in cases of obvious regional specialisation, such as the proportion of assistance to the Baltic States which is provided by the Nordic countries.
Indeed, further analysis reveals cases of obvious regional specialisation on the part of certain donors or groups of donors. Unsurprisingly, 39 percent of grant assistance to Estonia comes from Sweden (24%) and Finland (15%); a further 29 percent is provided by the EU programmes. Similarly, Sweden and Denmark are by far the most important bilateral donors in Latvia and Lithuania, with the EU programmes complementing their efforts with a further 35 percent and 43 percent respectively. It is also interesting to note that, of the bilateral donors, the Netherlands have provided the most grant assistance to the former yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (15%), followed by the United States (12%). Other noteworthy examples of regional specialisation include the 19 percent of total grants to Slovenia committed by Austria, 21 percent of grants to Albania provided by Italy, and the Swiss contribution of 14 percent of total grants to the Slovak Republic.
6. Conclusion
Generally, throughout central and eastern Europe, basic structural reforms are advanced and now serve as the basis upon which large-scale reconstruction of economic infrastructure is taking place. The assistance effort of the international donor community has, therefore, evolved to meet new realities.
Just as the nature of reforms changes through the various phases of economic transition, the mechanisms of G-24 assistance co-ordination evolve to meet new requirements. Today's increased emphasis on infrastructure investment has changed the respective roles played by bilateral and multilateral donors. The resources of the international financial institutions, as well as those provided through the EU institutions, are already the core of the international assistance effort.
The G-24 bilateral donors, after having been a major source of urgent and exceptional assistance, as well as expertise in the area of structural reforms, have become increasingly involved in promoting private investment and participating in the co-financing of major investment projects. As a consequence of this orientation to assistance, multilateral and bilateral lending represent an increasing percentage of overall assistance, as reflected in the decreasing proportion of grant assistance per year (26 percent in 1994 from a peak of 36 percent in 1992). The mobilisation of such investment funds has become the thrust of G-24 co- ordination, and is orchestrated within the framework of the medium-term Public Investment Programmes (PIP) developed by certain recipient countries.
Implementation of investment projects has required reinforcement of the aid co-ordination structures within the recipient countries as well. Assistance programmes today call for multi-annual budgets and ever more sophisticated management, as reform policies have become more refined, the number of sectors implicated has multiplied, and the various donor strategies have become more targeted and specialised. In this environment, beneficiary countries are necessarily more involved in all aspects of assistance co-ordination, from defining objectives with partner countries to mobilising financing and implementing programmes.
As for the future orientations of G-24 assistance, the EU will concentrate its resources on implementation of its Pre- Accession Strategy for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. As needs for macro-financial assistance in support of the general economic situation in these countries will persist, the role of the international financial institutions should be maintained. The bilateral donors, for their part, will tend to develop assistance programmes in fields, countries and regions of their particular interest.
[A] All data presented in this document are based on donor declarations to the G-24 Scoreboard (provided in annex). Due to the conversion of national currentices into ECU over the years, discrepancies between Scoreborard data and national sources may appear.
[B] Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, former yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia.
[C] Data based on 12 Member States of the EU, 1990-1994.
[D] Data concerning IMF assistance represent financial arrangements approved by the IMF Executive Board, irrespective of whether or not they have been disbursed.
[E] According to data reported by donors to the G-24 Scoreboard, total debt reorganisation amounts to the equivalent of 10.7 billion ECU.
Ref: MEMO/95/78. RAPID