OMRI: Pursuing Balkan Peace, Vol. 1, No. 47, 96-11-26

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From: Open Media Research Institute <http://www.omri.cz>

Vol. 1, No. 47, 26 November 1996

CONTENTS

[01] Massive Protests Sweep Serbia

[02] Kosovo: Government, Parliament, and President Fight over Strategy and Power

[03] War Criminals in Bosnia - Government Protection and IFOR's Blind Eye

[04] "The Srebrenica of our Time"

[05] A Tough Week for Bulgaria's Socialists

[06] DRASKOVIC'S WIFE FREED FROM POLICE CUSTODY.

[07] KOSOVO EDUCATION SECRETARY DIES IN CAR ACCIDENT.

[08] CROATIA'S TUDJMAN SLAMS OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE.

[09] 100,000 DEMONSTRATE IN ZAGREB FOR RADIO.

[10] BOSNIAN SERB POWER STRUGGLE UNRESOLVED?

[11] REPUBLIKA SRPSKA UPDATE.

[12] NATO CONFISCATES WEAPONS IN BOSNIA.

[13] ISLAMIC COUNTRIES DISCUSS AID TO BOSNIA.

[14] MISTREATMENT OF SARAJEVO SERBS.

[15] GERMANY AND BOSNIA SIGN REPATRIATION AGREEMENT.

[16] UN FORCE IN MACEDONIA TO BE EXTENDED AT REDUCED STRENGTH?

[17] PARTING SHOTS.

[01] Massive Protests Sweep Serbia

by Stan Markotich in front of the Belgrade parliament building with egg stains on his jacket

It was the sixth consecutive day of mass protests in Belgrade and across Serbia -- 25 November 1996. Radio B 92 estimated that as many as 200,000 people may have gathered in the capital city to register their anger against the ruling authorities, who in the past week have worked to overturn initial electoral returns from the 17 November municipal voting. Many commentators have already begun speaking of a new era in Serbian politics.

The protests have been peaceful but are the largest to date against the government of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, which is trying to retake control of urban municipal councils by forcing a third round of balloting. Early returns from the second round had shown that the opposition Zajedno (Together) coalition had taken at least 60 of 110 seats in the Belgrade Assembly. In addition, the coalition -- with the core of Vuk Draskovic's Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), Zoran Djindjic's Democratic Party (DS) and Vesna Pesic's Serbian Civic Alliance (GSS) -- won majorities in Serbia's twelve largest municipal areas. These were the returns that the ruling Socialists immediately questioned.

On the first evening, the protests and demonstrations were comparatively small. Only an estimated 5,000 people turned out near the Serbian legislature. Within a few days, however, crowds of an estimated 100,000 began gathering in the center of the capital. And on the night of 25 November, while the now-customary march past landmarks such as the Serbian legislature, Politika publishing house and RTV Serbia was largely peaceful, it did include the pelting of those landmarks with what appeared to be thousands of eggs. March organizers and Zajedno leaders urged protesters to maintain calm and to "peacefully" target only designated locations, which is what happened. In what appeared to be the only sign that tempers boiled over, a window at the RTV building was smashed, probably by a rock.

For their part the authorities have thus far used the state-media to describe the demonstrations as "anti-democratic" and a serious threat to public safety and stability. A third round of elections is slated to take place in Belgrade on 27 November, and the only major party from the opposition (and not affiliated with Zajedno) to say it will take part is the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) of accused war criminal Vojislav Seselj, Nasa Borba reported on 25 November. Meanwhile, Zajedno leaders have called for a third-round election boycott, insisting instead that the returns from the second round must be "honored."

If the demonstration of 25 November -- in which students played a prominent role -- is any indication, a large segment of the population refuses to have its will dampened and will likely continue with mass protests. What course the protests take, however, will likely be shaped by the outcome of events of 27 November. For not only has the third round been slated for that date, but Zajedno has appealed to Serbia's Supreme Court for a ruling on the lower court's invalidation of the second round. Zajedno is determined not to let "victory [turn] into defeat."

[02] Kosovo: Government, Parliament, and President Fight over Strategy and Power

by Fabian Schmidt

The legislature was not been able to hold its opening session due to intervention by the Serbian police in 1992, and since then Rugova has opposed a second attempt to get the parliament together. Instead, legislators hold irregular meetings in working groups in which they keep some contact with local government bodies.

The shadow state has managed to carry out crucial executive functions, such as to maintain the underground education and health systems and to collect at least some taxes. The parliament is, however, still suffering from an acute lack of authority and is virtually unable to pass legislation under the strained circumstances. This in return has an impact on the development of the shadow state as a whole. Only functioning and democratic structures can convince its inhabitants of the state's legitimacy, secure their loyalty, and prompt them to pay taxes and contribute to its future.

A number of indicators, however, suggest that the shadow state, as it is working now, has reached its limits. Shadow state exile Prime Minister Bujar Bukoshi sharply criticized Rugova's moderate policy in an interview published in Koha on 6 November. Bukoshi charged that Rugova had abandoned the policy of independence and argued that Rugova's office could only function under toleration of the Serbian authorities. He also said Rugova was sidelining the shadow-state government, adding he did not consult the its education minister during negotiations about an education agreement between Rugova and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic signed on 1 September. Bukoshi warned that Rugova's policy -- which seeks the diplomatic "internationalization" of the conflict -- will lead nowhere besides the creation of a "quisling government," and demanded that Rugova "once and for all give up the idea that [the shadow state] is able to play world politics."

But not only the relationship between the president and the government is strained: the legislators are increasingly demanding that the parliament meet. In late October, 31 out of 100 legislators -- including Health Minister Adem Limani -- sent a letter to Rugova demanding a constituent meeting of parliament and for Rugova to take an oath of loyalty.

If the shadow state remains unable to create functioning democratic institutions, it will also fail to begin an internal discourse that could lead to negotiations with Belgrade. Such talks could eventually result in a compromise about the future status of Kosovo within the framework of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the status that is supported by the international community. Rugova instead continues to claim that the September 1991 referendum has given him a mandate to press demands for independence.

Difficulties are thus increasing because the shadow state cannot carry out any normal governmental functions other than its health and school programs and because it has been unable to launch a discussion among its own people about the province's future. Meanwhile, the constitutional crisis also deepens with time. Bukoshi's government was appointed by the communist-era parliament, the predecessor of the current legislature. The new parliament's four year term expired on 24 May this year, before it was even able to vote for a new government or to properly approve the old one. Rugova solved this problem cosmetically by decree and prolonged the term of the legislature for one year. But for now, the only one currently holding a direct and valid mandate from the electorate is Rugova himself, whose five- year term runs out in May 1997.

Others are preparing to run against him in the next elections. Probably his most serious competitor is Adem Demaci, a senior human rights activist and famous communist-era dissident who spent 27 years in prison. Demaci, like Bukoshi, has voiced criticism about Rugova's hesitant and careful approach. He has called for louder protests against the Serbian regime and for demonstrations in the streets. Whether new presidential and parliamentary elections will take place remains, however, in doubt.

[03] War Criminals in Bosnia - Government Protection and IFOR's Blind Eye

-- Jan Urban and Yvonne Badal in Sarajevo

IFOR claims to have had no previous knowledge about Zeljko Mejakic, Mladen Radic, Miroslav Kvocka and Nedeljko Timarac being policemen in the Prijedor area until The Boston Globe revealed these cases at the end of October. However, "Version 5" of the wanted poster of indicted war criminals -- printed by IFOR itself 9 August 1996 -- states under the photograph and description of Mladen Radic - "PARTICULARS: employed at SJB." That is the old Yugoslav acronym for both police force and police station and it is still in use. On 30 October, The Boston Globe revealed that another two indicted war criminals, Blagoje Simic and Stevan Todorovic, still hold influential public positions in Bosanski Samac. Todorovic is even deputy chief of state security for this area. All international institutions on ground claimed not to know. But OMRI has a document proving that European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) monitors knew about Simic' position as early as the beginning of May.

It is not hard to guess why such behavior takes place. Three independent IFOR sources have told OMRI that since the beginning of IFOR's mission there was a specific order concerning indicted war criminals still in positions of power. Two of them said the order is nicknamed the "Monitor - Don't touch" rule. Four people also told OMRI that they themselves witnessed indirect evidence of such an order. At the end of October a convoy of two UN police (IPTF) and four IFOR vehicles went through Bosanski Samac. Two international policemen took photos and video footage of the workplaces and houses of at least two other indicted war criminals, Simo Zaric and Miroslav Tadic. Zaric himself told OMRI: "I went through IFOR check-points hundreds of times. In March, an American soldier even took my ID, looked at the photo and checked my face, looked at my car plate, saluted and waved me through. It is a lie that they do not know where we are and what we do".

Both IFOR and IPTF deny that any of their personnel filmed or took pictures or that any such incident took place at all. IFOR also denies that IFOR officers, as stated in a Human Rights Watch report, deliberately avoided the possibility of arresting indicted war criminal Milan Martic in August in Banja Luka. OMRI has a document proving Martic's official contact with the RS government ministry of information. IFOR's wanted poster clearly states his address in Banja Luka, which is in the vicinity of several international institutions. Meanwhile, the IPTF acknowledged that its officers have known since August that yet another indicted war criminal, Radovan Stankovic, is on the payroll of the RS police force in Foca. However, according to an OMRI source, there are also two more indicted war criminals on this payroll, Radomir Kovac and Dragan Zelenovic. They are shown on IFOR's wanted poster.

Thus out of twelve indicted war criminals found by the international press within the last four weeks, eight worked until recently as RS policemen. And with The Washington Post finding Goran Jelisic and Ranko Cesic earlier this year, combined with frequent media reports on the whereabouts of the Croats Dario Kordic and Ivica Rajic, the official version that "IFOR would get them if it came across them" has become less and less credible.

[04] "The Srebrenica of our Time"

by Jan Urban and Yvonne Badal in Sarajevo

Three weeks ago, on 2 November, Carl Bildt reacted angrily to the fact that the international press found several other indicted individuals working as police officers in the Republika Srpska (see above). "The issue of indicted war criminals running loose around this country unhindered, unaccountable, and unsought by anyone is a scandal that threatens to become, could become, but must not become the Srebrenica of our time of the post-Dayton period - a scandal that haunts those who were negligent and insults its victims. We must not sleep on this watch." In the same statement, he even appealed to the countries of the United Nations Security Council "to design the mechanism and take the actions."

Since then, the international press has located a grand total of more than 20 indicted war criminals and gathered additional information on 35 persons listed on the IFOR "most wanted" poster. Caught by their own rhetoric, representatives of IFOR, IPTF, OHR, and the OSCE pretend to be unimpressed. "We stick to our official version that IFOR had no prior knowledge of any of the four indicted war criminals in Prijedor police station until the end of October, when The Boston Globe ran its story on them," IFOR spokesman Simon Haselock said. He did not wish to speculate on how IFOR included that information on Radic on its poster (see above) without understanding its content. Neither IPTF nor The Office of the High Representative were willing to comment.

Findings by the international press over the last three weeks have demonstrated the paralyzing effect the continuous presence of indicted war criminals has on the future of post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Republika Srpska's government openly shelters and in many cases even officially hired nearly 40 known indicted individuals. Most, together with four indicted war criminals living in federal Yugoslavia, are in contact with the Belgrade lawyer Pantelic, known for his close ties to Milosevic. As Newsweek found, all 15 indicted Bosnian Croats and Croats are represented by the Zagreb lawyer Zvonimir Hodak, who has close family ties within the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ)-lead government. Neither Serbia nor Croatia, both signatories to the Dayton peace accord, have been subjected to international pressure over that situation. Sanctions against federal Yugoslavia were lifted and Croatia was even accepted into the Council of Europe, following a supposed "improvement in the human-rights situation."

"Nothing will change in the Republika Srpska if war criminals are allowed to control or to have influence in the police force," said an opposition party official in Doboj. The official continued: "They run and merge politics with organized crime. They are both servants and masters to Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) top brass. Without direct action from the international community, this system will soon become unbreakable from within."

West Mostar and most of West Herzegovina are already notorious for equally close ties between politics and organized crime. None of the three consecutive European Union administrators of Mostar since 1994 were able to change that. And there are extremely worrying signs that even among the Muslims -- who have been the most cooperative of the three groups thus far - - populist politics may start to demand a slowdown of the investigations into crimes against Bosnian Serbs in Sarajevo. The alleged perpetrators of those crimes are believed to have built close personal and economic ties with many powerful police and political figures.

[05] A Tough Week for Bulgaria's Socialists

by Stefan Krause

After 22 hours of closed-door deliberations among the members of the BSP Supreme Council and the BSP parliamentary deputies , the 158 delegates present at the plenary meeting had to decide whether to continue supporting Videnov as prime minister or not. Finally, 87 delegates backed Videnov, 69 voted against him, and two abstained. They also decided that an extraordinary BSP congress on 21-22 December will discuss future party policies and possible leadership changes.

Prior to the meeting, Videnov was under attack from all sides. On 5 November, 19 leading BSP members ranging from orthodox Marxists to social- democratic reformists called for his resignation in an open letter published in the BSP daily Duma. Despite their prominence, they failed to muster a majority against the unpopular prime minister and party chairman. On the other hand, Videnov's victory was not overwhelming, especially considering that although the BSP is highly fragmented, party discipline had always been one of the ex-communists' strongest assets.

During the plenary meeting, Deputy BSP Chairman Yanaki Stoilov and prominent party members Nikolay Kamov and Filip Bokov resigned from the Executive Bureau, the party's highest decision-making body. All three had signed the anti-Videnov letter.

And only one day after the plenary meeting, Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski handed in his resignation, saying that the government "no longer enjoys the necessary minimum confidence" of the people. At the plenary meeting, Pirinski had announced that he would vote against Videnov. Pirinski said that the outcome of the meeting "does not show convincing enough support" within the party for Videnov and noted that the majority backed Videnov not so much because it trusted him but rather because the consequences of rejecting him were unclear.

Pirinski's resignation cast new shadows on the future of Videnov, who by the 12 November vote appeared to have stabilized his position at least until the upcoming congress. No longer bound by cabinet discipline, Pirinski is free to pursue his own agenda and rally around him the reformist wing of the BSP. He is not only the most popular BSP politician, he is also arguably the most prominent reformer. As such, he is a deputy chair of the Alliance for a Social Democracy (OSD), the most important pro- reform group in the BSP. He has repeatedly been named as a possible successor to Videnov as prime minister.

After the 2 October murder of former Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov -- in recent years the mentor and unofficial leader of the OSD -- Pirinski started promoting himself as Lukanov's political heir. On 10 October, he published an article in Duma, entitled: "10 November is Approaching," a reference to the date when in 1989 long-time Communist dictator Todor Zhivkov was ousted. This article called for an extraordinary BSP congress and a review of government policy and was widely understood as demanding Videnov's sacking. And Kontinent the following day interpreted Pirinski's article as saying "I am Lukanov's successor."

Even if Pirinski's remains the only minister to resign -- talk has it that other Videnov critics may follow his example --, the pressure on Videnov remains high. Videnov's strongest asset is that he is a politician who knows how to play the intraparty game, at least partly thanks to his training as a Communist youth functionary. Whether this is enough to get a new mandate at the upcoming party congress is a different question. Although Videnov currently holds the two most important posts in the country, it seems that in the longer term, Pirinski has the better potential. At present, it is too early to say which side will come out on top in December. If the reasons for the present BSP crisis -- most notably that the party has to decide between reformism and dogmatism -- remain unresolved, even a split of the party cannot be ruled out.

[06] DRASKOVIC'S WIFE FREED FROM POLICE CUSTODY.

[07] KOSOVO EDUCATION SECRETARY DIES IN CAR ACCIDENT.

[08] CROATIA'S TUDJMAN SLAMS OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE.

[09] 100,000 DEMONSTRATE IN ZAGREB FOR RADIO.

[10] BOSNIAN SERB POWER STRUGGLE UNRESOLVED?

[11] REPUBLIKA SRPSKA UPDATE.

[12] NATO CONFISCATES WEAPONS IN BOSNIA.

[13] ISLAMIC COUNTRIES DISCUSS AID TO BOSNIA.

[14] MISTREATMENT OF SARAJEVO SERBS.

[15] GERMANY AND BOSNIA SIGN REPATRIATION AGREEMENT.

[16] UN FORCE IN MACEDONIA TO BE EXTENDED AT REDUCED STRENGTH?

[17] PARTING SHOTS.

Edited by Patrick Moore

This material was reprinted with permission of the Open Media Research Institute, a nonprofit organization with research offices in Prague, Czech Republic.
For more information on OMRI publications please write to [email protected].

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