bosnet-digest V5 #61 / Sunday, 11 February 1996

From: Nermin Zukic <[email protected]>

Bosnia-Herzegovina News Directory

CONTENTS

[01] Feb. 9, 96 (Zubak: "Constructive", But Will NOT Implement; Threats)

ZUBAK DOES NOT ACCEPT KOSCHNIK'S ARBITRATION Mostar, Feb. 9,1996 (Press TWRA) - According to B-H Federation President's office press release President Zubak does not "accept Mr Koschnik's decision and will not work on its implementation" because this means introduction of "new, seventh municipality" which was not regulated in none of the legal acts Koschnik's decision should have been based on. Asked, in the Zagreb's TV show "Slikom na slikom", why 15 days ago he agreed on H. Koschnik's arbitration, Zubak said that Croatian side wanted than to be "constructive".

Zagreb - "After the consultations which Ministress Agnelli will held with Koschnik's assistant Metcher, president Tudjman and Ministress Agnelli as EU Chair will propose the joint solution for the Mostar situation which would be acceptable for both sides", says the Croatian President's office press release after yesterday's meeting between Italian Foreign Minister S. Agnelli and Croatian President Tudjman. Asked whether Koschik's decision could be altered, Agnelli stated that "will be discussed because such decision must be acceptable for all". (end) S.K.

CONDEMNATIONS OF THE INCIDENTS IN MOSTAR Mostar, Feb 8, 1996 (Press TWRA) - Croat leaders in Mostar Puljic, Vucina and Brajkovic criticize decree of Hans Koschnick. Croat authorities enforced curfew in the part (western) of Mostar they have under control. The curfew is in force from 1O om to 5 am when cafes are closed and the miovement of residents banned.

"All Croat representatives have cut off the contact with the EU administration and for us the EU mandate to Mostar is over. H. Koschnick had better resign at once. Next week, we start to build a new cathedral near to date EU seat," said Mijo Brajkovic.

"We will start a constitutional procedure to investigate how much this Koschnick's decision is in accord with the B-H Federal constitution," said Srecko Vucina who once in a dispute with the B-H Federation K. Zubak said: "Yes, I am against the B-H Federation as it is against Croat national interests.'

Boro Puljic said: "The Mostar district is actually the 7th being the fourth Muslim county as Croats make 25%, Muslims about 32% and others about 41% of population." German media used to connect Puljic with the assassination against Koschnick.

Sarajevo - Prsident of the B-H Federation K. Zubak said for the B-H TV that he held that Koschnick had made a mistake by bringing a decision which breached the former accords. Yet, demonstrations are not the right way to express disagreement as unwanted incidents might easily occur said Zubak stressing it was his personal view and added that Koschnick's decision might be changed in a different, peaceful way.

Zagreb, Bonn, Rome - Foreign ministers of Germany K. Kinkel, and Italy S. Agnelli (president of the EU Ministry Council) had a phone talk with the head of the Croat president Tudjman's office Ivo Sanader. Sanader informed them on Croatia's view by which Koschnick, with his arbitration, had breached preliminary accord previously reached with Croat side and principles of the Dayton accord. Kinkel and Agnelli strictly condemned the incidents in Mostar demanding from Zagreb to calm down radical Croats there urgently and entirely in order to protect integrity of the EU staff in Mostar, particularly Koschnick who cannot move freely, who was attacked while being on his car and the fire was opened around the EU building where the EU flag was removed and Croatian flag is placed. Croatian government is regarded responsible for the conduct of Croats to Mostar so it will face the consequences of such incidents, stressed Kinkel and Susan Agnelli. /end/ A.S.

JOHN SHATTUCK IN OMARSKA Omarska Feb 8, 1996 (Press TWRA) - Assistant of the US Secretary of state, Shattuck visited ex-concentration camp Omarska near Prijedor, northwestern Bosnia. Serb col. Nikola Kajtaz told Shattuck he had not known for his visit, but he took him through repaired camp, with freshly painted walls. Shattuck was not impressed with new look of Omarska saying: "This is the death camp where 2O people used to be killed daily. /end/ A.S.

Marko Arsovic, nationalist Bosnian Serb ``justice minister,'' demanded: ``I am urging all relevant international players to do everything to ensure the release of the arrested people, and immediately and effectively to prevent any further similar actions by the federation's authorities... Failing that, I will be compelled to call on our prosecution bodies to act in the same way toward citizens of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation who cross over to our territory...''

Nationalist Serb television advised people to temporarily postpone visiting relatives or property on Federation territory ``until the security situation became more favorable.''

HOLBROOKE AGAIN IN BALKANS Washington, Feb.9,1996 (Press TWRA) - State Department spokesman N. Burns announced that US State Secretary Assistant R. Holbrooke will again come to former Yugoslavia in order to help solve the problem of Mostar and arrested Serbian soldiers and officers. During this 'weekend mission' Holbrooke will held talks with President Izetbegovic, Milosevic and Tudjman in Sarajevo, Belgrade and Zagreb. "Holbrooke's new mission is important sign for all sides that Dayton agreement must be fully implemented", stated Burns. (end) S.K.

SERBS THREATEN WITH RETALIATION Belgrade, Feb. 9,1996 (Press TWRA) - The commander of Bosnian Serbs' troops Gen. R. Mladic issued an order for postponement of all meetings with the IFOR representatives "until all 11 Serbian soldiers are released", reported Reuters, relating on the Bosnian Serbs' press release.

In the same time "vice-president of republic srpska" Koljevic threatened with retaliation for arrest of two Serbian officers. Koljevic said that Serbs will detain all Bosniaks and Croats who will cross the territory under Serbian control. He did not denoted precisely deadline for the beginning of retaliation which would violate one of the basic principals of Dayton agreement - freedom of movement on the whole B-H territory.

Sarajevo - NATO spokesman stated that Gen. Mladic's orders can not be legitimate since he, himself has been accused of war crimes. (end) S.K.

HEAVY ARMS STILL HAVE NOT BEEN REMOVED Sarajevo, Feb.9,1996 (Press TWRA) - NATO discovered 183 pieces of heavy arms near demarcation lines on the territory of north Bosnia. This arms already had to be turned over to IFOR. 183 tanks and cannons are divided between three sides: 147 on Serbian territory, 3O on B-H Army and 6 on HVO. (end) S.K.

[02] UNESCO For Bosnian Libraries

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNESCO

Appeal by

Mr Federico Mayor, Director-General of UNESCO

for the

Reconstruction of the National and University Library of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo

Paris, 13 April 1994

At the time when the force of arms and hatred seems to be giving way to that of reason, it its important that the intellectual and moral solidarity of humanity for which UNESCO is working should express itself vigorously.

The intellectual isolation imposed for nearly two years on Sarajevo is as dangerous as the shortages of electricity, water or medecines from which this shattered town is suffering. What better symbol to express solidarity and to break the isolation than a library - a national and university institution moreover? A place of teaching and research, of culture, of information and of intellectual exchange, the library furthers access to knowledge and helps to preserve cultural identity while consecrating the local community's participation in universal civilization.

The destruction of the National and University Libarary of Sarajevo was an act of barbarisme perpetrated in the context of a whole series of assaults on the national heritage. This beautiful building in the Moorish style - which was a town hall in the nineteenth century and had become a familiar monument in the centre of Sarajevo - has been severely damaged: the equipment and apparatus necessary for the proper running of a large library are no longer in working order. In addition, countless irreplacable treasures of Bosniac and world culture have been destroyed by fire.

The Library of Sarajevo must be reconstructed. It must then be given the equipment to enable it to establish its data bases and to have access to European and international information networks. It must finally be provided with reprographic laboratories, audiovisual equipment and the means to restore, conserve and safeguard its collections (those remaining and those needing to be reconstituted) as well as modern facilities for educating and training information specialists.

I therefore call on all States, international governmental and non-governmental organizations, public and private institutions, funding bodies, associations of librarians, archivists and documentalists, and private individuals to participate through voluntary contributions - in the form of funds, equipment or services -in the reconstruction of the National and University Library in Sarajevo and in the reconstitution if its collections.

I call on all intellectuals, artists and writers, historians and scientists, and all those whose buiseness it is to inform, to help focus world public attention on this project.

I express the hope that contributions will be commensurate with the task involved and that all those who are concerned to see the universal documentary heritage preserved and to promote its widest possible utilization by researchers and general public alike will play their part in the reonstruction and equipping of the National and University Library of Sarajevo.

Federico Mayor

- ---------------------------------------------------------------------

UNESCO General Information Programme

Assistance Programme for the Revival of the National and University Library of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo

Meeting of the Expert Group on the Reconstitution of Bosniaca

Prague, 2526 November 1994

RECOMMENDATIONS

The participants of the meeting of the expert group on the reconstitution of Bosniaca of the National and University Library of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo, organized from 25 to 26 November 1994 in the National Library in Prague, Czech Republic,

1. Considering Bosniaca as an irreplacable and unique part of the documentary memory of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

2. Defining Bosniaca as all documents in any format written or published

a) on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in its historical framework regardless of the languages in which they where written or published,

b) about Bosnia and Herzegovina in any territory or in any language regardless of the authors' origins.

3. Recommend that all effort should be made in order to reconstitute the Bosniaca collections of the National and University Library in Sarajevo within the framework of UNESCO's International Assistance Programme for the revival of this Library,

4. Appeal to all libraries and other concerned institutions worldwide to assist in the identification of Bosniaca in their collections and to provide, within the limits of their possibilities, title lists, copies of catalogue cards, print outs of related data bases, data bases in machine readable form, etc. as well as microforms of selected titles,

5. Recommend that the main activities related to the reconstitution of Bosniaca should be carried out by the National and University Library in Sarajevo in close cooperation with concerned libraries and institutions in and outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

6. Recommend that the National and University Library in Sarajevo establishes a task force to guide and coordinate the identification of Bosniaca in libraries and other concerned institutions and their possible reconstitution in all possible formats,

7. Recommend that the Bosnian authorities examine the possibilities to affiliate the task force with a library which helds outstanding Bosniaca collections, and establish an office of the task force in this library, preferably in the National Library either of Ljubljana, Vienna or Zagreb,

8. Recommend that UNESCO seeks funding for the operation and equipment of the task force and prepares a project document including the terms of reference of the taskforce and its objectives, outputs and activities."

9. Express their gratitude to the Government of the Czech Republic and the Director and staff of the National Library in Prague for their generous support for the organization of the meeting.

Opinions expressed/published on BosNews/BosNet-B do NOT necessarily always reflect the views of (all of the members of) Editorial Board, and/or moderators, nor any of their host institutions.

Murat Erkocevic <[email protected]>

Dzevat Omeragic <[email protected]>

Davor Wagner <[email protected]>

Nermin Zukic <[email protected]>

[03] Enforcing DPA; Not So Sponanteous In MO

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: A TALE OF TWO CRISES

OMRI Program Brief for Radio Free Europe

Patrick Moore

9 February 1996

The news from Bosnia in recent days has been dominated by two stories that have profound implications for the future of the entire Dayton peace process. The first case involves the government's arrest in a Sarajevo suburb of eight Serbs. Two of the men, General Djordje Djukic and Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic, are suspected of war crimes that include many murders in eastern Bosnia and around Sarajevo itself. The Serbian authorities haved demanded that they be freed and have broken off contacts with the government, the international community's representatives, and with NATO so long as they remain in custody. The government, for its part, says that it is enforcing the Dayton provisions calling for bringing war criminals to justice; and in this it has been seconded by Justice Richard Goldstone of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, based in the Hague. The Serbs respond that they are insisting on freedom of movement, which is also set down in the peace accords.

The second story centers on arbitration by the EU administrator in Mostar, Hans Koschnick, of the internal boundaries within a reunited city. The rejoining of Croatian-controlled western Mostar and the Muslim east is overdue according to the Dayton timetable. The formerly multi-ethnic city now consists of a dynamic Croatian part that in practice acts as though it were -- together with the rest of western Herzegovina -- an extension of Croatia, while the Muslim section is packed with thousands of impoverished refugees caught between the Croats and the Serbs farther east. Koschnick's decision followed the failure of the two sides to agree on an administrative plan. He established a large, ethnically mixed central district, which the Croats say is too big and creates an artificial Muslim majority. Following the announcement of Koschnick's decision on 7 February, violent demonstrations took place in which Croats ransacked EU offices and battered Koschnick's car. Some observers suggested that the protests were not entirely spontaneous; and Bosnian Croat leader and Bosnian Federation President Kresimir Zubak declared that Koschnick's judgment was no valid arbitration but rather "an act of self-will."

Both of these crises can be seen as operating at three levels, all of which bear strongly on the future of the Dayton process. The first is that of immediate issues at hand, which in the one case means keeping the Sarajevo Serbs participating in the meetings and other contacts specified in the treaty. In the other, the question is the reunification of Mostar and the preservation of the authority of its EU administration, both of which are similarly included in the peace documents.

The second level involves somewhat broader political issues that are vital to the Dayton agreement. Where Sarajevo in concerned, the problem centers on keeping the Serbs as part of a government-controlled multi-ethnic capital within a multi-ethnic republic. This is anathema to the nationalist Serbs under Radovan Karadzic and probably to some nationalist Croats or Muslims as well. It also reflects an inherent contradiction in the treaty and in previous Bosnian peace plans: on the one hand it calls for a multi-ethnic state with freedom of movement and the right to return to one's home; and on the other it sets down boundaries of zones controlled by one ethnic group or another, and thus seems to consolidate four years of "ethnic cleansing."

The question of Mostar also contains wider political implications. It involves the future of the Muslim-Croat Federation, which, together with the Republika Srpska, is one of the two pillars of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. If the federation collapses thanks to lingering animosities from the 1993 Croat-Muslim war, or thanks to sabotage by extremists, the entire Dayton structure would come into question. The ultimate result could well be the establishment of a greater Serbia and a greater Croatia, with a tiny but angry rump Muslim state in between. The Muslims would regard themselves as victims of injustice and could become a a source of future instability.

The third level involving the two crises is more abstract but deals with fundamental principles of the Dayton process as a whole. The Sarajevo developments raise the question of bringing war criminals to justice and its relative importance for the future. Many feel that this is the key to real peace, and that it should take precedent over issues like freedom of movement . Such observers would also argue that obtaining justice is more crucial than observing the exact letter of IFOR's mandate, and that NATO should be more assertive in going after war criminals and in preventing evidence of atrocities from being destroyed.

The Mostar crisis raises the question of whether parties to the conflict will be able to resist or wiggle out of supposedly binding arbitration if they so choose. This issue could also arise in talks over limitations of arms and troops, and over setting down the borders of the Brcko corridor.

And finally, central to all this is the question of enforcing compliance with the Dayton treaty. UNPROFOR and the international community until 1995 had a poor record in Bosnia because they were unable or unwilling to set down clear principles and back them up with force. That is no longer the case, since the Dayton treaty is very explicit and IFOR has a much tougher mandate than UNPROFOR ever did. But Dayton is a "voluntary peace" agreed to by three sides, none of which had been decisively defeated on the battlefield and all of which continue to take the advantage whenever they can. It thus remains to be seen whether the international community and NATO have the will to act, which includes pursuading the signatories in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Sarajevo to bring their local subordinates to heel. Failure to act soon and decisively could lead to the collapse of the entire peace.

Opinions expressed/published on BosNews/BosNet-B do NOT necessarily always reflect the views of (all of the members of) Editorial Board, and/or moderators, nor any of their host institutions.

Murat Erkocevic <[email protected]>

Dzevat Omeragic <[email protected]>

Davor Wagner <[email protected]>

Nermin Zukic <[email protected]>