BOSNEWS digest 477 - 23/11/95
BOSNEWS Digest 477
CONTENTS
[01] The Dayton Agreement: Peace with Dishonor
[02] REFUGEES -- RETURN BY DECREE
[01] The Dayton Agreement: Peace with Dishonor
by Stephen Albert, Montreal
The agreement initialed in Dayton by the Presidents of Bosnia, Croatia and
Serbia was less a peace treaty than the legitimization of a political
crime. For the last three and a half years the world has witnessed the
planned systematic destruction of Bosnia, the targeting of civilians in
Sarajevo, the organized rapes, the elimination of Bosnian cultural
heritage. The death camps of Omarska, the scenes of carnage in a besieged
European capital, the innumerable human rights abuses have crossed our TV
screen and entered our hearts. The international community has cried its
indignation over the horror in Bosnia but has been unwilling to sacrifice
its soldiers to bring an end to that horror. The result of this
willingness to defend human rights in principle while abandoning them in
practice is the Dayton Accord.
That agreement reads like an exercise in political schizophrenia. It
declares that Bosnia will continue its existence as united country, than
refugees have a right of return, and that war criminals have no place in a
new Bosnia. Such a clear statement of principle respects the basic tenants
of international law. It is contradicted by the details of the accord. The
accord recognizes Bosnian Serb control of Srebrenica, the scene a few
months ago the slaughter of most of the male population by General
Mladic's militia.
Can Mladic be brought to trial for those murders then the Dayton agreement
rewards him with the fruit of those crimes? Can either Dr. Karadzic or
General Mladic be tried as war criminals when the man who planned, ordered
and supervised the campaign of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia is consecrated
in Dayton as a men of peace?
To ask these questions is to answer them. International law has meaning
only if there are effective mechanisms for its enforcement. Secretary of
State Christofer made it clear at the very beginning of the Dayton talks
that the international tribunal at the Hague and the peace talks were
proceeding on two separate tracks. Thus the tribunal was relegated to the
role of side-show. To separate the real world of political deal making
from the principles of international law is to turn that law into little
more that a vague statement if intent. The failure to punish those
responsible for war crimes in Bosnia and Rwanda has made the International
Convention on Genocide a dead letter.
Do the long term consequences for the system of international justice
outweigh the benefits of peace in Bosnia? To answer that question one must
contemplate the spectacle of the initialing in Dayton. President Milosevic
of Serbia was surely the star of the show, lecturing his audience on the
virtues of peace, compromise and tolerance. It is worth remembering that
while this apostle of peace was preparing his triumphal entry into Dayton
he sent Arkan to the region of Banja Luka to eliminate the few non-Serbs
who might have the misfortune to still be residing there.
The American and European officials present at the ceremonies were
unabashed both in their description of the historic import of the moment
and their role in bringing it about. This after years of moaning about how
their own inaction led to the destruction of the credibility of the
international community. A compromise with basic principle as fundamental
a that reached in Dayton can only be justified by the argument of
political neccesity. To crow about it, as if it were a victory of
principle, is to invite further breaches of international law like those
which are ratified by this treaty.
The proponents of this treaty maintain that it was brought about by the
firm resolve of the West during the recent air campaign against the
Bosnian Srebs and by the effect of the Croatian offensive in Krajina.
Recent events have shown that Serbia was losing its war of aggression in
Bosnia and Croatia. The military balance of power in the region had
changed.
The West could not fail to act in some way after the fall of Srebrenica.
The credibility of international institutions was a stake. What is more,
by showing the vulnerability of the Serbs, the Croatian victory in Krajina
made western inaction seem all the more ridiculous.
The result of bombing campaign and the Croatian-Bosnian offensive
punctured the myth of Serbian invincibility. Serbia needed these talks
more than any of the other `parties to the conflict'. In this context
making the Vance-Owen concept of dividing Bosnia the basis of a
negotiation was pure folly. Such a strategy require pressuring the Bosnian
Government to sign a treaty that froze an unjust situation in place. The
Bosnians were given the choice of fighting on alone or signing.
The American initiative marginalized Sarajevo and made Belgrade the key to
peace. It thus consolidated the regime that was responsible for the war in
the ex-Yugoslavia. Consolidating Mr. Milosevic's power is recipe for
future instability in the region.
The Dayton treaty is thus both unwise and unprincipled. Nobody can
calculate the consequences of our collective lack of will when it come to
applying the principles of human rights.
[02] REFUGEES -- RETURN BY DECREE
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND TO GO HOME BY THE END OF THE MONTH
ZAGREB -- By the end of November, some 122 thousand refugees are to return
to the areas they abandoned in the face of the Serbian secessionist militias.
This concerns the small towns and villages located in the former Serb Krajina,
now rechristened the Banovina, and in Western Slavonia, the territories
retaken by the Croatian army and where mines and high explosives of various
kinds have been cleared away. A start has already been made on refurbishing
infrastructure and railway lines, and to the repairing public buildings and
houses destroyed or damaged during the fighting or by vandals.
The "compulsory repatriation" edict was one of the last actions of the
Valentic government before the elections of 29 October, a decree that caused
much dissatisfaction among the refugees themselves when it was promulgated. It
was for this reason that Jure Radic, the then Vice Premier and Minister of
Reconstruction, made haste to explain the purpose and details of the provision,
to soothe anxieties. .
According to Minister Radic, the return of refugees will take place only
to areas deemed secure and will affect not only Croat refugees but also those
Bosnians (who can, or rather must, return to the liberated areas of Western
Bosnia). Another major element is given by the fact that the "decree to counter
an exodus" also covers Croat or Bosnian refugees with Croatian passports who
have been located in Germany or other European states and who until a few
years ago resided in areas now controlled by the secessionist Serbs: in all
some 90,000 people (for Germany alone).
The only persons not concerned by the repatriation decree for the moment
are the refugees from Eastern Slavonia, where return is obviously impossible
given the continuing Serbian occupation. But with an agreement in Dayton, the
new Matesa government in Croatia will issue a similar provision. This affects
some 77 thousand persons still housed in reception centres or hotels
requisitioned by the government. Not included in the provision either are
Bosnian refugees from areas still occupied by the Serbs or still in combat
zones.
Under the Zagreb government edict, repatriation should have taken place
by 30 November, and refusal or failure to comply with it will result in the
immediate revocation of refugee "status" and loss of all benefits in social
welfare and health matters, monthly assistance payments, humanitarian
assistance, free transport, etc. In other words, those refusing to return will
have to fend for themselves. On the other hand, to ease reintegration, refugees
returning will receive subsidies for repair or rebuilding of destroyed homes,
finance contingent on claims being submitted by 30 November.
Under the Croatian government decree, finally, preferential treatment
will be provided to those who agree to resettle in houses or dwellings
provisionally requisitioned in the former occupied areas (defined as being of
"strategic importance") belonging to the Serb population. In these so-called
"strategic areas" five thousand dwellings are being built and next year another
20 thousand are to be made available.
The government still has not provided details concerning the numbers of
refugees who have so far complied with the decree, though several thousand
expellees are known to have left the Rijeka area, Istria and Dalmatia.
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